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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of the emergence and 
development of «new unionism» in Pernambuco, Brazil (1978-89). 
The analysis is based on a sample of six trade unions: 1) the 
Metalworkers’ Union; 2) the Bank Workers’ Union; 3) the Data 
Processing Workers’ Union; 4) the Urban (Electricity and 
Water) Workers* Union; 5) the Private Schools Teachers* Union; 
and 6) the Pernambuco State Schools Teachers* Association.
The principal objective of this thesis is to analyse and 
discuss a number of issues raised by the «new unionism». These 
are related to its emphasis on a new kind of relationship 
between union leaders and the rank-and-file. I analyse the 
tensions between the radicalism of policies put forward by 
«new unionist» leaders and their concern for responsiveness 
towards demands arising from the workplace and strategies 
aimed at reconciling radical proposals with the true interests 
of the rank-and-file. I have taken four aspects in order to 
analyse the development of the «new unionism»: union
bureaucracy and militancy; union democracy; demands, internal 
segmentation of the working class, union policies and 
militancy; and finally, union strategies, levels of 
negotiation and the State in Brazil.
Thus, another aspect analysed here is the Michelsian 
problem, namely whether or not union officials develop 
interests of their own which are different, and sometimes 
opposite, to the interests of the rank-and-file. I argue 
throughout this thesis that this relationship is socially 
constructed and that such a relationship must be understood 
in terms of the degree of reporting back to the membership,
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and responsiveness towards the demands of the rank-and-file. 
Thus, the major subject discussed in the thesis revolves 
around the theme of representativeness.
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INTRODUCTX ON 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: «NEW UNIONISM» ,
DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
1. THE PROBLEM
This work is about the emergence of the «new unionism» 
in the late 1970s and its development in the Brazil of the 
1980s. It deals with the re-emergence of trade unions in the 
political arena as representatives of the workers in what is 
a neglected region in terms of previous studies of urban trade 
unionism in Brazil: Pernambuco state. The period analysed here 
is related to the history of urban trade unionism in 
Pernambuco in the final part of the «darkest» period of the 
political history of Brazil and the first years of civilian 
rule after more than 20 years of military government. 
Specifically, this work is about the theme of 
representativeness within the union movement. In other words, 
it is about the nature of the relationship between «top and 
bottom», leaders and lay members, in labour organizations.
When the workers and their unions re-appeared in the 
political arena with the big strikes of 1978-79, many 
scholars, the press, politicians, and political and union 
militants began to speak of a «new unionism». Apart from the 
academic debate on the nature of this «new unionism^ and the 
implications of its political significance for labour action, 
which will be summarized below, union leaders themselves spoke 
of a new kind of relationship between the unions and their 
members. There was not only a criticism of the role imposed
, 10
on the unions by the State, but also the advocacy of a new 
relationship between unions and rank-and-file. In other words, 
the «old guard» was not only to blame for accepting the role 
imposed by the State, but also for failing to implement strong 
ties with the rank-and-file. This means that the 
implementation of a new relationship between unions and the 
membership was to be the basis for changes in other spheres 
of union action. Thus, this thesis explores the theme of this 
new relationship by trying to answer the following general 
question: how far have the unions become more representative 
of the interests arising from the membership in the late 1970s 
and throughout the 1980s in Brazil? At the basis of this 
question lies a more general question which is related to the 
very nature of the «new unionism».
I argue throughout this thesis that a new relationship 
has been developing and shaping new identities both for the 
radical union officials and militants, and the members 
themselves. As will be demonstrated, this new relationship is 
not only related to recognizing the interests of the rank-and- 
file, but also to creating forms of participation through 
which union members become involved in the internal affairs 
of the unions.
I also argue that the fact that new identities have been 
shaped implies that the political agenda of the «new unionism^ 
is a changing one. With this phrase I wish to suggest that, 
in spite of their political platform, «new unionist» officials 
and militants have a commitment towards involving the 
membership in the process of decision-making.
However, I also show that this new relationship is found 
in varying degrees. In other words, the unions do not have a
11
recurrent pattern of behaviour. The cases vary according to 
the different degrees of commitment of union officials towards 
improvement in the relationship between «top and bottom».
2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN «TOP AND BOTTOM*: THE ACADEMIC 
CONTRIBUTION ON THE BRAZILIAN «NEW UNIONISM*
In this section I address a general question related to 
the nature of the «new unionism* in terms of the relationship 
between unions and workers by providing a discussion of the 
work of some authors who have, directly or indirectly, written 
on the emergence of the «new unionism*.
The aim of Maroni [1982] is to analyse the meaning of the 
strikes of May 1978 in the main automobile plants of Sao 
Paulo. By looking at these conflicts, she tries to explain how 
they emerged through strikes. She points to two main causes: 
factory/workers* committees and factory assemblies. She also 
analyses the role played by strategic sector workers in the 
success of the strike movement. According to her, the role of 
these skilled workers must be put in its proper place since 
the metalworkers had a high level of organization symbolised 
by the factory/workers’ committees. On the other hand, she 
also shows that significant movements which followed were 
propelled by unskilled workers who questioned the capitalist 
control of the labour process without the leadership of a 
labour aristocracy.
Her work seems to indicate that the relationship between 
the unions and the categorias was turned upside down by the 
spontaneous action of the workers. By pointing out the fact 
that these protests were led by factory/workers* committees,
12
she implicitly shows, on the one hand, that the unions were 
not properly representing the workers because some pelegcJ 
union officials even stood against the strikes with arguments 
similar to the arguments used by the entrepreneurs. On the 
other hand, her work shows that even in the face of non­
representative union officials, the rank-and-file may 
undertake action not foreseen by union officials or 
entrepreneurs. In this case, the wishes of the rank-and-file 
were pursued by workplace organizations which would better 
express interests arising from the shop-floor.
Sader [1988] analyses what seems to him to be the 
emergence of a new form of labour organization in Brazil. In 
order to explain how conflicts emerged in Greater Sao Paulo 
in the 1970s, he takes two points: the appearance of new union 
leaders and the formation of union oppositions.
As an example of new leaders, Sader analyses the case of 
the Metalworkers* Union of Sao Bernardo (Sao Paulo state). Its 
officials did not constitute an opposition group who won union 
elections and transformed the union. Indeed, there is a 
continuity between this group and the group which «inherited» 
the union from the military after the intervention following 
the 1964 coup, the changes being due to what he calls a 
«transformation from inside» because of pressure from below.
In other cases, where union officials did not change 
their conservative attitudes, this produced a strong 
opposition group supported by several factions within the 
labour movement.
 ^ In Brazilian union jargon pelego defines a kind of 
union official who supports either the government or/and the 
employers.
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For the purposes of this thesis, these elements indicate 
that in the Brazil of the 1970s the relationship between union 
officials and rank-and-file was renovated both by official and 
unofficial leaders and/or groups. In fact, on the one hand, 
the first case shows that the relationship between «top and 
bottom» changed because of the action of official leaders, due 
to pressure from below. On the other hand, where the union 
officials resisted any changes, not only was there pressure 
from below, but the rank-and-file also developed forms of 
organization at shop-floor level in order to pursue their 
interests.
Antunes [1988] argues that workers, 1978, went 
spontaneously on strike mainly because of low wages. It seems 
that the union did not participate in the organization of the 
strike at the Saab-Scania plant. But, by striking without a 
formal organization, the Saab-Scania workers were unable to 
negotiate with the employers. Thus, the union was called in 
to negotiate the demands put forward by the workers.
Antunes*s work shows another interesting case of the 
relationship between union officials and the rank-and-file. 
In fact, although he does not say that union officials did not 
pursue rank-and-file interests, his work shows that even when 
the unions do not organize the rank-and-file politically, the 
workers can develop independent action regardless of union 
policies. However, the rank-and-file had to resort to the 
union, because it developed spontaneous action without the 
coordination of any organization at the workplace and was 
unable to negotiate directly with the employers.
According to Moises [1982], workers* protests in the 
1970s were possible due to the emergence of new leaders who
14
were able to synthesize demands containing new specific claims 
related to the modern plant workers and to what he calls 
«grassroots mobilization», which would be expressed by 
factory/workers* committees and, in general, by the union 
oppositions.
These two factors are important as signs of a change in 
the relationship between unions and rank-and-file, for they 
point to a change directed from below. In fact, even when 
Moists speaks of a new leadership, he does not refer to 
official leaders but rather to the general term, labour 
leaders. On the other hand, the fact that he also points to 
the existence of factory/workers* committees seems to indicate 
that the interests of the workers, in this context, were 
pursued by autonomous shop-floor organizations rather than by 
committed union leaders.
Tavares de Almeida's thesis [1975] is that the 
development of capitalism in Brazil with its modern factories 
created new ranks inside the structure of the working class, 
stimulating the emergence of a «labour aristocracy)), whose 
demands would be differentiated from the rest of the working 
classes' demands. According to her, these workers would have 
demands of their own and would constitute a «labour 
aristocracy» separated from the rest of the working class. 
Their demands were not able to unite all segments of the 
Brazilian working class. Thus, the conclusion she reaches is 
that unionism in Greater Sao Paulo would be business- 
orientated trying to avoid party politics.
Tavares de Almeida's work cannot immediately be assessed 
as an analysis of the relationship between unions and their 
constituents as, for instance, in the tradition of studies on
15
union internal politics. However, she offers some general 
insights into the relationship between some unions (or union 
leaders) and the workers at large. In fact, when she analysis 
the political action of the workers of the modern plants in 
Brazil and reaches the conclusion that their demands could not 
be extended to Brazil as a whole because of the specific 
nature of their demands and because of their conservative 
political attitude, she is implying that there would be a gap 
between the interests of some workers who could exert 
leadership in the politico-economic contests and the interests 
of the majority of the workers. We can extend her conclusions 
by considering the fact that not all workers represented by 
a given union would be members of this privileged labour 
aristocracy. In fact, if we were to accept her basic premise, 
this would mean that there is a gap between the interests of 
this privileged group and the interests of those members who 
are not members of a labour aristocracy. In short, if the 
union(s) was (were) dominated by a labour aristocracy, this 
would lead to a pessimistic conclusion on the relationship 
between union leaders and the rank-and-file.
Contrary to Tavares de Almeida’s thesis, Humphrey 
([1979b]; [1980]; and [1982]) shows that there is no such
«labour aristocracy» in Brazil. Indeed, there is a working 
class in the automobile industry earning wages higher than the 
rest of the working class. However, these wages are not high 
to the point where this new working class is detached from the 
rest of the working class. Humphrey shows that most of these 
workers would face problems if they were to find a new job. 
This means that their position is not secure enough to take 
industrial action of their own as implied by Tavares de
16
Almeida. The workers in this sector who are most secure in 
their jobs are the highly-skilled ones. These are the most 
likely to take industrial action because of their position in 
the labour market. In other words, workers have different 
degrees of control over the labour process and in the labour 
market, but their grievances are the same as those put forward 
by their fellow-workers.
Humphrey does not directly analyse the relationship 
between a given union leadership and the rank-and-file. 
However, his analysis can lend us some insights in terms of 
the role of a given union leadership and the workers. 
Humphrey’s analysis leads to another conclusion quite 
different from what was suggested by Tavares de Almeida. In 
fact, one might conclude that there is no gap between the 
interests of both the metalworkers of the ABC paulista and 
workers at large. This means that one must not consider that 
some categorias or groups of workers would isolate themselves 
from the rest of the working class by pursuing selfish goals 
regardless of the interests of the workers and without 
fighting for more radical politico-economic demands. The 
implication of Humphrey’s works is that the leading role 
played by the ABC paulista9s working class would be better 
interpreted as a vanguard role, that is, a group with strong 
political commitment towards the pursuit of the interests of 
the workers, whether by not detaching itself from the workers* 
general interests, or in terms of guidance of the workers in 
their action in support of claims.
Although none of the authors discussed above proposed an 
analysis of the relationship between unions and members, union 
officials and the rank-and-file, union leaders and the
17
workers, their works bring into play a wider implication for 
the study of this subject. In fact, by analysing the emergence 
of the «new unionism» they all had to consider the role played 
either by the official union leadership or by informal 
leaders. In doing so, they pointed to the birth of a new 
relationship between these two poles.
3. DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
3.1. The Question of Union Democracy
Michels [1962] posed a general question mark on the issue 
of democracy inside trade unions by arguing that labour 
organizations - parties and trade unions - inevitably develop 
trends towards oligarchy. According to him, there is an 
inescapable tendency for union officials to develop interests 
of their own which are not only different from but also 
opposed to the interests of the union members. Because of its 
definitive character, Michels*s thesis gained the status of 
a sociological law, which he reinforced himself by calling it 
an «iron law of oligarchy)*.
Subsequent studies such as that by Lipset et al. [1977] 
led to the same conclusion. Indeed, the fact that their 
findings pointed to the existence of democracy inside the 
International Typographical Union (ITU) was to be seen as an 
exception which confirmed the «law» stated by Michels, because 
of the particular characteristics found in this union.
Edelstein and Warner [1975] challenged the conclusions 
both of Michels and Lipset et al. They showed, by resorting 
to an organizational theory of union democracy, that trade
18
unions might or might not be democratic organizations. Their 
theory was built around a model which focused on electoral 
results (closeness of elections), existence of contested 
elections, existence of organized opposition groups and 
turnover of incumbent leaders for the assessment of the degree 
of democracy within a given union.
3.2. The Question of Representativeness
Recent studies on internal union politics have put the 
spotlight on the dynamics of the relationship between union 
officials and the membership. These studies have moved away 
from a strict view on democratic procedures resembling general 
political systems to pay attention to the channels and 
procedures through which the participation of the union 
membership is secured. Thus, these studies have examined 
issues like the degrees of accountability, i.e., the extent 
to which the leadership reports back to lay members, and of 
representativeness, i.e., the extent to which the leadership 
is committed to pursuing the interests of the rank-and-file.
Fosh and Cohen [1990] carried out research in 5 British
labour organizations and showed that there were different
degrees of union democracy in these unions when considering
the commitment of union officials to both accountability and
representativeness. They tested these factors against a number
of variables and found that the degree of union democracy has
more to do with
"...the interaction between...leaders and members' 
commitment to collectivism and leadership style with the 
threats and challenges posed by management...[than] with 
institutional factors...,the influence of national union 
and the particular attributes of the membership..." (Fosh
19
& Cohen [1990:138]).
On the other hand, Heery and Kelly [1990] have also 
focused their analysis on patterns of collaboration between 
union officials at various levels and the rank-and-file. They 
drew their research questions from questions put forward by 
both the Michelsian tradition and Marxist theorists of union 
bureaucratization. These two traditions predict that there is 
an inevitable gap between the union leaders* and members* 
interests. Moreover, authors working within the Marxist 
framework have suggested that this gap is due both to the fact 
that union leaders develop a conservative political culture 
which allows for and accepts managers* control over the 
workers and to the essentially progressive nature of the rank- 
and-file .
Heery and Kelly show that such does not take place, at 
least in the unions analysed by them. Indeed, they found a 
widespread pattern of co-operation and interdependence between 
union officials and members. Moreover, they found that union 
officials are more likely to propose radical demands than lay 
members are. In other words, they did not find evidence to 
support the claim that union officials are conservative and 
try to decrease the demands of a radical, progressive rank- 
and-file, according to the wishes of the management.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that union officials 
impose their radical demands on the rank-and-file. In fact, 
by showing that there is a chain of co-operation between these 
two poles, Heery and Kelly demonstrate that there is a two-way 
relationship between them. In other words, union leaders are 
committed to reporting back to the members and, at the same 
time, they try to be responsive to the interests of the
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members. Then, Heery and Kelly introduce the concept of 
«participatory leadership» to explain the fact that although 
union officials are committed to accountability and 
representativeness, they keep some discretion when 
negotiating.
Away from the studies on union democracy and degree of 
representativeness in trade unions, recent theoretical 
contributions in political thinking suggest that the concept 
of representativeness is not necessarily linked to a 
statistical resemblance between the representative and those 
represented (Cf. Laclau [1991a] and [1991b]). Indeed, it is 
not only a relationship through which the representative (in 
the case of this thesis, the union officials) simply voice the 
wishes of those represented, but it also expresses the idea 
that the representative is an active social agent who 
interprets and shapes the interests of, and constitutes the 
identity of those represented (Laclau [1990a:12] and [1990b: 
15ff]).
4. THE OBJECT OF THE THESIS
The starting point of this thesis, as pointed out above, 
is the analysis of the relationship between «new unionism» 
unions and the rank-and-file. The «new unionism» emerged with 
demands for changes in the relationship between «top and 
bottom». By doing so, they criticized the «old guard» 
officials for being attached to power and unwilling to 
properly represent the workers* interests. In other words, 
«new unionist» militants and officials pointed to the fact 
that there would be a gap, in the Michelsian sense, between
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the interests of the «old guard» officials and those of the 
rank-and-file. Thus, a further aspect to be analysed is the 
classical problem put forward by Michels, namely that there 
is an inevitable gap between union leaders* and members* 
interests.
The «old guard» run trade unions were hardly 
representative of their members or of the categoria. More than 
one author has pointed to the fact that conservative officials 
were able to run unions irrespective of their level of 
membership. In fact, the imposto sindical (union tax) allowed 
for the existence of unions which were able to survive 
regardless of whether they affiliated N-l or N+l workers. 
Indeed, many conservative officials preferred a low rate of 
membership because this would mean weak pressure on the 
financial resources of the union to be spent on social 
assistance services.
On the other hand, the repressive military government did 
not allow for fair conditions for opposition groups to act or 
for the presence of more militant officials who would actively 
pursue the interests of the workers.
These facts in combination allowed for the existence of 
an environment which resembled that anticipated by Michels*s 
«iron law of oligarchy». In fact, it is difficult to trace any 
signs of democratic rule or representativeness in Brazilian 
trade unions in the years which followed the 1964 coup up to 
the emergence of the «new unionism».
The «new unionism» emerged with demands for or a 
political agenda which was directed towards reshaping the role 
the unions were to play in society by means of reshaping the 
very nature of their relationship with their members, in
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particular, and the categorias in general. In fact, «new 
unionist» officials do not conceive of their posts as a job 
for life. They are to stay in power as long as they represent 
the categorias* interests (Cf. Mangabeira [1991:42]).
Thus, the aim of this thesis is the analysis of how far 
«new unionism» unions have achieved the goal they set 
themselves for a better representation of the workers after 
a decade of militancy.
Stated as a law as Michels* s thesis is, it does not allow 
much room for manoeuvre. However, instead of considering it 
as a law, I take his thesis as a starting point for a social 
investigation which will allow me to question the nature of 
the relationship between «top and bottom», union officials and 
members.
Therefore, I shall not consider from the outset that 
union officials inevitably develop interests of their own 
which are not only different but sometimes opposite to the 
interests of the workers. Instead, I shall put forward the 
idea that this relationship is socially shaped, made, and 
remade.
This means that in this thesis the existence of
democratic unions is not seen as an exception to the rule as
stated by Lipset et al. On the other hand, the existence of 
democracy inside trade unions is not seen here as necessarily 
resembling political systems or electoral mechanisms, an idea
present in Edelstein and Warner’s model.
Instead, I shall take the path of more recent evidence 
in this field by which the mechanisms for participation of, 
accountability to, and representativeness of the rank-and-file 
allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of the
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relationship between union officials and the rank-and-file.
However, by taking this approach I shall not take the 
naive step of considering that union officials only represent 
the rank-and-file as long as they only pursue the interests 
expressed by the workers. Nor that union officials who impose 
«true» interests on the rank-and-file, an idea present in the 
Marxist tradition in which an enlightened vanguard knows what 
is best for the workers, are more representative than any 
other officials of any other political persuasion.
This means that I shall take a more complex definition 
of representativeness. This definition embodies the idea that 
the relationship between the representative and those 
represented is a two-way one. In other words, it means that 
both poles are capable of influencing and shaping the identity 
of each other. In this way, union officials are representative 
of the rank-and-file as long as they interpret and pursue the 
interests of the rank-and-file. A complement to this is the 
fact that union officials should report back to their 
constituents, which is expressed by the idea of 
accountability.
A final point of this definition is related to aspects 
of this relationship in which union officials take the lead 
and propose new themes which could be of interest to the rank- 
and-file. This point combined with the fact that union 
officials are able to interpret and shape the goals and 
interests of the rank-and-file are expressed in this thesis 
by the concept of «participatory leadership», which is 
borrowed from Heery and Kelly [1990:90, 94].
In order to carry out an analysis of the nature of the 
relationship between union officials and the rank-and-file
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within the realm of the «new unionism», four sensitive areas 
have been chosen. Two are related to internal aspects of union 
life, whereas two are related to external aspects. The first 
area analysed in this thesis is the organizational apparatus 
of the unions. This is related to the apparatus providing 
social services for the members, the union finances and the 
workplace organization. Social services provided by the unions 
as well as the financial resources available for 
implementation of union policies are thought to be an area 
around which considerable disagreement could emerge because 
of the number of proposals as to how these issues should be 
handled. The organization at workplace level has been thought 
of as providing a new channel for wider participation of the 
rank-and-file in union life.
Secondly, there is analysis of the very mechanism of 
formal political activity inside the unions. The aim is, on 
the one hand, the test of the predictions of Michels, Lipset 
et al. , and, on the other, how effective Edelstein and 
Warner’s electoral model is for grasping the dynamics of 
internal union politics.
Turning to external aspects of union life, there is 
further analysis of the area related to new demands and how 
this is handled by the unions. The roles of both union 
officials and workers are analysed, i.e., the extent to which 
either side proposes new issues to be negotiated as well as 
the creation of channels for providing wider participation, 
in the process of drawing up the lists of demands, of the 
workers represented.
Lastly, one final area around which there might be some 
discrepancy in terms of how to deal with it, is related to the
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negotiation of these demands expressed in lists of demands. 
This has to do with the paths to achieve settlement of labour 
disputes. Thus, the relation between the unions and their 
members, on the one hand, and between these and employers and 
the State, on the other, is analysed bearing in mind the fact 
that the «new unionist» officials had a clear proposal about 
the role of the State in negotiations. This is checked against 
the evidence arising from the different patterns of 
negotiation that the unions of my sample have to undertake.
5. THE CASES UNDER INVESTIGATION
Six trade unions were chosen as objects for this study. 
They were chosen on the grounds that their particular 
characteristics would ensure the achievement of the objectives 
of this thesis. The sample, in spite of its small size, was 
balanced in order to secure that general characteristics of 
other unions would be present in the analysis.
I decided to investigate these cases because I opted for 
a comparative analysis of the particular history of some 
unions. It was felt from the beginning that, in spite of all 
the findings that a study of a «representative», though 
particular, union might provide, a representative sample would 
ensure that a much fuller analysis could be achieved by 
comparing different unions representing various categorias in 
a number of economic sectors. In fact, if I had decided to 
analyse only one union, all findings of the cases displayed 
and analysed throughout this thesis would be missing.
As mentioned above, the main objective of this thesis is 
the analysis of the new relationship between «top and bottom»,
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union officials and members, brought about by the «new 
unionism». However, there is not only one «new unionism». The 
myriad of political persuasions acting within it sometimes 
accounts for different views, approaches and policies to 
particular problems faced by the unions. Thus, for instance, 
anarchists, communists, independent leftists, Stalinists, 
catholics and so on, all of them acting in «new unionism» 
unions, may form different alliances and take different paths 
to implement «new unionist» policies. Because of this, I have 
decided to study a number of unions which might allow me to 
make comparisons from their particular history. Moreover, the 
investigation is on «new unionism» unions, which implies that 
there is a tacit comparison with unions run by «old guard» 
officials. Thus, I have also decided to include some unions 
which were run by conservative officials. At the time of the 
fieldwork, all unions were run by «new unionist» officials, 
but at least one of them - the Bank Workers* Union - had been 
run by conservative officials well into the 1980s. Three were 
won by «new unionists» in the late 1970s and/or early 1980s. 
One was run, for some time, by an alliance of conservative and 
communist officials and the last has been run since its 
foundation by «new unionist» officials.
This diversity of experiences along with characteristics 
such as categorias represented, economic sectors (secondary 
or tertiary, public or private) from which workers are 
unionized, and political affiliations would assure a number 
of comparisons which might allow for significant 
conclusions^.
2
Details of the unions under investigation in this 
thesis are given in chapter II.
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The period here investigated is roughly from 1978-79 up 
to 1989. The period 1978-79 was that which witnessed the first 
big strikes in the country after the 1964 coup and these have 
been accepted by different scholars as the beginning of a new 
era for trade unions in Brazil. The first strikes in the 
country during this period occurred in Sao Paulo state, but 
as early as 1979 the first strikes and other militant action 
began taking place in Pernambuco state. In fact, as will be 
shown in chapter II, radical militants of different 
persuasions had been in action since the mid-1970s, but their 
actions became more «visible» from 1978-79 onwards. Finally, 
in 1989 two decades came to a close. Firstly the decade of the 
1980s, and the first strikes and other militant action in 
Pernambuco saw their 10th anniversary, which seems a good date 
for a balance.
At first all studies on the unionism which emerged from 
the 1978-79 strikes were based on the Sao Paulo case. In fact, 
Sao Paulo state, being the richest and most developed of the 
Brazilian states, has unique characteristics in terms of the 
diversity of its working class. Studies carried out in Sao 
Paulo were intended to hold good for Brazil as a whole.
During the 1980s a number of studies without any trace 
of «regionalism» were carried out in other Brazilian states 
(Cf. Castro [1990]; and Mangabeira [1991]). These studies were 
intended to analyse cases outside the Sao Paulo case and show 
the wide diversity of paths followed by the «new unionism». 
This thesis was carried out in Pernambuco state. It does not 
have the aim of proving the Sao Paulo case either right or 
wrong. The simple aim is to enrich the studies on the 
Brazilian working class by supplying evidence and arriving at
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conclusions which could be tested against evidence and 
conclusions of other studies carried out in other regions or 
states.
However, in spite of being restricted to a particular 
state and to some unions, there is no evidence to prove that 
the characteristics of this state are different from other 
Brazilian states that one could not generalize the findings 
of this study to the experience of Brazil as a whole. On the 
other hand, as mentioned above, the unions present in my 
sample share with other unions of the country representing the 
same categorias common characteristics which would allow for 
generalization of the conclusions here arrived at. Moreover, 
as will be shown throughout this thesis, some unions maintain 
strong ties with their counterparts in other states, 
particularly during wage campaigns in cases where these are 
undertaken nationally. Others which do not experience 
nationally conducted wage campaigns have sought to share with 
other unions in the country their experiences under the 
umbrella of the Workers' United Central (CUT). These facts 
combined could be taken with confidence as signs that the 
conclusions arrived at here may be extended to an 
understanding of the new relationship, brought about by the 
«new unionism», between unions and their members, in 
particular, and between unions and the categorias in general.
6. THE STUDY QUESTIONS
A number of questions act as a guide to this study in the 
sense that the data collected will be checked against them. 
These are related to general aspects of the «new unionism^ and
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to the cases under investigation in this thesis.
1) Are «new unionist» officials more concerned with
responsiveness towards the rank-and-file than the 
conservative officials?;
2) Are «new unionist» officials more concerned with
accountability, i.e., reporting back to the categoria, 
than conservative officials?;
3) Are «new unionism» run unions more representative of their
members* interests than conservative run unions?;
4) Are «new unionism» unions more democratic than unions run
by conservative officials?;
5) Are «new unionism» unions more likely to go on strike than
conservative unions?;
6) Is a large social assistance service apparatus more likely
to produce less militant attitudes on the part of the 
unions or, in turn, would a small social assistance 
service apparatus be more likely to produce more militant 
attitudes on the part of the unions?;
7) What is the impact of shop-floor organization on the
bargaining power of the unions?;
8) What is the impact of shop-floor organization on the issues
of democracy, accountability, responsiveness and 
representativeness of the unions?;
9) Is the existence of factions, groups, parties and so on
likely to produce more democratic unions?;
10) What is the impact of repressive measures taken both by
employers and the State on the internal politics of the 
unions?;
11) Are the demands put forward by the «new unionism^ only
related to small segments of the working class?;
12) Is there an actual gap between the interests of union
officials and those of the rank-and-file when one 
considers the demands put forward by the «new unionism»?;
13) Is the attitude of «new unionism» unions towards the
presence of the State in negotiations something stated 
from the outset?;
14) What is the impact of nationally conducted wage 
negotiations on the role of individual unions in terms 
of their representativeness?;
15) What is the impact of more (or less) concentrated wage
negotiations on the profile of the unions?
7. THE THESIS STRUCTURE
This thesis has an introduction and seven chapters 
dealing with different aspects related to problems of 
democracy and representativeness faced by the «new unionism». 
In this introduction I have outlined the main problem under 
investigation by discussing some contributions both in terms 
of works directly related to Brazilian trade unionism as well 
as other works which are related to the general theoretical 
aspect discussed in this thesis. I have also pointed out the 
main questions which will guide this study.
Chapter I considers three aspects. Firstly, I provide the 
reader with a description of the main historical moments of 
the Brazilian labour movement. Secondly, I consider the 
principal aspects of Brazilian labour legislation and its 
implications for the labour and union movements. Finally, I 
provide some insights in the economic environment with 
particular emphasis on the 1980s. This is intended as a
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background to the political fights of the union movement.
Chapter II is a historical analysis of the labour 
movement in Pernambuco from the beginning of the 20th-century 
up to the end of the 1980s and a brief description of the 
unions under investigation in this thesis. This is intended 
to give the reader a background to the scene from which the 
«new unionism» emerged in Pernambuco in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
The data gathered is displayed and analysed from chapters 
III to VI. Chapter III concerns a discussion of the relation 
between union «bureaucracy», social assistance services 
provided by the unions and patterns of union militancy. I 
analyse the approach of «new unionist» leaders to these 
problems and how they were dealt with in the context of 
concern for democracy and representativeness inside the 
unions. Chapter IV is directly related to the discussion of 
union democracy and «new unionism». I discuss some theories 
of union democracy and proceed to a test of Edelstein and 
Warner’s electoral model by using the data collected in the 
unions of my sample. Furthermore, I suggest that such a model 
has a number of shortcomings which do not allow us to properly 
grasp the problem of the relationship between leaders and the 
rank-and-file within labour organizations. I also provide an 
analysis of aspects neglected by such a model and consider the 
implications of these aspects as regards understanding the 
internal politics of trade unions.
Chapter V contains a discussion related to the new 
demands put forward by the «new unionism». Many analysts of 
the «new unionism» see it as the expression of new demands 
arising from the workplace. Some even saw it as the expression
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of a labour aristocracy. I discuss these aspects and argue, 
following other authors, that there is no labour aristocracy 
in Brazil. However, I discuss the data collected by showing 
that there are some internal divisions in the union movement 
arising from the privileged position of some workers. 
Moreover, in the face of high inflation rates during the 1980s 
in Brazil, I show that some workers were able to get wage 
increases without the help of their unions. Therefore, I 
develop an analysis of union policies through which they have 
attempted to unite different positions within the categorias. 
In other words, I analyse the data bearing in mind the problem 
of the representativeness of the unions. That is, I consider 
whether the unions have pursued the interests of the workers 
or the interests of restricted groups inside the unions. 
Chapter VI contains a discussion of the relationship between 
the unions, employers and the Brazilian State in the 1980s in 
terms of negotiations. The «new unionism» emerged with demands 
for direct negotiations with employers. In fact, labour 
disputes were characterized by the presence of the State in 
the settlement of disputes through a number of mechanisms. 
Therefore, I analyse the new relationship between unions, 
employers and the State by taking into consideration aspects 
like the expectations of the rank-and-file, the policies put 
forward by the «new unionism» leaders on their own account, 
the willingness of the employers to talk directly to the 
unions without the mediation of the State, and the willingness 
of the State to give up its historical role as an arbitrator 
of labour disputes in Brazil.
Finally, chapter VII is a conclusion in which I state the 
main theoretical findings and contributions of this thesis
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towards the understanding of the dynamics of democracy within, 
and the representativeness of, the «new unionism» in Brazil 
through the analysis of data collected in a Brazilian state 
which is outside the main economic region of the country. I 
also provide a discussion of the contribution this thesis 
lends to a wider understanding of the problem of democracy and 
representativeness inside labour organizations.
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CHAPTER I
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT, THE STATE AND 
ECONOMY IN BRAZIL
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to provide a historical 
analysis of the Brazilian labour movement in the context of 
which the labour movement in Pernambuco has developed. To add 
the proper perspective, on the other hand, I shall also 
provide a description of the relationship between the State 
and the labour and union movements by describing the legal 
corner-stones on which the State has based its presence within 
union life. Finally, I shall analyse the development of the 
Brazilian economy from 1964 onwards. This is necessary in 
order to frame the political, social and economic environment 
in which the Brazilian labour and union movements have 
developed.
I shall start by analysing the wider historical context, 
that is, by providing a brief analysis of the history of 
Brazilian trade unionism. My analysis emphasizes mainly the 
period from 1964, the year when a coup d ’etat took place. This 
is an important turning-point in the history of trade unionism 
in Brazil as will be shown below.
In order to analyse this history, I will be using the 
periods into which the 20th-century Brazilian history has been 
divided. These periods are as follows: 1) the Republica Velha, 
from 1889 to 1930; 2) the Vargas government, from 1930 to
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1945; 3) the populist period, from 1945 to 1964; and 4) the 
period since 1964. Although the military government ended in 
1985, I will not use this as a dividing line. Instead, I will 
arrange this period into two as follows: 1) from 1964 to 1978; 
and 2) from 1978 to 1989. The reason for doing so is that from 
1978 a wave of strikes started to hit the country. Most
Brazilian scholars on trade unionism consider this year to be 
a watershed in the history of Brazilian trade unionism.
2. A HISTORY OF LABOUR MOVEMENT IN BRAZIL
2.1. From 1889 to 1930
At the beginning of this century the labour movement in 
Brazil was influenced mainly by the anarcho-syndicalist 
ideology of Italian immigrants. The anarchists had succeed in 
establishing the first true labour organization which 
resembled trade unions. Before the anarchists became 
hegemonic, workers had established some labour associations 
in the late 19th-century. However, these associations were 
only intended for mutual help of the retired, the elderly, 
health assistance, etc. (Bernardo [1982:32-3]).
During the First Workers* Congress, in 1906, the
anarchists condemned the mutual associations because these 
organizations, with their emphasis upon mutualism, social 
assistance and cooperativism would shift the true focus of the 
workers* struggle from the actual fight: that against the
capitalists (Bernardo [1982:44]).
The anarchists did not espouse the idea of creating a
political party. Instead, they proposed a sort of
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revolutionary unionism whose main function was not to fight 
for better wages and working conditions, but to fight 
capitalism through strikes, protests, and even violence.
The anarchists were hegemonic until around 1917 when 
their influence began to decrease. The Russian Revolution of 
1917 was an important event influencing the foundation of the 
Communist Party in Brazil. Unlike the anarchists, the 
communists tried to politicize the labour movement, in the 
sense that unions were also to fight capital in day-to-day 
life, instead of being only unions for resistance in search 
for the final confrontation - the anarchists* big strike - 
which would bring about the final demise of capitalism. During 
the 1920s, the anarchists lost their hegemony, and the 
communists became hegemonic, at least in this first period 
(Fausto [1976]; Fiichtner [1980:28-34]; Maram [1979]; Sarti 
[1981]; and Telles [1981]).
However, the opposition of the anarchists towards actions 
which "would improve capitalism" did not mean that they 
excluded pursuit of claims for better wages and working 
conditions. Indeed, there was a general call for the 
regulation of working conditions. However, the Brazilian State 
did not recognize labour problems as social problems and dealt 
with labour protests as a case for the police (Buchanan [1989: 
76]; Gomes [1979]; Martins [1979]; J.A. Rodrigues [1968]; 
Simao [1981]; and Vianna [1978b]).
In this period, workers were subject to 1) working 14 
hours a day and had no vacations; 2) the work of children and 
women was not regulated; and 3) there was not any state 
sponsored social and medical assistance. For, in Brazil, the 
social problems related to labour were thought of within the
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framework of an old liberalism supported by the Brazilian 
dominant classes.
Any urging for regulation of labour problems was met with
the reasoning that socio-labour relations should be regulated
by the market’s hidden-hand. Any legislation on this matter
would mean an undesirable interference of the State between
two free citizens: the employee and the employer (Cf. Gomes
[1979]). In the words of Martins [1979:183],
"The structure of the State was a liberal, fiscal and 
police one, and the unions operated to achieve regulation 
of urban labour and to transform society".
On the other hand, in this period, unions were not 
regulated by the State. There were no legal constraints 
linking them to the State. There was, then, a degree of 
freedom to organize. And, in addition, union plurality, while 
the State did not regulate union activities. Indeed, if one 
can speak about regulation, it was synonymous with violent 
police repression of workers.
2.2. From 1930 to 1945
In 1930, a coup d ’dtat occurred. With this coup, known 
as the Revolugao de 30, the situation changed because of the 
new approach of the State towards labour problems (Cf. Almeida 
& Lowy [1976: 104]; Bernardo [1982:78-122]; and Fuchtner
[1980:39-68])^. With this political movement, the State began 
to think of unions as organizations capable of mediating in
It must be said that during the first period there were 
some pieces of labour legislation. However, they only referred 
to rural associations. The first governmental decree related 
to urban trade unions was issued in January 1907 by which was 
guaranteed the right of the workers to organize in unions (Cf. 
Rands [1990:127-8]).
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relations between capital and labour and as a channel for the
integration of the State itself and the masses.
"The old unionism of militant minorities, organized by- 
trade and gathering the most skilled workers, was not 
able to attract newcomers. It was easily replaced by the 
structure built by the State, through a process in which 
there was a mixture of violence against groups of 
organized workers and concession of benefits to the 
masses" (L.M. Rodrigues [1968:347]).
In 1930, the government created the Ministry of Labour, 
Industry and Trade, by which the labour movement was to be 
controlled (Cf. Humphrey [1979c:223]). One of this Ministry’s 
main goals was to elaborate, implement and supervise laws 
aimed at regulating unions and labour conflicts. Among the 
laws related to labour matters the most important was the Lei 
de Sindicalizagao (Unionization Law), issued as early as March 
1931. Its main characteristics are: 1) only one union could 
be legalized by categoria; 2) it made the employment of
foreign workers difficult in order to thwart the activities 
of anarchists; 3) it established that the minute of union 
inauguration with a membership list and a copy of the unions’ 
rules as well was to be sent to the Ministry of Labour; 4) 
financial control over unions by the Ministry of Labour; and
5) the Ministry of Labour had the power to apply sanctions 
against the unions (Cf. Alves [1989:40-4]).
The Lei de Sindicalizagao (Unionization Law) also 
prohibited the unions from participating in any ideological 
propaganda and established that unions should perform social 
assistance functions. The overall intention of a law of this 
nature was to demobilize and depoliticize the unions (Cf. 
Vianna [1978b:147]).
The alliance of political factions that took over the 
state apparatus needed the support, but not the participation
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of, the urban working classes for its politico-economic 
projects. Thus, the ideological discourse of this period 
repeated ad nauseam the confluence of interests of capital and 
labour. For, it was said, contrary to what alien ideologies 
(a reference to the communists) proclaimed, a national and 
autonomous development was possible through the harmonious 
cooperation of capital and labour (Cf. Alves [1989:40]). The 
unions were, thus, put under a guardian State inspired by 
Italian fascism (Almeida & Lowy [1976:104]; Alves [1989:41]; 
Martins [1979:184]; and L.M. Rodrigues [1968:348]).
As it was necessary to promote a controlled integration 
of the lower classes, the State gave the class organizations 
social assistance functions. They became a State appendage for 
carrying out state duties. As, until that period, the masses 
had been excluded from social benefits, the integration and 
support of these social ranks to the dominant classes* 
political projects occurred through the concession of social 
assistance to be executed by the unions. By this means, the 
masses were integrated into the dominant classes* political 
projects along with control of the unions.
Therefore, as from 1930, and especially as from 1937, 
trade unions became bureaucratic agencies having to administer 
financial resources aimed at meeting the membership’s demands 
for social assistance services. Consequently, the 
bureaucratization of trade unions meant allocation of time to 
manage an agency that tended to become more complex because 
of its new objectives and reduction of other union activities. 
(Cf. Bernardo [1982]; Martins [1979:185]; Tavares de Almeida 
[1975]; and Vianna [1978b]).
The Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), from 1943, which
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was inspired by Mussolini’s Carta del Lavoro (Cf. Lowy [1987: 
456]), marked the high point of state regulation of union 
life. It was a compilation of all laws which had been enacted 
since 1930. In article 514 it detailed trade unions* duties 
as follows:
"1) to collaborate with the government to develop social 
solidarity; 2) to maintain legal assistance services for 
the membership; 3) to promote harmony during labour 
disputes. Paragraph 1: Moreover, the employees* unions 
must: a) establish credit and consumer cooperatives; and 
b) establish and maintain schools".
This list of duties linked to article 521, paragraph 1, 
which states that a trade union’s very existence is subject 
to "the prohibition of any propaganda of doctrines 
incompatible with the Nation’s institutions and interests...", 
implied the transformation of trade unions into agencies, 
whose aim was the integration of peripheral population into 
the process of national capitalist development as a 
subordinate partner (For details of the Brazilian labour law 
system, see Alves [1989:41-3]; Erickson [1977]; Fuchtner 
[1980:50-68]; and Humphrey [1979c]).
Elections for the presidency of Brazil were due in 1937. 
However, President Getulio Vargas closed the National 
Congress, promulgated a new Constitution and continued to 
govern the country. This period of Brazilian history - 1937-45 
is known as the Estado Novo. The end of the Vargas 
dictatorship in 1945 and the new Constitution of 1946 allowed 
many of the left-wing political forces to emerge.
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2.3. The Democratic Period: 1945 to 1964
The integration of urban workers into the political arena 
was a two-edged weapon. The overthrow of President Getulio 
Vargas, in 1945, gave the trade unions a certain autonomy 
because of the relaxation of some state controls, which 
provided a room to manoeuvre for the workers to increase their 
demands and even to go on strike (Cf. Alves [1989:45]; and 
Humphrey [1979c:226]).
The requirement for an ideological certificate 
disappeared* and the workers got back their right to strike, 
which allowed the unions a greater freedom to concern 
themselves specifically with political and labour demands 
(Moraes F9 [1982]; L.M. Rodrigues [1968]; Rowland [1974]; 
Tavares de Almeida [1975]; Vianna [1978b]; and Weffort [1978- 
79] and [1978]). However, the state moved quickly and "in 1947 
a new law limiting the right to strike was passed" (Humphrey 
[1979c:226]).
This means that, on the one hand, the urban workers were
integrated into the political process as subordinate partners,
and, on the other hand, this integration provided room for
gains which could destabilize the existing status quo, as
Weffort stated:
"The political emergence of the lower classes meant, to 
a certain degree, its effective incorporation into the 
existing politico-institutional framework, that is, it 
meant lower class pressure inside the existing political 
regime" (F. Weffort, quoted by L. M. Rodrigues [1968: 
355]. Cf. Almeida & Lowy [1976:99]).
From 1930 to 1951 any worker wishing to be a candidate 
for union offices had to get a certificate from the police 
stating that they were «untainted» by any charge of being 
leftists.
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However, this double-sided reality of the union movement 
was a contradictory one insofar as, on the one hand, there was 
greater autonomy for demands, while, on the other hand, the 
unions had no willingness to separate themselves from the 
State, for their survival depended basically on the benefits 
given by the State, which meant an ambiguous situation.
During this period, the Communist Party, again an illegal 
party after it had been legalized for a short period, put 
forward a strategy based on two points: 1) in the realm of
economic development, it sponsored the view that the best 
policy for the country was to promote its autonomous 
development (Almeida & Lowy [1976:103]). According to the 
communists, the main «enemy» of the country was not the 
capitalists, but the imperialists; and 2) in the unions* 
province, it supported the creation of parallel organizations 
such as the Movement for Unification of Workers (MUT) in the 
1940s and the Workers’ General Command (CGT) at the beginning 
of the 1960s, which would complement the official structure 
(Alves [1989:44]; and Keck [1989:256]).
According to Weffort [1978:18], as a result of the 
communists* strategy, the situation of the unions during this 
period could be summarized as follows. Firstly, unions were 
subordinated to the nationalist ideology and supported reforms 
and collaboration between classes; secondly, the unions acted 
through a dualist structure because of the official and the 
parallel structures sponsored by the communists; and thirdly, 
they were subordinated to the alliances between the left and 
the trabalhistas (labour politicians).
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2.4. The Period of the Military Government
In 1964, through a coup d ’etat, the military took power 
and intervened in many trade unions, where - the military said 
- a Republics Sindicalista (Union Republic) was being planned. 
As many writers have pointed out, this happened through 
interventions in several trade unions^, strict enforcement of 
the Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), cancellation of union 
leaders* political rights, imprisonments and killings (Cf. 
Alves [1989:46]; Figueiredo [1978:135]; and Humphrey [1979c: 
231]). The military forcibly restrained room for political 
manoeuvre, which had been won by the unions in the interregnum 
1945-64.
In the post-64 period, what one can see is the increasing 
presence of the State controlling the unions’ daily life, thus 
stressing bureaucratic functions (Martins [1979:184]; and 
Moises [1979:55]). From then on, the unions* social assistance 
functions were aggravated, which made them appendages of the 
State or mediators in class conflicts. The old ideology of 
harmony between capital and labour elaborated during the 
Estado Novo was achieved by all means by the existing regime 
as from 1964. Thus, the unions had their contradictory feature 
diminished, for they were no longer agencies that put forward 
workers* demands, but mainly a State collaborator to provide 
their members with social assistance.
The repression by the authoritarian regime installed in 
1964 grew worse in 1968 when the workers came back to the
® According to Figueiredo [1978], between 1964 and 1970, 
the State intervened in 483 unions, 49 union federations, and 
4 union confederations.
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first scene of the political arena through the strikes in 
Contagem (Minas Gerais state) and Osasco (Sao Paulo state). 
The authoritarian State countered any action by unions and 
workers with repressive measures (Almeida & Lowy [1976:110-4]; 
CEAS [1977:32]; Keck [1989:257]; and Weffort [1972]).
The five-year period that follows is known as the 
«Brazilian economic miracle» during which the economy grew 
yearly by 10%, strict wage control playing an important role 
in this policy. During this period any political movement was 
viewed as subversive and as an attack against national 
security.
However, it is possible, at the beginning of the 1970s, 
to find some facts that tell us that the unions and workers 
existed politically. Firstly, workers of some plants of 
Greater Sao Paulo engaged in isolated action to demand an 
increase in their wages (Keck [1989:258]). The main action was 
one taken by metalworkers of the Industrias Villares in 
December 1973. The workers stopped working from time to time 
without declaring themselves on strike and promoted an 
operagao tartaruga (go slow) (Alves [1989:51] and CEAS [1977: 
36-7]), which is a tactic in which workers do not stop 
working, but reduce the speed of the machines. They won an 
increase in their wages (Almeida & Lowy [1976:116-7]; Antunes 
[1988]; Moises [1979]; and Sader [1988]).
Secondly, some union officials tried to promote action 
that could change the course of Brazilian trade unionism. The 
best example is the case of the Metalworkers’ Union of Sao 
Bernardo (Sao Paulo state). This union’s officials learnt that 
within the political and historical context in which Brazilian 
trade unions had developed it was impossible to think of
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putting an end to the whole bureaucratic structure aimed at 
providing the rank-and-file with social assistance services.
TABLE 1.1. URBAN STRIKES IN BRAZIL, 1978-87
WORKER IW CE WMC SSW OTHERS TOTAL
YEARS
1978 84 8 8 13 5 118
1979 77 20 55 50 44 246
1980 43 19 43 21 18 144
1981 41 7 48 20 34 150
1982 73 4 31 25 11 144
1983 189 10 85 47 16 347
1984 317 18 84 62 11 492
1985 246 23 211 125 14 619
1986 534 45 237 187 1 1,004
1987 714 118 787 567 7 2,193 |
Source: NEPP/UNICAMP [1989:129]
IW = Industrial Workers 
CE = Civil Engineering 
WMC = Waged Middle Classes 
SSW = Service Sector Workers
However, along with this practice, they started to engage 
in action to change, to a certain degree, Brazilian trade 
unions* conservative tendencies. Thus, at the end of 1977, 
union leaders began to demand a wage increase of 34.1%, for, 
according to a World Bank report, the rate of inflation had 
been 26.6%, and not 13.7%, according to Brazilian government 
figures. The government acknowledged the falsification, but 
did not show any willingness to give the workers what they had 
lost. The workers, through their unions, started to campaign 
for a wage increase in order to recuperate what they regarded 
as their proper dues (M.H.M. Alves [1984:86-7]; Humphrey
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[1979a:78]; Keck [1989:262]; Moists [1978] and [1979:51]; and 
Silva [1979:91-2]). As no judicial means succeeded, the 
metalworkers went on strike in May 1978. The strike initially 
started in the Saab-Scania plant on May 12th 1978. From there 
it spread to all auto plants. Although the strike was 
pronounced illegal by the Regional Labour Court (TRT), the 
employers* union decided to negotiate directly with the trade 
unions (Alves [1989:50-1]). In 1979 the strike movement spread 
from the ABC paulista to the whole Southeastern states and 
from the metalworkers to other workers (M.H.M. Alves [1984:88- 
9 and 93 ] )®.
2.5. The Development After the Strikes of 1978-79
The strikes of 1978 and 1979 were to cause a profound 
impact on Brazilian labour relations. The new union leaders, 
militants and activists who emerged during these strikes were 
to play an important role in the history of the labour and 
union movement in the 1980s. This new kind of unionism came 
to be known as «new unionism». However, the expression «new 
unionism» does not refer solely to those strikes in the late 
1970s. It was coined to mean the new political attitudes 
towards labour problems with an emphasis on a new relationship 
between the unions and the rank-and-file, a more militant
® According to a report (NEPP/UNICAMP [1988:72-86]), 
industrial workers were responsible for 84 out of 118 strikes 
in Brazil as a whole in 1978. In 1979 the movement spread and 
went as far as 246 strikes in the country. Industrial workers 
were responsible for 31.3% of these strikes. This number 
decreased until 1981 when it began to increase again reaching 
534 strikes out of 1,004 in 1986 in the country as a whole 
Useful accounts of the strikes of 1978-80 as well as the 
reaction of the State are given in Alves [1989]; Antunes 
[1988] ; and Keck [1989].
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action regardless of the constraints imposed by the 
authoritarian state, and demands for a complete revision of 
the relationship between the State and the unions (Cf. Keck 
[1989:260]).
The actions of the «new unionism» unions and militants 
linked to it meant a shift in terms of the relations between 
the unions and the workplace. The plant became a place of 
conflict in the sense that the old strategies of the pre-1964 
unionism were replaced by new strategies in which the unions 
were to express grievances and demands arising from the shop- 
floor (Keck [1989:267-8]; and Tavares de Almeida [1981] and 
[1983]). On the other hand, «new unionism» has become 
synonymous with new demands. In fact, along with demands for 
wage increases, «new unionism^ has been focusing attention on 
new aspects of labour relations, namely the conditions where 
workers experience the daily reality of their working lives. 
Finally, since first appearing in the political scene, «new 
unionism» has been trying to establish a new relationship with 
the State. According to «new unionism» leaders, workers should 
be free to negotiate with employers without any interference 
from the State.
However, this new militancy was not the expression of a 
unified political, ideological faction. M.H.M. Alves [1984:85] 
distinguished three factions in the Brazilian union movement 
after 1978. Firstly, there were those union leaders 
representing the «old» unionism who did not mobilize the 
workers, were a «bridge» between the State and the workers, 
and endorsed the social assistance functions of the unions. 
In the realm of «new unionism», there were the leaders of the 
unidade sindical (union unity), commonly linked to the
48
communist parties, who supported the strategy through which 
the unity of the union movement should be maintained at all 
costs and frequently engaged themselves in alliances with 
conservative union officials, and, finally, the faction known 
as the autenticos (authentic unionists) who had a more radical 
view of labour relations and proposed a "total shift from the 
past". Keck [1989:273] went further to recognize a fourth 
faction within the «new unionism»: the oposigoes sindicais
(union opposition).
During the 1980s, an increasing dispute between the 
unidade sindical (union unity) and the autenticos (authentic 
unionists) replaced the disputes between the «new unionism» 
and the conservative, «'old» union officials within the unions. 
The differences between these two factions appeared early. In 
1980, the autenticos (authentic unionists), left-wing 
intellectuals, a small number of people linked to Trotskyist 
groups and activists from many grassroots organizations linked 
to the Catholic Church founded the Workers* Party (PT) (On the 
foundation and the role of this party, see Keck [1992]; Lowy 
[1987]; and Sader [1987]). The existence of another party 
which intended to represent workers was seen as a negative 
fact by those supporting unity at all costs. Most of the 
unidade sindical militants were linked to communist parties, 
which supposedly "truly represented the working class".
The divisions between these two factions went deeper. In 
August 1981, in Praia Grande (Sao Paulo state), the First 
National Conference of the Working Classes (CONCLAT) was held 
as a first step to organize the Workers’ United Central (CUT) 
(Alves [1989:58-9]; and Keck [1984:28-9] and [1989:273-5]). 
Conflicting views appeared on a number of issues. Firstly,
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there was a disagreement on the formation of the national 
executive of the National Pro-CUT Committee, which would carry 
on the work and call the next National Conference of the 
Working Classes (CONCLAT) (Keck [1989:275]). Secondly, there 
were a number of disagreements on the structure of the 
organization itself. The autenticos (authentic unionists) 
favoured a wider and more democratic basis of representation, 
while the unidade sindical (union unity) favoured a structure 
based on the official union structure. For instance, should 
the National Pro-CUT Committee accept union opposition groups? 
And what about those workers to whom the right to form a union 
was denied?
Moreover, the II National Conference of the Working 
Classes (CONCLAT) was scheduled for 1982. Also in November 
1982 direct elections were due for governors of all states for 
the first time in 17 years. The unidade sindical (union unity) 
proposed to delay the conference by arguing that these two 
political events could jeopardize abertura politica (political 
liberalization), because the military could become upset by 
such an overt challenge to the union structure. It seems this 
was part of the communists* strategy not to put much emphasis 
on facts which could risk the legalization of their party. 
Thus, they proposed that the II National Conference of the 
Working Classes (CONCLAT) should be postponed to 1993 (Alves 
[1989:59]; and Keck [1984:28-9] and [1989:275]).
The final split occurred in 1983. The autenticos 
(authentic unionists) established the Workers* United Central 
(CUT) in August 1983, and the unidade sindical (union unity) 
argued once again that the abertura politica (political 
liberalization) should not be jeopardized. They advocated a
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more moderate approach by arguing that the political forces 
in the country should guarantee a peaceful transition to 
democracy by negotiating with the military. However, it seems 
that this was not the central point of disagreement, but 
control over the union movement because the unidade sindical 
(union unity) held a congress in November 1983 when they 
established the National Coordination of the Working Classes 
(CONCLAT). Finally, in 1986, the National Coordination of the 
Working Classes (CONCLAT) changed its name and became the 
Workers* General Central (CGT).
3. STATE AND TRADE UNIONS IN BRAZIL: THE CORPORATIST FRAMEWORK
One of the main characteristics of the Brazilian labour 
relations system has been the presence of the State, 
regulating not only labour conflicts but also the internal 
structure of the unions and the role they were allowed to play 
in these conflicts. As we will see below this changed a little 
after the 1988 Constitution; however the enduring 
characteristics have been maintained. In fact, as mentioned 
above, since 1930 the State began to regulate labour conflicts 
and union structure.
From 1930 a number of decrees related to labour relations 
were enacted. In 1931, decree No. 19,770 became law and was 
aimed at controlling the unions through formal recognition. 
In other words, unions could not be founded without formal 
recognition from the Ministry of Labour. The decree also 
established the conditions under which the unions should be 
recognized: 1) a minimum of 30 members, all of them of 18 or 
more years of age; 2) at least 2/3 of the members should have
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Brazilian nationality; 3) union constitution, stating the 
unions* objectives and types of union elections as well as the 
tasks of the union executive board, should be approved by the 
Ministry of Labour; 4) the term of each union executive board 
was to be of one year; and 5) all union members should be 
registered in files with personal information (See Bernardo 
[1982:88-9 ; Fuchtner [1980:42-3 ] ; Rands [1990:128]; and Vianna 
[1978b:146-7]).
Moreover, the decree ascribed a number of functions 
related to social assistance services which should be 
performed by the unions and the prohibition of political 
propaganda.
During the following years, a number of decrees were 
issued, all of them dealing with union and labour matters. 
Finally, these were incorporated into a body of laws called 
Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT). From all decrees issued 
during this period - 1930-45 - it is possible to infer some 
of the main characteristics which shaped labour relations in 
Brazil.
3.1. The Unicidade Sindical
Under this principle there must be only one union 
representing a categoria in a given geographical area. A 
categoriat which refers to a group of workers, is determined 
by the main economic activity of the firm where the workers 
are employed. If a firm has data processing as its main 
economic activity, then all its employees will be considered 
data processing workers and will be represented by the data 
processing workers* union. Accordingly, those workers whose
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skill is data processing but who work for a firm whose 
principal economic activity is not data processing are not 
considered data processing workers in terms of union 
representation. For instance, data processing workers who work 
in the banking sector are considered bancarios (bank workers) 
and are represented by the bank workers’ union.
Moreover, the Ministry of Labour also established the 
geographical region which should be represented by a union. 
This means that there cannot be, for instance, two bank 
workers’ unions in the same geographical area. The size of the 
geographical areas varies according to some categorias. The 
most common form is that a union represents one or more 
municipio. However, in some special cases the Ministry of 
Labour authorises the existence of a regional or national 
union.
In addition to this principle, it is important to mention 
the national union structure. Along with the local unions 
there are two other levels. The second level is represented 
by the federations. A federation is formed by at least five 
unions and usually covers a state, though it may cover the 
whole of Brazil. The third level is represented by the 
confederations which must comprise at least three federations. 
It is worth stressing that, in spite of the foundation of both 
the Workers’ United Central (CUT) and the National 
Coordination of the Working Classes (CONCLAT), later Workers’ 
General Central (CGT), no horizontal representation was 
allowed.
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3.2. The Imposto Sindical (Union Tax)
The imposto sindical (union tax) was created in 1940 by
decree No. 2,377. This is a tax which is levied on all workers
of the occupational categoria regardless of the fact whether
they are union members or not. It is charged through
compulsory pay-roll deduction and is worth one day’s wage,
7
being the day March 1st .
However, the unions could only spend this revenue 
according to what was ascribed to them by the Ministry of 
Labour as the unions’ proper functions. In other words, unions 
could not spend this income for political purposes such as 
contributions for political parties* campaigns, to finance 
strikes or creating a strike fund.
Instead, article 7 of the decree stated all activities 
on which the unions should spend the revenues from the union 
tax:
”1) on union employment agencies; 2) on assistance to 
infants; 3) on medical and odontological assistance; 4) 
on legal assistance; 5) on primary and pre-vocational 
schools; 6) on credit and consumer cooperatives; 7) on 
recreation centres; 8) on libraries; and 9) on sports 
activities".
However, in spite of the fact that all workers of an
7
The union tax is deposited in an account in Banco do 
Brasil. Until the Constitution of 1988, the amount was divided 
into four parts: 1) 60% for the unions (from which Banco do
Brasil deducted 6% to cover the costs of services); 2) 15% for 
the union federations; 3) 5% for the union confederations; and
4) 20% for the Ministry of Labour in a special account called 
Emprego e Salario (Employment and Wage) in the Banco do 
Brasil. When there was not a union federation, its share was 
transferred to the confederation. And, in extreme cases, when 
there was not a confederation either, the amount should be 
transferred to the Emprego e Salario account, i.e. the 
Ministry of Labour could receive as much as 40% of the union 
tax deducted from a categoria.
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occupational categoria contributed to this fund, it was used 
to finance social assistance services which were aimed only 
to union members. Therefore, as many scholars have already 
noticed (Cf. Fuchtner [1980:61]), there was a paradoxical 
situation. It was not interesting for the unions to affiliate 
new members because their financial situation was safe 
regardless of fees paid in by new members and an increase in 
membership could mean also an increase in the pressure on the 
use of the social assistance services of the unions and thus 
on their financial situation.
On the other hand, the institution of the union tax also 
meant the interference of the State in another sphere of union 
affairs. In fact, the State also had power to inspect union 
finances to check whether the unions had been spending their 
incomes according to the constraints imposed on their budget 
by the law.
3.3. State Recognition
As mentioned above, a decree stating that a union’s 
existence required State recognition was enacted as early as 
1931. Along with the administrative process through which the 
State analysed and granted the unions the right to exist, 
State recognition also implied the right of the State to 
intervene in the unions in a number of ways. Firstly, the 
State had the right to supervise union finances. Secondly, the 
State determined that all unions should have the same estatuto 
unico (articles of association). This means that the 
objectives of each union were imposed a priori by the State. 
Finally, the State also controlled union elections and had the
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right to veto candidates on a number of grounds. Electoral 
slates had to be submitted to the Ministry of Labour for 
approval. However, even after election to office, unionists 
could be dismissed if they went against what was established 
by the labour law. For instance, in the case of a strike 
unions could be open to intervention and their leaders 
dismissed. Moreover, if dismissals occurred, the State could 
designate interventores, state appointed officials, to look 
after union affairs pending an election.
3.4. The Labour Courts
Up to 1988 the labour courts were the judicial branch of
State intervention in union matters. They were created to
mediate in labour conflicts inside the framework which
emphasized social peace and harmony.
The Labour Code established that collective agreements 
between workers, represented by their union, and employees 
should be negotiated. The discussions could be intermediated 
by the Regional Labour Office (DRT), the regional executive 
branch of the Ministry of Labour, if the process of
negotiation appeared to be difficult.
If the negotiations reached stalemate, either party could 
take the case for judgement in the Regional Labour Court (TRT) 
whose arbitration would be binding. However, the parties had 
the right to appeal to the Supreme Labour Court (TST). On the 
other hand, the labour courts also had the right to interfere 
as a compulsory arbitrator without being referred to when the 
parties did not reach an agreement, mainly in cases of strikes 
in important sectors of the economy.
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FIGURE 1.1. STRUCTURE OF STATE APPARATUS ON LABOUR MATTERS
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The labour courts also had the right to judge whether a 
strike was legal. This means that not only the outcome of the 
negotiations but also the very nature of the demands could be 
dismissed beforehand just because a labour court could judge 
a strike as illegal. This also affected the profile of the 
unions in organizing a strike because if a strike was adjudged 
illegal, the labour court ruled that wages should not be paid.
Apart from a collective agreement which might deal with
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wage increases, working conditions and other issues related 
to labour aspects, the labour courts were also responsible for 
the settlement of individual grievances. Individual workers 
could take their cases - which might be related to the breach 
of the annual agreements on the part of the employers or 
simply because the employers were not upholding rights granted 
under the Labour Code - to the labour courts.
This seems to suggest that the normative power of the 
labour courts was intended to avoid the resolution of labour 
conflicts through processes which would depend upon the 
strength of the parties (Rands [1992:6]).
3.5. The Constitution of 1988 and the «Neo-Corporatism»
The hybrid solution proposed by the Constitution of 1988 
has been termed «neo-corporatism» by some authors (Souza 
[1990]) to refer to the present situation in which the State 
no longer has the right to interfere in union affairs but 
where the three main pillars of the corporatist system have 
survived, namely: the imposto sindical (union tax), the
unicidade sindical, and the labour courts. On the other hand, 
the Constitution also granted the unions the exclusive right 
of representation of all workers of a categoriat regardless 
of their being unionized.
During the debates on the Constitution the union movement 
was divided, with different proposals on the unicidade 
sindical and the imposto sindical (union tax). On the one 
hand, one faction argued that the end of the unicidade 
sindical and the imposto sindical (union tax) would cause 
chaos because many unions would disappear and fragmentation
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of the union movement would occur. On the other hand, another 
faction argued that unions could not be independent while 
their finances and survival depended on the State (Rands 
[1990] ) .
The solution finally approved was a hybrid one. In fact, 
article 8 grants the right to form unions and associations and 
the right to strike without any adjudication by the labour 
courts as to whether strikes are illegal. However, paragraph 
II of this article prohibits the existence of more than one 
union representing a given categoria within the same 
geographical area, while paragraph IV granted the survival of 
the imposto sindical (union tax). Finally, the structure of 
the labour courts was maintained through articles 111 to 117.
The main changes in union life provoked by the 
Constitution of 1988 are as follows: 1) the State no longer 
has power to recognize and/or intervene in unions; 2) a union 
when created needs only to register in a civil registry; 3) 
a union’s constitution is no longer imposed by the State; 4) 
unions dispose of their funds of their own accord and may 
create, for instance, a strike fund; and 5) although the 
labour courts survived, they no longer have power sui Juris 
to arbitrate mandatorily in individual or collective labour 
disputes. However, the parties - unions and/or employers - may 
refer to them for arbitration in disputes.
4. THE BRAZILIAN ECONOMY IN THE 1980s
According to Brazilian Institute for Geography and 
Statistics (IBGE) data, since the 1950s the Brazilian economy 
has undergone many changes. Between 1950 and 1980, for
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instance, there was an increase of 10.7% in the number of jobs 
created; in the same period the percentage of jobs created in 
the secondary sector was 30.9% and in the tertiary sector 
58.4%. The economy itself experienced a number of changes. 
During the Kubitschek government (1956-61) a wide programme 
of economic development was implemented. The military who took 
power in 1964 also implemented an economic policy aimed at 
accelerating economic growth. After they took power, the GDP 
grew as follows:
FIGURE 1.2. BRAZILIAN GDP, 1970-88
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When the military took power a number of decrees 
regarding wage increases were issued. Unions could not 
negotiate wage increases which were decreed by the government
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and tied to the rate of inflation. At first, the law, issued
in 1965, regulating wage increases allowed some discretion to
the labour courts in the settlement of wages. However, as
Humphrey ([1982:40]. Cf. Marques [1985:375]) points out:
"In 1966 new laws were decreed which reduced the role of 
the Labour Courts... From this point on the wages policy 
was strictly subordinated to overall economic policy. 
Wage settlements, and the figures on which they were 
based, became subordinate to the needs of the ministries 
of Finance and Planning, and this led to a systematic 
misapplication of a wages formula that in theory should 
have maintained the share of the national income going to 
wages".
TABLE 1.2. EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES IN BRAZIL, 1970-79
(Basis 1980 = 100)
YEARS REAL WAGES*
1970 66.65
1971 n. a.
1972 74.67
1973 75.61
1974 80.32
1975 83.59
1976 90.70
1977 93.63
1978 99.23
1979 103.76
Source: Amadeo & Camargo [1991:18]
(*) Deflated by the IBGE/FGV index
Nevertheless, the inflation rates published were hardly 
the real ones, as shown by the campaign over the 34.1% 
mentioned above. Between 1973 and 1983, the military 
government issued nine separate decrees regulating wage 
policy. Most of these decrees were aimed at regulating wage 
increases on the grounds that wage increases were a major 
factor influencing inflation rates (Cf. Marques [1985:374- 
79]). According to Inter-Union Office for Statistical and
61
Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE) data, some workers lost more 
than 30% after the implementation of the new decrees (Cf. 
Alves [1989:47]).
In spite of these tight controls on wage settlements, the 
data available shows that real wages increased during the 
1970s. However, this must be detailed. As Taieb and Barros 
[1989:29] show, some workers, depending on their skill, earned 
higher increases, while others suffered losses. For instance, 
skilled experienced increases in their wages, but unskilled 
workers experienced decreases particularly in 1977 (Cf. 
Humphrey [1982:43]).
FIGURE 1.3. INFLATION RATES, 1978-89
Annual Inflation Rates (%)
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Source: Conjuntura Economica (Fundagao Getulio Vargas)
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On the other hand, the rate of inflation, which had gone
down after 1967, started increasing again in 1973 to reach its
0
highest peaks during the 1980s . To combat inflation the 
government resorted to recessive measures which hit the 
country from 1981 up to 1983. As shown in figure 1.2., the 
Brazilian GDP fell sharply in this period, which reflected on 
high unemployment and on the capability of the State to invest 
in social programs. Moreover, inflation, instead of falling, 
increased what "erode[d] the fiscal equilibrium of the State" 
(Feijo & Carvalho [n/d:ll]).
Gomes [1987] shows that the economic crisis did not hit 
badly the economy of the Northeastern region. However, 
Pernambuco’s economy was affected. The rate of economic growth 
in 1980 was the lowest for many years, being negative in 1981. 
This reflected on the creation of new jobs. Moreover, it had 
a negative impact on the average index of jobs available (Cf. 
Desempenho da Economia de Pernambuco em 1980 [1981:10, 12]); 
and Desempenho da Economia de Pernambuco em 1981 [1982:11,
13]).
The deteriorating economic situation and the several
economic packages hit the Pernambuco economy hard in the
1980s. From mid-1984 up to 1986 there was a significant growth
in the Pernambuco economy. However, from 1987
"[Pernambuco] state was more sharply hit than the country 
as a whole by the national economic crisis as a result of 
the accelerated growing inflation.. . , indecision and 
uncertainties about economic policy" (Desempenho da 
Economia de Pernambuco em 1988 [1988:179]).
During the 1980s inflation became a chronic problem and
® For a useful analysis of the several factors 
influencing the increase in inflation rates during the period 
from 1973 to 1983, see Marques [1985],
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the various economic measures taken by the government hit 
workers* purchasing power hard. Between 1979 and 1984 the 
government issued nine laws to regulate wage increases. The 
overall intention of these laws was to compress wages. Lerda 
([1986:475]. Cf. Marques [1985:377-8]) shows that the first 
of these laws only affected wages negatively for those earning 
more than 15 minimum wages a month. However, the decree of May 
1983 provoked heavy losses for almost all workers.
Because of this, the National Conference of the Working 
Classes (CONCLAT) organized in July 1983 the first general 
strike in the country since 1964. This general strike was 
organized as a protest against the ineffective governmental 
policies to reduce inflation (Sandoval [1990]). According to 
Inter-Union Office for Statistical and Socio-Economic Studies 
(DIEESE), the main objectives of this strike were: 1) to
protest against the government’s economic policy which caused 
unemployment, low wages and high prices; 2) to protest against 
the wage policy based on a «tight belt strategy» which 
provoked widespread misery; 3) to protest against the 
agreements between the country and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); 4) to demand job stability and better working 
conditions; 5) to demand that prices of staple products be 
frozen; and 6) to demand that the government should end 
intervention in the unions and allow democratically elected 
union leaders to return to their unions (Boletim do DIEESE, 
Aug. 1983 ).
Real wages, which had increased in the 1970s for some 
workers, suffered heavy losses in the 1980s, particularly in 
the years 1983, 1984 and 1987.
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TABLE 1.3. EVOLUTION OF REAL WAGES IN INDUSTRY 
AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN BRAZIL, 1980-89* 
(Basis 1980 = 100)
YEARS PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
INDUSTRY
1980 106.30 116.08
1981 103.01 120.24
1982 109.70 135.03
1983 91.88 112.77
1984 83.23 109.86
1985 105.81 120.74
1986 123.80 124.36
1987 103.11 106.78
1988 105.46 112.52
1 1989 89.04 95.00 |
Source: Chadad [1990:555]
(*) Deflated by the INPC/FIBGE
After the civil government took over power in 1985, a 
number of economic plans were decreed to deal with inflation. 
The Sarney government decreed the first of these plans in 
February 1986, the Cruzado Plan. Amongst the main measures 
announced were: 1) the creation of a new currency, the
Cruzado, which was worth Cr$ 1,000; 2) wage and pension
increases should maintain an interval of 12 months; 3) all 
prices were frozen; and 4) an 8% wage increase was granted to 
all workers, a 16% increase in the minimum wage and automatic 
wage increases (the so-called «trigger mechanism») when the 
Consumer Price Index reached 20% (Cf. Carvalho [1989:205-13]; 
Feijo & Carvalho [n/d:14-6]; Flynn [1986:1157-8]; Tavares de 
Almeida [1991:13ff.]; and Zottmann [1986:145-6 and 149-51]).
The reaction from the union centrals was mixed. The 
president of the National Conference of Working Classes 
(CONCLAT),
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"Joaquim dos S. Andrade, said that, while the Plan hit 
the workers, it did contain items that helped them, for 
example, the price freeze and unemployment benefit. By 
contrast, Jair Meneguelli, president of CUT.described 
the changes as «confiscation»,...and Paulo R. Paim, CUT*s 
secretary-general, said that «they have put their hands 
in our purse». DIEESE... agreed with this, calculating 
that the conversion of wages from cruzeiros to cruzados, 
on the basis of average wages over the last six months, 
implied an average cut of about 20%, while some workers, 
especially bank employees, were hit even harder. Their 
six-month adjustment, based on inflation, which was due 
in March, would have given a rise of 105%: under the new 
they obtained only 62%" (Flynn [1986:1172-3]).
In spite of its initial success and popular support, 
after August 1986 the plan started failing (For an analysis 
of the factors which contributed to the failure of the Cruzado 
Plan, see Carvalho [1989]; and Feijo & Carvalho [n/d]). The 
inflation rates of March and April were -1% and -0.6%. 
However, it reached 1.4% in October and 2.5% in November. The 
real average wages, which had increased up to November, fell 
sharply. In November 1986 the government issued what became 
known as the Cruzado Plan II, by which the government tried 
to reduce demand which had experienced a boom with the 
freezing of prices and was causing problems to the economic 
stabilization plan (Feijo & Carvalho [n/d:16]). However, 
prices increased and the inflation rate reached 7.6% in 
December of 1986 (All data on inflation rates for these months 
was calculated by Fundagao Getulio Vargas, as quoted by 
Pereira & Nakano [1991]).
The measures of the Cruzado II caused heavy wage losses. 
The Workers* United Central (CUT) called for a general strike, 
being supported by the Workers* General Central (CGT) and all 
national union confederations. The strike took place on 
December 12th 1986 and its aims were to protest against the 
Cruzado Plan II and to demand the recovery of lost wages, and
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to protest against payment of foreign debt (Boletim do DIEESE, 
Jan. 1987). According to Sandoval [1990:12], a total of 10 
million workers went on strike.
In June 1987 the Sarney government tried to cut
inflation, which had reached 15% in March, 20% in April and
27.7% in May, by issuing a new plan known as the Bresser Plan
(Cf. Tavares de Almeida [1991:17-9]). It proposed an end to
all indexation mechanisms which helped to perpetuate
inflation. However,
"Wage indexation was not eliminated but the trigger point 
mechanism [of the Cruzado Plan] was replaced by a lagged 
system in which wages were to be adjusted by the average 
price increase of the three months before each 
adjustment. If the plan was successful in eliminating 
inflation the mechanism would be innocuous but if 
inflation revived it would raise money wages more slowly 
than inflation" (Feij6 & Carvalho [n/d:17-8]).
TABLE 1.4. WAGE LOSSES FROM THE CRUZADO PLAN 
UNTIL 1 JULY 1987, BY DATA-BASE
DATA-BASE DISTRIBUTION 
OF WORKERS BY 
DATA BASE 
(%)*
REAL WAGE ON 
1 JULY 1987 
(%)**
WAGE LOSSES 
BY 1 JULY 
1987
January 11.4 63.14 36.86
February 3.9 61.47 38.53 1
March 9.1 58.36 41.64
April 4.7 66.77 33.23
May 15.8 67.30 32.70
June 5.5 69.10 30.90
July 5.8 64.12 35.88
August 4.4 64.89 35.11 |
September 9.3 65.98 34.02
October 13.0 55.92 44.08
November 14.1 56.99 43.01
December 3.0 58.86 41.14
Source: DIEESE [1987:6]
(*) Data from the Ministry of Labour 
(**) Deflated by the ICV/DIEESE index
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According to the Inter-Union Office for Statistical and
Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE):
"The [Bresser Plan] endorses the fall of the level of the 
real average wage and intensifies it by hiding the 
inflation rate of June" (DIEESE [1987:3]).
The unions envisaged new wage losses in the new plan and 
a joint protest was called by the Workers* General Central 
(CGT) and Workers* United Central (CUT). The aims of the this 
general strike, which, according to Sandoval [1990:12], 
gathered about 10 million workers, were: 1) a wage increase 
of 37.74% to recover lost wages; 2) job stability; 3) a 40 
hour week; 4) support for land reform with participation of 
workers; and 5) to protest against payment of foreign debt 
(Boletim do DIEESE, Sept. 1987; and Sandoval [1990:12]).
The Bresser Plan failed and the new Finance Minister,
Malison da Nobrega, refused to take «heterodox» measures
against inflation. The inflation rate was to be kept at about
20% a month. However,
"From the latter month [June 1988] on, inflation began 
accelerating again, to reach 36.56% in January 1989. The 
deterioration seemed to have been due to the emergence of 
unfavourable expectations related to a growing capacity 
of the labour movement to recover in the Labour Courts 
past inflationary losses" (Feijo & Carvalho [n/d:19]).
In January 1989, once again, the government resorted to 
a macroeconomic plan (The Summer Plan) to deal with growing 
inflation. In relation to wages, the Summer Plan stated that 
they should be maintained at their average real level of 1988. 
There were also some measures which meant that the government 
was trying to cut inflation through recessive policies (Feijo 
& Carvalho [n/d:19-21]; Maia [1990:4-6]; and Tavares de 
Almeida [1991:20]). These measures caused the level of 
employment to fall, the general level of production decreased
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as well as real wages.
The workers* centrals called for a new general strike 
which lasted two days and involved 22 million workers on the 
first day and 10 million on the second day, according to 
Sandoval [1990:12]. The strike was called to protest against 
the implementation of the Summer Plan and demand the recovery 
of lost wages (Boletim do DIEESE, April 1989).
5. CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have tried to set the political and 
economic scene in which the Brazilian labour movement has been 
developing. It was shown that the main feature of the history 
of the Brazilian labour movement has been the presence of the 
State within it. In fact, since 1930 the State has been 
responsible for a number of laws aimed at regulating and 
controlling labour matters in Brazil. Of course, State 
interference has varied over the years with periods of 
relaxation and periods of direct and violent intervention. 
Even with the 1988 Constitution, some of the corporatist 
mechanisms have been kept alive and the survival of some 
unions and the outcome of fights for demands still depends to 
some extent on the state apparatus. On the other hand, the 
Brazilian economy is characterized by high inflation wages 
over the years. Indeed, only in 1947, 1948 and 1957 were
inflation rates below 10% a year (Marques [1985:343]). The 
1980s were characterized by the highest inflation rates in the 
history of the country and a number of macroeconomic plans 
were issued in attempting to reduce inflation. Real wages 
suffered heavy losses in 1980s and the workers reacted by
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calls for general strikes, the first having occurred in 1983. 
In spite of attempts during the Cruzado Plan to redistribute 
income, the subsequent plans meant wages were to be reduced, 
which provoked angry reaction from the union centrals which 
called for general strikes to protest against wage and 
economic policies and demand increases in wages and other 
benefits. In short, the analysis developed in this chapter was 
an attempt to set the economic and political scenes where 
labour action took place during late 1970s and 1980s.
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CHAPTER I X
A HISTORY OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN
PERNAMBUCO
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is twofold: firstly, it provides 
a historical analysis of labour conflicts in Pernambuco; 
secondly, it provides an historical description of the unions 
which are part of the sample I will be using. This will allow 
me to describe the political situation in which the activities 
of the unions I am analysing have developed.
2. THE LABOUR MOVEMENT IN PERNAMBUCO
This section is divided into four parts. I will be using 
the same period covering the description of the Brazilian 
labour movement to describe the history of organized labour 
in Pernambuco.
2.1. From the Late 19th-Century to 1930
The process of industrialization started in Pernambuco 
in the 1820s largely as a result of the initiatives of British 
entrepreneurs who established some foundries. These plants 
employed a native labour force, but engineers and raw 
materials were brought in from Great Britain.
Another industry that developed was the railway, also
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supported by British capital. As the tracks were imported from 
Great Britain, it did not contribute to increase steel 
production in Pernambuco. Engineers, foremen, and skilled 
workers were mainly from Great Britain and Belgium. However, 
because of the fact that these foreign workers demanded high 
wages, the Great-Western (the railway company) started to 
employ the native labour force, establishing large metal 
plants in a number of towns.
Finally, the textile industry was also set up in 
Pernambuco. This industry was firmly established from the 
1870s. According to Melo [1984:7], the textile industry 
expanded from 1890 when plants were established in several 
towns.
Since the late 19th-century workers started to establish 
labour organizations under the influence of anarchists and 
socialists at first, as occurred in Brazil as a whole (Centro 
Josue de Castro [1988:9]). They organized labour leagues, 
resistance societies and unions. In 1890, the Pernambuco 
workers went on strike for the first time. It happened in a 
fabric plant and the weavers demanded better wages.
Under the influence of the anarchist Brazilian Labour 
Confederation (COB), in 1906, workers founded in Pernambuco 
the Working Class* Federation (FCO), which lasted until 1945. 
Under this federation the anarchists organized several labour 
unions comprising around 20,000 urban and rural workers. At 
that time (1906-08), the anarchists had won the leadership of 
the labour movement and the utopian socialists had 
disappeared.
The First World War provoked a sharp crisis. Much of 
food, fuel, machines and raw material supplies from Europe and
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the United States were cut due to the war. There were many 
strikes during this period due to low wages and the anarchist 
press became an important means to stimulate strikes (Centro 
Josue de Castro [1988:10]).
The industrial crisis, high inflation, and unemployment 
provoked some bitter strikes. In 1919, a general strike in 
Recife lasted one week. Railwaymen, tramdrivers, dockers, 
metalworkers and printing workers were in the forefront of 
this strike (Melo [1986a:8]).
By 1922, the influence of the anarchists had started to 
decrease. Some anarchists and/or socialists had been converted 
to Marxism mainly due to the Russian revolution. The Communist 
Party was founded in 1922 and disputes between these two 
factions inside the unions grew up. However, the unions 
suffered a severe crash not from these disputes, but caused 
by the new governor Sergio Loreto (1923-31), who closed down 
most of them.
Nevertheless, even with this repression carried out by 
the government, in 1929 workers promoted the First Regional 
Labour Meeting when they founded the Workers* General Union 
(UGT-Pernambuco), which was influenced by the communists.
2.2. From 1930 to 1945
As described in chapter I, the new government issued the 
Lei de Sindicalizagao (unionization law) in 1931. In 
Pernambuco, the Workers* General Union (UGT) stood against 
such a law. Only 13 out of the 36 trade unions of Pernambuco 
had applied for registration at the Ministry of Labour by 1934 
(Cf. Brayner [1987:165-6]). However, in spite of the tough
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controls brought about by the Lei de Sindicalizagao 
(unionization law), the labour movement did not disappear. In 
1931, according to Brayner [1987:167], tramdrivers, railwaymen 
and weavers went on strike demanding better wages.
In 1932, the number of strike increased. In February, 
printing workers went on strike at the Imprensa Industrial and 
at the Imprensa Dreschler companies. In July, weavers went on 
strike protesting against decreasing wages and for an eight 
hour working day. Also, in July, tramdrivers went on strike 
and there was a total stoppage of buses and trams in Recife 
(Brayner [1987:169]).
There was no strike in Pernambuco in 1933. However, in 
1934, the May Day rally ended with violent clashes between the 
police and workers. In May, drivers went on strike against a 
high tax the government had imposed on them and, in July, 
telegraphists went on a national strike. This was the first 
time civil servants had been on strike in Pernambuco.
In 1935 the federal government was willing to issue a 
National Security Law (LSN), which would possibly be used 
against unionists. There were, as a consequence, numerous 
strikes against such a law. The government repressed such 
strikes with violence. In Recife, many workers promoted a one- 
day strike. Some workers continued the strike beyond one day 
to demand better wages. In the following months, printing 
workers, dockers, food industry workers, bakers, civil 
engineering workers and railwaymen went on strike in support 
of better wages.
In November 1935, a communist uprising took place. The 
communists took power in Natal, Rio G. do Norte state’s 
capital city. This uprising was led by the army’s communist
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officials and sergeants with the support of dozens of workers. 
In Recife, a battalion rebelled and there was a bloody fight. 
The government repression was tough and hundreds of people 
were arrested and tortured. In 1936 and 1937 there were no 
strikes due to the National Security Law (LSN), and the state 
of siege and war. On the other hand, the Ministry of Labour 
started to replace the radical union leaders by conservative 
officials.
2.3. The Democratic Period: 1945-64
According to Soares [1982:121],
"In Pernambuco, the ease of the Ministry of Labour’s 
control [over the unions after 1945]...permitted intense 
and open activity for independent and communist 
unionists...".
Telles [1981:43] tells how the workers’ political 
activities re-emerged at the beginning of the 1950s. According 
to him, in 1951, there were three important strikes in 
Pernambuco: weavers, bus drivers and paper industry workers 
went on strike in support of wage increases.
In 1952, the weavers of Paulista and other towns went on 
strike again (Lopes [1988]). In May, the weavers started to 
prepare a campaign to demand a wage increase. They elected a 
wage committee and elaborated a list of demands, whose main 
points were economic demands.
In Pernambuco, as in the whole of Brazil, the major 
political debate was about the path for economic development. 
According to analyses current at the time, there would be a 
conservative sector represented by the big landowners, who 
were opposed to «progress», and a somewhat progressive urban
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and industrial bourgeoisie, who should be won to the «full 
development of capitalism» in Brazil. The labour movement was 
in the middle of this debate due to the influence of the 
Communist Party.
In 1955 the Communist Party founded the Congress for the 
Northeast’s Salvation. The aim of this congress was to discuss 
ideas and plans for regional development. Union leaders and 
rank-and-file together gathered to discuss not only wage 
matters, but also to provide support for the congress. In 1958 
the communists took over the Workers’ Inter-Union Council 
(CONSINTRA), a union advisory committee to the Pernambuco 
government (Cf. Soares [1982:122-3]). In that year, the First 
Pernambuco Workers* Congress took place. Among the main points 
discussed were those related to national subjects: land
reform, industrial development, nationalization of foreign 
banks and economic policies to reduce inflation (Jaccoud 
[1990:67] ) .
Nevertheless, more than one author has pointed out the 
fragility of trade unionism during this period in Brazil, 
which is also true of the Pernambuco case. Indeed, there was 
a unionism of top leaders. There were many intermediate union 
organizations that were created to co-ordinate the many 
existent unions. However, these union organizations engaged 
themselves in political bargaining with the government without 
the participation of the rank-and-file (Almeida & Lowy [1976: 
103 and 106]; Alves [1989:45]; and Keck [1989:253-4]). When 
the military took power through the 1964 coup, these 
intermediate union organizations called upon the unions to 
strike. However, there was no answer. In spite of the apparent 
strength, the unions were weak and they could not react
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against powerful weapons.
2.4. The Period of the Military Government
The 1964 coup was violent. Many unionists were arrested, 
tortured, killed or disappeared. In Pernambuco, most of the 
unions were subject to direct intervention and direct 
government control. As a result of the weakness of the unions 
and the gap between leaders and the rank-and-file there was 
no reaction to face the violent repression. The military took 
to the simple strategy of arresting union leaders, and the 
rest of the movement stood paralysed. The only reaction was 
from rural workers. However, confronting the strength of the 
military’s weaponry, rural leaders preferred to advise the 
workers to stay indoors (Jaccoud [1990:143]).
Officials of those unions subject to government 
intervention were replaced by state appointed officials who 
supported the new government. These union state appointed 
officials were influenced by sectors of the Catholic Church, 
by conservative and right-wing agencies, or simply opposed the 
populist, reformist unionism.
From then on, the unions became, as in the rest of the 
country, agencies to provide the affiliated workers with 
social assistance. There was no room for political manoeuvre 
due to strict government control. The only union activities 
related to labour problems referred to denunciations resulting 
from lack of enforcement of the Labour Code.
According to Jaccoud [1990:147], in spite of the violent 
repression, the labour movement had not been finished off. The 
union leaders who had managed to escape imprisonment started
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to participate once again in union life. Those unionists who 
were lucky enough to continue in their unions behaved strictly 
inside the legal framework because it was very dangerous to 
make demands as they had before the coup.
At the beginning of the 1970s an independent labour 
movement started to appear amongst youth groups formed by the 
Catholic Church, which gradually began to criticize the 
government. In Pernambuco, most of the union leaders of the 
1980s gained experience inside movements linked to the Church.
Around 1978 a group of printing workers, shop assistants, 
metalworkers and weavers started to meet frequently. Their aim 
was to begin to participate in those unions managed by the 
pelegos, because in these there were still many workers. This 
could allow them to promote militant activism amongst their 
fellow workers. On the other hand, as the pelegos were not 
interested in developing campaigns of unionization or 
discussions about labour problems, these young militants began 
to operate inside plants. Their strategy was to discuss issues 
that could make workers think about the role of the unions
a
(Centro Josue de Castro [1988:39]; and interview No. 8 ).
Sometimes there were denunciations about the workers 
situation. These denunciations were not only about low wages, 
but also about employment opportunities. In 1979, the Catholic 
Labour Action (ACO) revealed that many factories were closing 
down. Other ones were simply dismissing employees without 
replacing them. For this reason, this organization called upon 
workers to take up a more decisive position to face such 
problems concerning the working class (Jornal do ComSrcio, 10
Q
Full details of each interview are given in appendix I.
78
April 1979) .
The 1978 May Day was commemorated by a number of 
militants linked to the Catholic Labour Action (ACO). They 
decided to expand the celebrations by inviting other workers. 
However, there was no room for union officials, as they were 
seen as supporting the State. This event was a root for the 
formation of the Union Opposition Group, as those militants 
invited were already trying to form groups to confront 
conservative union officials.
However, in 1978, the general picture was still one of 
fear and terror vis-a-vis the authoritarian and repressive 
state. Some of the basic rights were denied to workers. Only 
a handful of union officials complained about the breaking of 
labour laws by the employers, bad working conditions and low 
wages. If these complaints meant any demand for a wage 
increase, this was envisaged inside the legal framework of the 
economic policy established by the government and demands were 
aimed at the State, seen as a neutral entity above society, 
which could solve workers* problems.
On the other hand, the news about trade unions shows a 
picture in which they were only dealing with social assistance 
services. The Bank Workers* Union, for instance, was starting 
to give bank workers* widows medical assistance (Diario de 
Pernambuco, 3 June 1978).
During the first few days of 1979, there was a threat of 
strike action in Recife. Five hundred taxi-drivers threatened 
to go on strike to demand a taxi tariff increase (Jornal do 
ComSrcio, 6 Jan. 1979).
At the same time, some categorias started to undertake 
political action. Pernambuco state schools* teachers began to
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rebel against the officials of their association. These 
teachers attended a public meeting to discuss their demands 
which should later have been sent to the governor. During the 
meeting some teachers disagreed with the association 
president’s management. Some teachers said that the president 
of their association represented the state rather than the 
teachers because he refused the formation of a committee to 
deliver the list of demands to the state governor (Jornal do 
Comercioj 12 April 1979). At the end, he had to accept the 
formation of such a committee. A letter was then written with 
21 points related to economic demands, better working 
conditions, and control over working time.
At the same time, a public gathering was held by the 
Teachers* Union to discuss a list of demands. Some teachers 
criticized the way the board of directors called the meeting. 
They declared that, it seemed, the officials did not intend 
to have a true assembly. At this meeting some of the radical 
militants who took over this union in the 1980s managed to 
have their proposals, which referred to wage increases and job 
stability, approved (Jornal do Comercio, 25 and 26 April
1979).
As the disputes grew worse, both the union and the 
association established a time limit to have their demands 
met, otherwise they would strike. What followed, then, was the 
organization of the strikes. The government was still trying 
to delay any discussion, and the private schools* owners did 
not believe, it seemed, in any strike during that period. The 
teachers* strategy in order to legitimize their strikes before 
public opinion was to link the fight for better wages with 
improved teaching quality. They often said they could not
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teach properly as they earned such low wages.
As the options about the means to fight in order to 
secure wage increases began to became clearer, so did the 
political positions of some union officials. The presidents 
of the Watchmen’s and of the Private School Teachers’ Unions 
(the latter pushed by the militancy of the teachers) disagreed 
with the Minister of Labour about threats against strikers. 
However, the president of the Bank Workers’ Union declared he 
supported the Minister by saying that the union had accepted 
only a 20% wage increase, as a vote of confidence in the 
Figueiredo government, which provoked angry reactions from an 
opposition group of bank workers who were willing to challenge 
the union’s president during the coming union elections in 
(Jornal do Comerciot 13 May 19 79).
Meanwhile, the organization of the strike of the state 
school teachers continued. The governmental position was a 
mixture of calls for negotiation and threats. The head of the 
Regional Labour Office (DRT) also threatened the teachers 
(Jornal do Comercio, 17 and 19 May 1979).
As the possibility of a state school teachers’ strike 
became nearer, the association’s president managed to 
disassociate himself from the movement. As a meeting was 
scheduled to be held at the association’s headquarters, he 
simply locked the doors and disappeared. According to most of 
the teachers who attended the meeting, he was afraid of losing 
his privileges at the association as he used the association’s 
properties as his own (Jornal do Comerciot 27 May 1979).
Finally, at the end of May, the private schools* teachers 
and the state schools* teachers both went on strike. All 
attempts to negotiate had failed. The participation of the
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private schools’ teachers was high and a few pickets avoided 
those who went to work. However, the participation of the 
state schools’ teachers was not too high in Pernambuco as a 
whole. In towns far from the capital city there was no strike. 
Strikers were concentrated in Greater Recife.
After seven days, the strike of the private schools* 
teachers ended and they won partial job stability, permission 
to attend the union’s meetings during working time without 
losing wages, a 58% wage increase, and permission to fix a 
board for union news in any teachers* rooms (Jornal do 
Comercio, 6 June 1979; and Mendonga & Medeiros [1989:10]). 
However, the strike of the state schools’ teachers was 
hardening as neither parties were willing to give up their 
positions. The government hardened and the threats to dismiss 
all strikers increased. In order to force the government to 
meet their demands, they even surrounded the State Education 
Office building by camping on its footpath. Finally, the 
teachers decided to call the strike off after one month as 
there was no negotiation.
Through the description of these strikes I intend to show 
the pattern of such political action in Pernambuco. I pointed 
out above the main characteristics of the «new unionism» that 
emerged in Brazil at the end of the 1970s. These strikes in 
Pernambuco I have just described show that those patterns were 
not present everywhere in Brazil. Indeed, there was a re- 
emergence of labour militancy in Pernambuco, but its 
characteristics were different from the labour militancy in 
the Southeast Region,
These strikes in Pernambuco show, at least, three 
features: 1) they did not happen in the modern sectors of the
82
economy; 2) none of them happened in the traditional factory, 
that is, the workers who took part in the strikes were not the 
traditional working class; and 3) they were led by informal 
leaders outside the circle of official union leaders, as a 
result of the disbelief of the workers in the union officials. 
When union officials participated in the strike, as in the 
case of the Teachers* Union, they did so because they were 
«pushed» into the movement. In the case of the president of 
the Teachers* Association, he was dismissed by a teachers* 
assembly and a new board of directors, who were chosen from 
amongst the informal leaders who had directed the organization 
of the strike, was elected. In the Sao Paulo case, there were 
some union officials who had promoted a «transformation from 
inside» and led the big strikes of 1978-80, or there were a 
number of factory committees that organized and led such 
strikes. However, in Pernambuco the process was somehow 
different. There were no union officials who promoted a 
«transformation from inside». Indeed, unofficial leaders, that 
is, lay members of the unions, took over the leadership of the 
movement and led the strikes. On the other hand, there were 
no factory committees at the workplace to organize such 
strikes. Indeed, the only factory committee that existed in 
Pernambuco, during this period, was founded in the mid-1980s 
after a number of strikes had occurred. This committee, 
however, disappeared after management dismissed all its 
members. On the other hand, another organization at the 
workplace level was set up by bank workers. In this case, it 
was a gain achieved by the employees of the state-owned Banco 
do Brasil without union help.
Finally, scholars who studied the Sao Paulo case pointed
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out that one of these labour movement's characteristics was 
to aim their demands at the employers and not at the State. 
The Pernambuco case shows that, at least at the beginning, 
there was not a strong case for direct negotiations.
In June 1979, there was another important political 
activity in Recife, which strengthens this point about the 
nature of the sectors where the «new unionism» emerged in 
Pernambuco. As I pointed out above, a number of workers, at 
this time, demanded a wage increase due to governmental 
falsifications on the inflation rate. A number of workers in 
Pernambuco also demanded such a wage increase. The electricity 
workers of the federal state-owned Companhia Hidreletrica do 
Sao Francisco (CHESF) and the Pernambuco-owned Companhia de 
Eletrif icagao de Pernambuco (CELPE) campaigned to get this 
wage increase. A group of informal leaders put pressure on 
union officials to lead a campaign to put forward such a 
demand, which was successful. It was followed by the 1979 wage 
campaign and the new leaders were active in leading it. A 
committee for negotiation was set up and the group of informal 
leaders managed to have some of its members in this committee. 
In practice, the union officials had to give up the leadership 
of this movement (Cf. interview No. 33). A strike that hit 
both firms followed. There were threats to dismiss employees 
who were on strike, as these were key plants for the 
functioning of the economy and the military treated the 
electricity sector as a matter of national security.
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2.5. The Development in the 1980s
In general, those groups of militants of different 
sectors who were in opposition to conservative union officials 
carried on meeting regularly by founding a union opposition 
group. They promoted a number of joint events and organized 
lists of demands in which they asked for better working 
conditions and wage increases. Their first large demonstration 
took place in 1980, when they demonstrated against 
«unemployment». This opposition group was also a kind of 
mixture as it was formed by radical people who had won 
elections in their unions, as in the case of the urban 
(electricity and water) workers and by people who were still 
in the opposition, as in the case of the bank workers.
In 1981, workers in Brazil were planning to hold a 
national meeting called First National Conference of the 
Working Classes (CONCLAT). In Pernambuco, the Urban Workers* 
Union and the Rural Workers* Union Federation (FETAPE), 
together with some opposition groups organized the local 
meeting, which was required to precede the national meeting 
(Mendonga & Medeiros [1989:14-5]).
However, as the labour movement became stronger, 
divergences amongst the many political persuasions started to 
emerge by the time the II National Conference of the Working 
Classes (CONCLAT) took place in 1982. There were two main 
factions. The first one, called «combative block», which 
supported the idea that the meeting should take place as 
scheduled, and the second one, called «union unity», which
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supported the idea that it should be postponed^. The split 
between these two factions took place in Brazil as a whole and 
included Pernambuco. In this state, the first group was 
supported by the Metalworkers’, which had been taken over by 
unionists linked to the «combative block», by the Insurance 
Workers’, and by the Watchmen’s Unions and by the Teachers’ 
Association. The Teachers’ Union was divided into two groups 
because its officials were divided into tendencies which 
supported both factions. On the other hand, the «union unity» 
group was mainly supported by the Urban Workers’ Union and by 
the Rural Workers* Union Federation (FETAPE). Finally, this 
movement split when the Workers’ United Central (CUT) was 
founded. Later, the «union unity» faction supported the 
foundation of another union central called National 
Coordination of the Working Classes (CONCLAT).
2.4.1. Summary
In short, this description of the history of labour 
conflicts in Pernambuco points to a number of conclusions. 
Over time, strikes and demonstrations shifted from some 
categorias to others. From the early 20th-century to the mid- 
1960s, weavers, dockers, railwaymen and tramdrivers were the 
main political actors in strikes, rallies or demonstrations 
when demanding better wages and working conditions. After the 
1964 coup, the labour movement that emerged was a changed one.
^ Another main aspect causing divergence among these 
unionists was related to political conceptions on union 
structure. The «combative block» favoured union plurality 
while the «union unity» favoured only one union for each 
economic sector.
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The importance of the textile industry had declined and 
weavers were no longer in the forefront of the labour movement 
in Pernambuco. It emerged through a new working class based 
not on the old factory system, but on other economic sectors. 
This does not mean, of course, that the traditional working 
class did not go on strike. On the contrary, they went on 
strike and sometimes were in the forefront of disputes. 
However, what I intended to show was that they did not 
effectively lead the labour movement any longer. Other workers 
such as teachers and public servants were leading, both in 
organizational terms and in the number of strikes.
However, as the «new unionism» movement spread from the 
Southeast region to other regions and from the modern, private 
sector to others, the Pernambuco case is a clear example that 
the re-emergence of trade unionism in this state was not based 
on modern, large factories or on private sectors* employees. 
Indeed, from the very beginning, strikes hit the public sector 
or sectors other than the modern one. Moreover, as the unions’ 
strength increases, the picture becomes clearer. The power of 
Pernambuco trade unions is based on the public sector. In the 
early 1980s, there were a number of strikes in the metal 
sector, but soon strikes in the public sector outnumbered 
these. According to Koury [1989:20-1], civil servants were 
responsible for most of the strikes in Pernambuco in 1987-88. 
Finally, one cannot see, retrospectively, a firm call for the 
State to give up its role as mediator in labour disputes. Of 
course, again there were some individual voices that called 
for free negotiations between employees and employers. 
However, this did not become a feature of the Pernambuco trade 
unions before the mid-1980s. Indeed, until more or less the
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mid-1980s, most union officials supported the view that the 
State should be a permanent mediator in any labour disputes.
TABLE 2.1. URBAN STRIKES IN PERNAMBUCO, 1983-89
YEAR 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 TO­
TAL
MON.
JAN 1 - 1 4 2 3 5 16
FEB - - - - 10 8 8 26
MAR - 1 2 1 19 12 25 60
APR - - - 3 4 9 13 29
MAY 1 1 4 8 8 3 8 33
JUNE - 1 10 5 10 1 9 36
JULY 1 1 1 4 7 6 9 29
AUG - 2 3 13 8 17 17 60
SEPT - - 4 9 16 11 17 57 1
OCT 1 1 5 6 13 19 24 69 1
NOV - - 5 5 21 7 17 55 1
DEC 1 1 2 8 13 10 9 44 |
TO­
TAL
5 8 37 66 131 106 161 514
Source: Boletim do DIEESE, Jornal do Comerciot Informe
Sindical, Diario de Pernambuco, Folha Sindical, and 
Reports of the Regional Labour Office (DRT).
3. THE UNIONS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE SAMPLE
This section provides information on the unions I intend 
to analyse in terms of history, membership, places and firms 
where workers are unionized and internal organization of the 
six unions that are included in my sample.
These unions are the following: 1) the Teachers*
Association; 2) the Bank Workers* Union; 3) the Urban Workers* 
Union; 4) the Metalworkers* Union; 5) the Data Processing
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Workers’ Union; and 6) the Teachers’ Union.
Four of these union were founded before the 1964 coup: 
the Bank Workers* in 1931; the Urban Workers* in 1953; the 
Metalworkers’ in 1935; and the Teachers’ Union in 1941. On the 
other hand, two unions were founded in the post-1964: the
Teachers* Association in 1967 and the Data Processing Workers’ 
Union in 1985 which replaced an association which existed to 
organize data processing professionals. In 1990 the Teachers’ 
Association ceased to exist as it was replaced by a union, 
which was then formed from three different associations that 
represented all workers of the state educational sector.
All union founded before 1964 were subject to 
intervention by the military in the months following the 1964 
coup. In the post-1964, these unions, apart from the Data 
Processing Workers’, were run by conservative officials 
closely identified with the military. These conservative 
unionists alternated the top posts between themselves until 
the late 1970s and early 1980s when most of the unions were 
won by radical militants.
«New unionist» leaders took over the Teachers* 
Associations in 1979, the Bank Workers* in 1988, the Urban 
Workers* in 1980 and the Metalworkers’ in 1981. The Teachers’ 
Union has a different history. As from 1982 this union was run 
by an alliance of conservative and communist officials and as 
from 1985 it has been run by an alliance of left-wing 
officials led by the Trotskyists. Finally, the Data Processing 
Workers* Union has been run by «new unionist» officials since 
its inception.
These unions represent workers from a number of economic 
sectors. The geographical area represented by them is the
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whole of Pernambuco, with the exception of the Bank Workers* 
Union which represents workers from all Pernambuco towns but 
Garanhuns and Caruaru, which are represented by the other two 
bank workers* unions in the state. During the period analysed 
in this thesis the Teachers* Association organized teachers 
from state schools and from some town halls. The three major 
employers were, in 1986, Pernambuco state and the Caruaru and 
Garanhuns town halls. The Bank Workers* Union is the third 
largest bank workers* union in the country and represents 
employees from federally- and state- owned banks and employees 
from private banks. The main banks where it attracts its 
members are Banco do Estado de Pernambuco, Banco do Brasil, 
and Banco Nacional do Norte. The Urban Workers* Union 
represents employees from three state owned firms. These firms 
are: the Companhia Hidreletrica do Sao Francisco (CHESF) which 
produces and distributes power for regional electricity firms 
and some large plants in the Northeastern area; the Pernambuco 
owned Companhia de Eletrificagao de Pernambuco (CELPE) which 
distributes power for individual and some collective consumers 
in Pernambuco, takes care of maintenance of electrical cables 
and power stations, and sends the monthly bills to customers; 
and the Companhia de Saneamento do Estado de Pernambuco 
(COMPESA) which has the responsibility for the maintenance of 
water stations, water supply, and sanitation.
The Metalworkers* Union organizes workers from the steel 
and metal industry and its membership is wide ranging. There 
are as many as 500 plants in the municipalities of Recife’s 
metropolitan region. The main companies where it attracts its 
members are as follows: COSINOR, NORAQO, MICROLITE, Maquinas 
Piratininga and CODISTIL. The Data Processing Workers* Union
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represents a wide range of different professionals who work 
for data processing firms of Pernambuco. The largest firms 
which employ a great number of workers are: the federally
owned SERPROt the Pernambuco state-owned FISEPE-CETEPE, and 
the Recife town hall owned EMPREL. These are also the firms 
in which this union is best organized with a great number of 
unionized workers. Finally, the Teachers* Union represents 
teachers of private schools in the whole of Pernambuco State.
TABLE 2.2. THE NUMBER OF UNION MEMBERS, 1978-89
UNIONS Teachs * 
Assoc.
Bank
Works’
Union
Urban
Works*
Union
Metal 
Works * 
Union
Data 
Proc. W. 
Union
Teachs * 
Union
YEARS
1978 2,500 10,024 - - - 3,883
1979 2,604 8,914 - 5,763 - 4,166
1980 300 - - - - 4,332
1982 - 12,240 - 6,200 - 5,134
1983 - 14,006 - 4,200 - 5,599
1985 - - - 5,500 824 6,588
1986 5,419 15,596 9,396 - 1,286 6,933
1987 7,689 - 9,597 7,006 1,740 7,222
1988 9,001 15,900 11,500 - 2,051 8,077
1989 10,656 - - - 2,597 9,763
Sources: FISEPE-CETEPE, Regional Labour Office (DRT),
CEAS-Recife, Data Processing Workers* Union, and 
Teachers* Union
In terms of ideological and/or party. Most of these 
unions are linked to the Workers* Party (PT) and to the 
Workers’ United Central (CUT). The exception is the Urban 
Workers* Union whose officials are linked to the former 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and during the 1980s they did 
not affiliate but supported the National Coordination of the 
Working Classes (CONCLAT). Finally, it is worth noting that
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the Teachers* Union was linked to the National Coordination 
of the Working Classes (CONCLAT) during the period when it was 
run by the conservative-communist alliance. The alliance led 
by the Trotskyists after taking power managed to affiliate it 
to the Workers’ United Central (CUT).
There have been a number of strikes in these sectors. In 
the educational sector strikes organized either by the 
Teachers* Association or by the Teachers* Union involve 
teachers from different schools in a single action. On the 
other hand, strikes in the other sectors have been happening 
on a plant by plant basis. In other words, strikes in these 
sectors do not involve all workers from the same sector in a 
single action such as in the educational sector. These unions 
concentrate their action when organizing strikes in the 
largest and/or most strategically important firms. In the case 
of the Bank Workers* Union, strikes occurred mainly in the 
Banco do Brasil because this bank has played a strategic role 
in the Brazilian financial system. Finally, it is worth 
stressing that there have been a number of strikes in several 
private data processing firms although these have not been 
recorded by the agencies which collect data on strike in 
Brazil. However, there have been a number of strikes in the 
private data processing firms. These strikes do not last for 
more than a few hours and seem to go undetected by the 
agencies that compile data on strikes, either because of the 
strikes’ short duration or because of their definition of 
«strike».
92
TABLE 2.3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNIONS OF THE SAMPLE
CHARACTER. PRIVATE
SECTOR
STATE SECTOR LINKS
WITH
PARTIES
(WHICH)
LINKS 
WITH PO­
LITICAL 
PERSUA­
SIONS IN­
SIDE BRA­
ZILIAN 
UNIONISM
UNIONS Fed. Stat Mun.
Urban 
Workers * 
Union
No Yes Yes No PCB/
PMDB
CGT
Priv. Sch. 
Teachers * 
Union
Yes No No No PCB CGT
PT CUT
Bank Work. 
Union
Yes Yes Yes No PT/
PCdoB
from
1988
CGT
CUT
Metalwork. 
Union
Yes Yes No No PT CUT
Publ. Sch. 
Teachers * 
Associat.
No No Yes No PT CUT
Data
Processing 
I Workers *
I Union
Yes Yes Yes Yes PT CUT
Source: Morais
Legends:
CGT - Workers’ General Central 
CUT - Workers* United Central 
PCB - Brazilian Communist Party 
PCdoB - Communist Party of Brazil
PMDB - Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
PT - Workers* Party
In short, these unions just described above allow a 
number of comparisons. First, they belong to different 
economic sectors and their individual experiences are useful 
to understand and explain how labour militancy and protest 
emerged in Pernambuco from late 1970s onwards. Apart from the 
Teachers* Association and the Union, which represent workers 
from the same economic sector, all unions represent workers
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who are employed in important and different productive 
sectors. Thus, I will be able throughout this study to set up 
major comparisons stressing experiences from five economic 
sectors.
These unions represent a wide spectrum. They represent 
both blue- and white-collar workers: 1) one includes workers 
exclusively from the private sector; 2) two include workers 
exclusively from the public sector; 3) three unions represent 
employees from both public and private sectors; 4) the three 
Brazilian political-administrative levels are represented; and 
5) these unions also represent some important economic 
sectors: power and sanitation, education, data processing, 
metallurgy, steel and electric-electronic industries, and the 
financial sector. Moreover, they represent the main political 
persuasions that exist within the Brazilian union movement.
The industrial action they took during the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s is very illustrative of the paths they 
chose in order to put forward their demands. Their individual 
stories show that new labour leaders exerted a strong 
influence on the way the unions developed their industrial 
action. Apart from the Data Processing Workers* Union, in all 
unions new, radical labour leaders led campaigns and 
challenged the power of conservative officials. Those workers 
who went on strike, whose unions which were run by 
conservative unionists, did so outside their unions, sometimes 
against the union officials’ will.
Another conclusion is that, in the late 1970s and during 
the 1980s, the pattern of strikes in Pernambuco has been that 
in which strikes happen in individual firms. In other words, 
strikes which do not necessarily involve all workers of the
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same categoria. Not even all workers represented by the same 
union. The case of the Urban Workers’ Union is illustrative 
of this fact. None of the strikes that took place in this 
sector involved in a single action employees of the three 
firms in which the Urban Workers’ Union organizes workers. The 
counterpart of this pattern is the teachers. Both the union 
and the association have been able to organize most of their 
strikes involving teachers of a number of schools and towns. 
On the other hand, in those unions that represent workers both 
from private and public sectors, public sector employees have 
been striking more than the former have.
Finally, the unions have been utilizing a number of 
different strategies in their fight to deliver goods to their 
members because of the nature of the sectors from which they 
unionize. The diversity shown by this sample will allow me to 
make an important number of comparisons which can help to 
understand the «new unionism» unions* policies in the 1980s.
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CHAPTER XIX
UNION «BUREAUCRACY» AND LABOUR
CONFLICTS
1. INTRODUCTION
After 1930 the Brazilian state started regulating trade 
union activities. One of the main aspects of the legislation 
ruling on union activities was related to the regulation of 
service of social assistance that the unions should provide 
for their membership.
The role of the unions as organizations aiming to provide 
their membership with social assistance was reinforced by the 
military who took power in 1964. Thus, when the «new unionism» 
emerged, one of its main criticisms of the role of the unions 
and of the conservative officials was that the unions were 
«bureaucratic» organizations^. Eduardo Luczinski, president 
of the Textile Workers* Union of Sao Paulo in 1978 stated it 
clearly:
"If the unions are welfare orientated, this is so because
It is worth stressing that the use of terms like 
bureaucracy and bureaucratization in the Brazilian union 
movement is not exactly related to their classical definition 
in the sociology of Max Weber and in the subsequent sociology 
of organizations. It is rather meant to highlight the process 
by which unions built their apparatus to run social services. 
In this case, even when unions do not have huge bureaucratic 
apparatuses in the classical sense, the term has been used by 
unionists and scholars studying the Brazilian trade unionism 
alike to signify that process as well as the attachment of 
conservative union officials to this role as the only one to 
be performed by the unions. I will be using both terms and 
related ones in the sense that they have been used in the 
context of the Brazilian labour movement.
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the [conservative] union officials have been making them 
agencies for social assistance services instead of a wage 
demanding role" (Escrita Ensaio [1978:28]) .
Lula, the main leader of the strikes of 1978 and 1979,
also remarked that:
"I think that the union’s job is to show the working 
class the truth, to show them that the union is there to 
assist , but that the union cannot do shit for the 
working class, except in individual cases. But in the 
group sense we can do very little for the worker... It *s 
to have guts to say that the union is tied, is castrated, 
and that it’s the workers who will resolve the problems" 
(Silva [1979:95]).
On the other hand, after 1978 the «new unionism» 
unionists have also been trying to expand the size of the 
unions* organizational apparatus towards other directions. In 
fact, their criticism of the welfare orientation of the «old» 
unionism was that, in spite of its organizational apparatus, 
it did not provide for the strengthening of the ties between 
the union and the membership, i.e., the absence of the union 
of the workplace (Cf. Keck [1989:256]). In other words, the 
problem seems to lie not in the size of the «bureaucracy»
12 The same point was stressed by other unionists and 
legal advisers during these discussions sponsored by the 
journal Escrita Ensaio. See particularly the contributions of 
L&zaro A. Cruz, vice-president of the Metalworkers’ Union 
Federation of Sao Paulo; Valdecirio T. Veras, lawyer of the 
Metalworkers* Unions of Sao Bernardo and Santo Andre, Sao 
Paulo state; and Hugo Perez, president of the Urban Workers’ 
Union Federation of Sao Paulo. In Pernambuco, in 1977, a group 
of workers from the metropolitan region of Recife released a 
pamphlet in which they say:
"We want to denounce the farce and emptiness of our 
unions nowadays. They have become agencies for social 
assistance and for the retired, acting as the national 
health service" (Pamphlet issued on 20 Nov. 1977 by a 
group of workers of Recife and its metropolitan region).
13 I am quoting from the English translation of an 
interview Lula gave to the journal Cara a Cara in 1978. In the 
original version, Lula refers explicitly to the fact that "o 
sindicato e assistencialista" (The union is welfare 
orientated).
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itself, but in the way it had been used by the conservative 
unionists. Therefore, the «new unionism» unionists have even 
had, sometimes, to increase the number of officials in order 
to meet the new needs in terms of links with the workplace.
As Keck [1989:272] puts it in relation to developments
likely to happen in «new unionism» policies:
"[A] development [which] seem[s] likely as result of a 
shift in emphasis to plant-level bargaining, shop floor 
activism, and concern with working conditions... is a 
change in the functions of the union leadership, away 
from bureaucratic tasks related to the administration of 
social assistance programs and towards the coordination 
of shop floor demands and activities, and the development 
of bargaining strategies...”.
Thus, the general aim of this chapter is to provide an 
analysis of the development of unions’ organizational 
structure after the emergence of the «new unionism)). This will 
be done, firstly, through the analysis of the unions in terms 
of social services and «bureaucracy», and the relationship
r
between these aspects of union life and the tendency of the 
unions to be more or less militant. In other words, I analyse 
the impact of «bureaucratic» tendencies on the policy making 
of the unions in Pernambuco in the 1980s. Secondly, I analyse 
the development in the unions* structure towards the 
establishment of links between themselves and the workplace.
2. THE «BUREAUCRATIZATION» OF TRADE UNIONS IN BRAZIL
It must be stressed that the «bureaucratization» of trade 
unions in Brazil is a post-1930 phenomenon. Simao [1981: 
chapter IV] has shown, by analysing the Sao Paulo case, that 
during the first three decades of this century trade unions 
had not established any formal «bureaucracy» at all. This was
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not only due to the small size of services or lack of 
financial resources, but mainly due to ideological principles. 
The anarchists refused to accept the role of trade unions as 
organizations providing the workers with social services. They 
believed that such a move would have a negative impact on the 
mind of the working class. If a structure for social services 
was to be established, instead of seeing trade unions as a 
means to fight the capitalist system, workers would use it to 
have access to social services that were denied by the State.
Only with the labour laws of 1931 and 1934 (Simao [1981: 
171]), which were incorporated into the Consolidation of 
Labour Laws (CLT), did the unions start building their 
«bureaucracies». Before 1930 the work of trade unions was done 
by volunteers. Under the new system established by the 
Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT) trade unions were able to 
employ permanent paid staff to run their daily businesses. 
They had to do so in order to meet the increasing quantity of 
work ascribed to them by the State. As I showed in chapter I, 
article 514 of the Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT) provides 
a list of duties to be carried out by the unions, which refers 
to social services to be provided for the membership. This 
means that unions had to build «bureaucracies» not only to run 
internal businesses, but also to meet the demands of the rank- 
and-file in terms of access to social assistance. Simao shows 
that this was possible thanks to the creation of the imposto 
sindical (union tax) (Cf. Costa [1986:148-63]).
On the other hand, the military government, which took 
power in 1964, put stress on this side of union life. 
According to Martins ([1979:115-6]. Cf. M.H.M. Alves [1984:81] 
and [1989:43]; and Moises [1979:55]), along with the already
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traditional functions of giving the rank-and-file medical, 
hospital and pharmaceutical assistance, the military added new 
functions which stressed the «bureaucratic» character of trade 
unions and the managerial role of their officials (Keck [1989: 
256-7]; and Lowy [1987:461]).
As Martins [1979:163] shows, in Brazil
"The union bureaucratization was not a result of the 
trade unions willing to organize themselves in terms of 
complex administrative processes to deal with demands 
arising from the rank-and-fileM.
Neither was it the need to
"Employ paid staff to do the work of organizing, 
discovering information, planning strategy, etc..." 
(Crouch [1982:162]),
nor the need to have a technically competent bureaucracy to
face the dominant class (Michels [1962]), or even to supervise
collective bargaining agreements (Clegg [1976]). Indeed, the
main reason was the dominant role of the Brazilian State as
regulator of each aspect of the unions* life as well as the
growing number of tasks they had to meet in terms of social
assistance services.
Many of the Pernambuco trade unions have been building 
an infrastructure over the years to provide social assistance 
for their membership, for social welfare services that should 
be provided by the State were transferred to the unions. 
Outside the urban realm, many of the rural trade unions also 
have as their principal activity the task of providing their 
membership with social and medical assistance. In another work 
(Morais [1988]) I showed that the only activity maintained by 
the union I was then analysing was, roughly speaking, to 
organize a timetable for its members to see physicians and/or 
dentists.
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Even for trade unions run by radical unionists it has 
been difficult to avoid such a profile. It seems that the poor 
quality of the Brazilian health service, and the labour law 
until 1988, have been forcing union officials to run such 
services. On the other hand, even those «new unionism)) 
officials who emerged during and after the 1978 strikes have 
been unable to put an end to such services. Sader ([1988:280- 
2]. Cf. Humphrey [1979a:77]) shows that officials of the 
Metalworkers’ Union of Sao Bernardo, who came to be known as 
the pillar of the «new unionism)) in Brazil from 1978, realized 
the importance of maintaining such services. In the union’s 
newspaper officials showed that they were proud of the new 
laboratory for clinical analysis, the new ambulance, the new 
infirmary, the drugstore, etc.
Thus, union officials have to spend a lot of time in 
management of the union apparatus as well as the coordination 
of the «bureaucracy» employed to run these activities (Keck 
[1989:257]). I will be looking at how the unions of Pernambuco 
have been dealing with this aspect during the decade following 
the re-emergence of labour protests of 1978-79. It has been 
argued that union officials whose unions have a huge 
«bureaucratic» apparatus would spend much of their time 
dealing with managerial issues rather than organizing the 
workers politically, and I will look at the evidence provided 
by the experience of trade unions in Pernambuco to evaluate 
whether the latter gives this hypothesis support. I will also 
analyse the organization of the unions at the workplace in 
order to understand how these facts influence the unions’ 
approach to labour problems.
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3. THE UNIONS’ SOCIAL SERVICES
Most of the unions I am investigating either employ or 
maintain agreements with certain professionals to provide 
their membership with social, legal, and medical assistance. 
The infrastructure to achieve this aim has been built up over 
the years. As I pointed out in chapter II, some of them were 
won by young and left-wing officials at the beginning of the 
1980s. These officials found out in some cases that they had 
just inherited a large apparatus for social services. Thus, 
though wishing to stress the role of the union as something 
else other than a legal or medical office, they have been 
unable to avoid such an image because of the scale of the 
apparatus to provide the membership access to social 
assistance services.
So far what these officials have been able to do is to 
manage in order to give the unions a radical attitude while 
keeping the social services running. They understand that 
after almost fifty years it is difficult to finish such 
services. According to some data available to the unions, it 
seems that most of the workers join their unions in order to 
have the right to see the unions’ physicians, lawyers, and 
dentists. For, apart from the Data Processing Workers’ Union, 
for reasons explained below, in all unions the requirement for 
medical care is among the three main reasons why their members 
go to their headquarters (CEAS/FUNDAJ [1989]).
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TABLE 3.1. REASONS GIVEN BY UNION OFFICIALS WHY THE MEMBERSHIP 
GOES TO UNION HEADQUARTERS - 1986
UNIONS Teachers'
Union
Teachers'
Association
Urban
Workers’
Union
Metal­
workers’
Union
Bank
Workers’
Union
Data Pro­
cessing 
Workers’ 
Union
REASONS
Medical-
Odontologi-
cal
Assistance
1st Reason 3rd Reason 2nd Reason 1st Reason 1st Reason
Legal
Assistance
2nd Reason 3rd Reason 3rd Reason 2nd Reason 1st Reason
To Partici­
pate in 
Meetings
2nd Reason
To Partici­
pate in 
Assenblies
1st Reason
To Partici­
pate in 
Parties/ 
Ganes
To Partici­
pate in 
Courses
Conplaints 
About Con­
ditions at 
the Work­
place
1st Reason 2nd Reason 3rd Reason 2nd Reason
Source: CEAS/FUNDAJ (Questionnaire data [1986])
This point is stressed by a union official. In 1985, the
Metalworkers* Union was facing difficulties because of the
amount of money put into social assistance services. The union
officials decided, for this reason, to carry out a survey to
find out whether the membership would support any cut in the
amount of social services available.
"We carried out a survey and unfortunately the results 
showed that more than 90% [of the membership] were 
against any changes in policies in this area. Indeed, 
they wanted increases in social assistance. Faced with 
such a situation - 90% is a huge figure, isn’t it? - you 
couldn’t, at any point in time, dismiss such a result.
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There was no way to dismiss it. Even considering the 
proposals of the union movement which is to finish social 
assistance services, we realised that the moment for this 
is distant. We have no means to terminate the provision 
of such services. If we wanted to kill the [union] 
movement I should only terminate these services, because 
we wouldn’t have members any longer, no money for 
anything else. So, why terminate them if it could damage 
the union?" (Interview No. 9).
The spectrum of union officials’ attitudes towards the 
importance of this apparatus varies according to their 
ideology, that is, it depends on their view of what a union 
is for (Cf. M.H.M. Alves [1984:85]). Radical unionists tend 
to be critical of such a role played by trade unions. They 
think that trade unions should only play the role of a 
representative of the workers during collective bargaining, 
demonstrations, and strikes and as a means to organize the 
workers politically (Cf. Keck [1984:28]). On the other hand, 
conservative unionists stress that the role of the unions is 
to provide their membership with social and medical assistance 
and, as ordered by the labour law, to be a mediator between 
employers and employees during labour disputes.
The scale of the socio-medical services of the unions I 
am investigating is varied. Some have a large apparatus with 
dozens of professionals. Others have as few as two employees 
and a tiny medical and/or legal staff. These are extreme 
positions that are related mainly to the sort of activities 
the union should perform, according to its ruling board, as 
suggested above.
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TABLE 3.2. UNIONS* SOCIAL AND MEDICAL STAFF
EMPLOY­
EES
BUREAU­
CRATIC
STAFF
OTHER PROFESSIONALS
UNIONS Physi­
cians
Dentists Lawyers Teachers Nurses Barbers Bioche-
sist
Tea­
chers’
Union
11 - - - - - - -
Metal-
Wor­
kers’
Union
34 12 4 4 1
Urban
Wor­
kers’
Union
39 4 6 4 2 1
Bank
Wor­
kers’
Union
68 19 18 7 8
Tea­
chers'
Union
2 1 - 1 - - - -
Data
Proces­
sing
Wor­
kers’
Union
4
Source: CEAS/FUNDAJ (Questionnaire data [1986])
One must be careful with the interpretation of the table 
above. At first, one might think that there are only two 
cases, i.e., one with those unions that favour social 
assistance and maintain a large staff, and another with the 
unions that oppose any kind of social assistance. However, 
taking into consideration the sort of ideological divisions 
in terms of approaches among union officials towards the 
existence of social services inside the unions as suggested 
above and by M.H.M. Alves [1984:85], I would suggest that 
there are four cases, which will be analysed as follows: 1)
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that represented by the Bank Workers’ Union; 2) that 
represented by the Metalworkers* and the Urban Workers’ 
Unions; 3) that represented by both the Teachers* Union and 
Association; and finally, 4) that represented by the Data 
Processing Workers’ Union.
The Bank Workers’ Union was founded long before the 1964 
coup. In 1964, it was subject to state intervention and its 
board of directors replaced by unionists loyal to the 
military. The exclusion of militant left-wing unionists meant 
that the then officials implemented the military’s plans for 
the trade unions. In other words, they were able to strengthen 
the functions of social assistance in the union.
From then on, this group emphasized the role of the union 
as an organization to give workers social and medical 
assistance. These unionists were able to build the largest 
union infrastructure for social and medical assistance in 
Pernambuco. Thus, through the union’s social services, 
unionized bank workers could get much of what is not supplied 
by the state regarding health. They also built a large 
recreation club in the countryside. In short, until 1988, most 
of the union’s activities were related to social services. The 
data available shows that, during this period from 1964 until 
1988, most of the news in the union’s newspaper referred to 
social assistance matters.
In 1986, the union’s assistance services consisted of 19 
physicians, 18 dentists, 7 lawyers, and 8 teachers. Moreover, 
the union maintained a number of other agreements with medical 
laboratories, schools, opticians, and several hospitals for 
the membership, forming a powerful network of social 
assistance services (CEAS/FUNDAJ [1989]).
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In 1986, in order to manage this apparatus the union 
employed some 68 workers. With such an apparatus its officials 
had to spend a long time dealing with managerial issues. In 
other words, they had to spend more time as managers in order 
to administer the union than they spent as unionists, in the 
sense of officials who are supposed to organize the rank-and- 
file and who deal with grievances arising at the workplace. 
As the union did not have a professional administrator to 
manage it, the officials themselves had to be in charge (On 
the role of the union official as a manager, see Martins 
[1979:163-81]).
From 1964 to 1988, this union acted, almost exclusively, 
as an organization to give bank workers a variety of social 
assistance, which ranged from a school to a country club. 
Indeed, the speeches of its officials during this time show 
that they stressed this union’s fagade^. During election 
campaigns they used to emphasize achievements such as the 
provision of new medical offices and other social facilities 
(Jornal do Comercio> 28 June 1979). As I quoted above, in 
1979, some of the declarations of the union’s president were
For instance, in 1981, during the bank workers’ 
national day, the union’s president issued a message to all 
bank workers in which he stressed that the union had no links 
with any political group or party, "for our sole objective is 
to improve workers* life conditions", and that the union 
officials were working hard to improve the quality of socio­
medical services (Cf. 0 Defensor, Aug. 1981). For a similar 
experience, see the case of the Sugarmill Workers’ Union of 
Pernambuco reported by Informe Sindical, 24 Feb.-2 March 1986. 
This newspaper reports that this union, in 1986, had one of 
the best and largest union infrastructures for medico- 
odontological and legal assistance in Pernambuco. It also 
owned a large hospital and restaurant for those coming to 
Recife to see doctors. However, according to this newspaper, 
it had never organized the sugarmill workers for any wage 
campaign, but maintained excellent relations with employers 
and Pernambuco state government.
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even contrary to the working class’ demands regarding wage 
increases.
If one looks at the content of some issues of this
union’s newspaper, he or she will find that a great emphasis
was put on socio-medical services offered by the union.
Headlines stressed achievements of the union in terms of new
15services available for the membership . In 1981, this union 
was 50 years old and a number of short articles were published 
in every issue of its newspaper in that year to celebrate the 
event. As one could expect from the description above, what 
was then celebrated in terms of main achievements over 50 
years was the socio-medical services the union had been
providing. According to one article (O Defensor, Sept.
1 fi1981) , the odontological service of the union had been
founded as early as 1941. The article concludes by saying 
that, in 1981, hundreds of bank workers and their husbands/ 
wives and children had been using such services.
Along with the medical services, the legal assistance 
service provided by this union was presented as the most 
important in the union’s structure. The union did not 
restrict, of course, its activities in providing workers with 
social assistance. One can find some denunciations about some
15 This analysis refers to issues published in the period 
between 1980 to 1988. There used to be a full page informing 
its members about each service available, in terms of 
physicians with expertise in several fields.
1 C
See also interview with the union official for social 
and medical services published in this same issue. He says 
that the major importance of such services is because bank 
workers have a straight access to good medical services in a 
country where the quality of the national health service is 
poor and the services of private hospitals are too expensive 
to be afforded by workers who earn low wages (Cf. interview 
of the union’s president about the same issue in Diario de 
Pernambuco, 5 Aug. 1981).
108
banks breaching the law for not paying overtime or news about 
new wage agreements. However, these officials used to place 
stress on legal means in dealing with such problems. There was 
not any attempt to organize workers for strikes or any other 
industrial action in order to protest against the conditions 
imposed by bankers on their staff. The means to combat law 
breakers was to denounce them through the union’s newspaper 
and/or letters to the Regional Labour Office (DRT). In this 
case, the union’s lawyers played a major role in dealing with 
several bank workers’ complaints about the non-enforcement of 
the labour law. On the other hand, disputes about wage 
increases were dealt with solely as a legal matter. Disputes 
arising from the renewal of annual collective agreements were 
taken to the labour court without any mobilization of the 
rank-and-file (See 0 Defensor, May; June; July; Aug.; and 
Sept. 1981; and chapter VI).
An opposition group appeared in 1979 in this union and 
in 1982 its most important conservative official gave up union 
politics due to pressure from other less conservative 
officials. The conservative officials who remained in power 
pushed for a more militant role by taking cases of non­
enforcement of the labour law to the labour courts and by 
publicizing the wage campaigns and corresponding processes in 
the labour courts. However, in spite of all changes that may 
well have occurred in the approach of the conservative union 
officials towards labour conflicts, the evidence provided by 
this union shows that the case of unions turning to labour 
courts instead of appealing to the government as a «neutral» 
mediator does not necessarily signify a militant role. In this 
case, the union officials managed to increasingly use legal
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channels without modifying their relationship towards the 
rank-and-file.
The political position described above reveals a specific 
view on the role the unions should play. That is, that of 
avoiding labour conflicts by acting as a mediator between 
employers and employees and providing workers with social 
assistance. Thus, it is no surprise at all to see the content 
of these officials* speeches emphasizing such a role for their 
union and refusing to take militant action.
In 1986, the medical staff of this union was even greater 
than that of small towns in Pernambuco state. Or one could say 
that its staff was greater than most of the branch staff of 
some banks. When radical unionists took over this union in 
1988 what they inherited was a huge apparatus requiring 
management. Since 1979 they had been criticizing conservative 
unionists by pointing out what the functions of the unions 
should be: to organize the workers politically, the fight for 
better wages and working conditions, to be representative of 
the workers, instead of being a mediator during labour 
conflicts. However, this case illustrates that it has been 
difficult to manage to terminate such services.
As a union delegate puts it:
"When we took over the union [in 1988] we found a 
structure for social assistance services larger than in 
any other union. However, we cannot suddenly finish with 
such a structure, we still have to maintain it and it is 
a thing which absorbs almost 100% of the union’s 
financial resources. When one invests in social 
assistance, one no longer has the resources for greater 
investment in the organization of the workers, such as, 
for example, a more frequently published union newspaper" 
(Interview No. 44).
Thus, the only means available to these «new unionism)) 
unionists has been that of continuing such services and, at
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the same time, implementing more militant courses of action.
The cases of the Metalworkers* and of the Urban Workers* 
Unions illustrates another path. These cases look like that 
of the Bank Workers* Union since 1988 when it was taken over 
by radical militants. However, as they have been managed by 
«new unionism)) unionists since the beginning of the 1980s, it 
is worth looking at them to reveal what their experiences have 
been.
Both unions had been run by conservative unionists after
1964. They built large social and medical services and
employed a number of people in this area. In the case of the
Metalworkers’ Union this apparatus was built aiming at a
labour force who has had access only to the state health
services. Traditionally, in Brazil the metal and steel
industries do not give their employees further facilities in
terms of health services, and wages seem to be low, which does
not enable metalworkers to afford private medical services.
Thus, in 1986, for instance, the Metalworkers* Union had 34
17employees. There were 12 physicians , 4 dentists, 4 lawyers, 
and 1 nurse. The rest were employed to run the union 
«bureaucracy» (CEAS/FUNDAJ, questionnaire data [1986]). 
Moreover, it had agreements with an optician and a medical 
laboratory. According to a union official (CEAS/FUNDAJ, 
questionnaire data [1986]), this apparatus was needed because 
of the poor level of assistance provided by the Brazilian
17 According to union data, some about 35,000 people saw 
the physicians in 1985 (CEAS/FUNDAJ [1989]). This figure is 
confirmed by a union official:
"Our clinic served 35,000 people in 1985; in 1986, it 
served over 36,000, i.e., an increase of 1,085 people;
and in 1987, in only 6 months we served exactly 21,875 
people" (Interview No. 9).
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health service (Cf. Keck [1989:283-4]). In the case of the 
Urban Workers* Union, also a large social and medical services 
apparatus was built in spite of numerous agreements maintained 
mainly by the Companhia Hidreletrica do Sao Francisco (CHESF), 
the biggest of the plants in this sector.
The officials elected in both unions in 1980 (the Urban 
Workers’) and 1981 (the Metalworkers’) had a clear political 
project. The unions were to avoid a conservative profile. They 
often criticized the «old» unionism officials for their 
submissive posture before the State and/or employers. 
According to them, «old» officials had followed the labour 
code strictly by transforming the union into a social and 
medical assistance office. However, as in the case of the Bank 
Workers* Union after 1988, they have been unable to end social 
and medical services (Cf. Souza [1981]). According to them, 
it would be difficult to increase or even maintain the number 
of members if such services were terminated (On this same 
point on Brazil as a whole, see Gongalves [1984:30]). For them 
it would be difficult to convince workers of the functions of 
unions when they are not facing labour disputes. In other 
words, the unions have to do something in the meantime. Thus, 
they continue to maintain social services.
However, I would suggest that their attitudes in keeping 
social assistance services running have a meaning which is not 
restricted to a purely political calculus. By pure political 
calculus, I mean the strategy by which these radical unionists 
would keep such services solely for fear of losing their 
membership. I do not deny that this is also implied, as is 
clear from the reasoning of some officials. Nevertheless I 
suggest further that this also reveals that «new unionism»
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unionists have been trying to be responsive to the demands of 
the membership, even when they do not agree with such demands. 
This is clear from the evidence arising from the case of the 
Metalworkers’ Union. In 1981, when the radical militants were 
campaigning for the union election of that year, they carried 
out an informal survey among a large number of workers from 
several plants to get to ascertain what they wished to see as 
a «true» programme for the union. Medical services and clinics 
were almost at the top of the list.
TABLE 3.3. WHAT IS TO BE DONE BY THE UNION
POLICIES %18
To Fight for Better Wages
too00
To Maintain a Good Clinic 45.8
To Give the Categoria the 
Opportunity to Get Together 
and Discuss Problem and 
Find Solutions
41.9
To Represent the Workers at 
1 the Workplace
39.4 I
To Promote Professional 
Courses
31.0 I
To Have Good Lawyers 23.8
To Promote Courses on Union 
Matters
21.2
To Build a Country Club 11.2
To Create a Department for 
Leisure and Sports
9.5
Source: Ze Ferrugem Especial, 1981.
The radical militants have opposed the role of unions as 
agencies for social services (Cf. Z6 Ferrugem Especial, 1981; 
and Resolugoes do Congresso dos Metalurgicos de Pernambuco,
18 The interviewees were asked to nominate three choices.
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1985, resolution No. 30). Nevertheless, they integrated the 
social services into their electoral manifesto (Cf. Electoral 
pamphlet Saiu a Chapa Ze Ferrugem, 1981). As will be shown in 
relation to other aspects of union life which will be analysed 
in the following chapters, «new unionism» unionists have a 
radical view of society and of labour relations. However, 
their radical view of labour relations embodies the idea of 
a new relationship between the union and the categoria in 
general and the membership in particular. This relationship 
means that the union has to properly represent the membership 
and that it has to take into account what the rank-and-file 
demands. Therefore, I would suggest that the difference in 
relation to «old» union officials is that what radical 
unionists stress is no longer this fagade, i.e., social 
assistance services, but that of the union as a radical 
representative of the workers. What they have been able to do 
is to try and combine militancy with social assistance, for 
commonly the unions offer better services than those offered 
by the Brazilian health service. This means probably that most 
of the workers would be against such changes, most especially 
those who cannot afford private medical and legal services (O 
Metalurgico, no month, 1984).
An analysis of the newspaper of the Metalworkers* Union 
shows that its officials emphasized other aspects of the 
labour world in comparison with the case of the Bank Workers* 
Union. A research carried out by the Centro Josue de Castro 
[1988] on this union’s newspaper shows that there is little 
stress on social services. Most of the news is about new forms 
of organization inside the factories, wage disputes, strikes, 
federal government policies, and unemployment. Indeed, there
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is just one issue of the newspaper stressing the social 
services available over the years. In 1984, when campaigning 
for the elections due in July of that year, the union 
officials published a special issue of the union’s newspaper 
in which they presented their main achievements. There was one 
news item about legal assistance and one item about the 
medical and odontological services provided by the union. 
However, the main aspects that they highlighted were related 
to political disputes which the union had undertaken (0 
Metalurgico, no month, 1984).
Differently from experience of the Bank Workers’ Union 
until 1988, labour disputes were not dealt with solely as a 
legal matter. One learns over several issues that there is 
over the years a stress on the political organization of 
workers in order to fight for better wage agreements and/or 
working conditions.
Likewise there is little stress on social assistance 
matters in the newspaper of the Urban Workers’ Union. Indeed, 
the union officials have been placing stress on the 
organization of the workers in order to fight for wage 
increases. In other words, they have been emphasizing the 
militant role that the union plus the workers are to play. As 
I pointed out above, by analysing its newspaper one realizes 
that this union continued to maintain some kinds of social 
assistance. Some short courses for its members and their 
families as well as scholarships for the members’ children 
were maintained (Cf. 0 Eletricitario, Feb. 1981), and medical 
and legal assistance services were improved. This seems to 
give further evidence to support my suggestion that, in spite 
of their radicalism, «new unionism» officials have been trying
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to be responsive to the interests of the membership. Evidence 
from a report (CEAS [1986:15 and 43]) suggests that most of 
the union’s membership, both in Recife and in the interior of 
Pernambuco, go to its headquarters because of the need for 
some sort of medical and/or odontological assistance, which 
gives support to the findings of another study on this union’s 
officials (CEAS/FUNDAJ, questionnaire data [1986]). When asked 
about the main reasons why the membership goes to the union's 
headquarters, the need for medico-odontological services was 
ranked second (See table 3.1).
This kind of evidence alone does not, of course, show 
that socio-medical assistance services are the most important 
reason why workers join the unions. However, it seems to 
indicate that they carry a great weight in their decision to 
do so. If we take these indicators regarding the main reasons 
why union members go to the unions’ headquarters, coupled with 
the evidence given by officials, plus, more importantly, the 
concrete fact that, after more than a decade of «new 
unionism», the unions have been unable to cease providing such 
services, it seems reasonable to say that socio-medical 
services play a major role in giving further incentive to 
workers to join the unions, as suggested by the experience of 
all unions, with the exception of the Data Processing Workers' 
Union.
According to a report (CEAS/FUNDAJ, questionnaire data 
[1986]), in 1986 the Urban Workers' Union had 39 employees. 
There were 4 physicians, 6 dentists, 4 lawyers, 2 barbers, and 
1 biochemist, the rest being employed to run the union 
«bureaucracy». Some agreements were signed for the rank-and- 
file to have access to more options (0 Eletricitario, June
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191981) and they even rebuilt the interior of the union 
headquarters in order to provide the rank-and-file with better 
services as demand was increasing and facilities were 
inadequate to serve everyone willing to use such services (O 
Eletricitarioy March 1986).
The third case is illustrated by both the Teachers* 
Association and Union. While the association was won by 
radical militants in 1979, the union has been run by various 
alliances of differing political persuasions since 1979. 
Firstly, by the conservative officials; then by a coalition 
formed by the «old» officials and communist militants. In 
1985, the communists alone took power, but were ousted later 
in that year by the Trotskyists. Later, the communists 
returned to joint power with other factions in an alliance led 
by the Trotskyists. Differently from the two cases above, the 
«old» officials of these two organizations did not build large 
social services. In both cases, one might suppose that 
financial difficulties were the main obstacles. Thus, the new 
radical unionists of both unions did not inherit a large union 
apparatus.
Supposedly the new officials of both the Teachers* Union 
and Association are opposed to the role of the unions as 
merely an agency for social services. In fact, over the years 
they have been considered as radical and militant unionists. 
As I pointed out above, since 1979 they have been organizing 
strikes almost every year. However, they have also been
19 In this issue there is a small note in which, after 
some complaints from some members, the officials acknowledge 
that the medical services were not so good. They explained 
that this was due to the union’s bad financial situation and 
the physical situation of the union’s headquarters.
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maintaining social services. In spite of the tiny size of 
their socio-medical services, they have been unable to abandon 
such services altogether.
This point is corroborated by an analysis on the 
association’s newspaper. Although they have been emphasizing 
the militant role the association is to play, one can find 
some news about agreements established by it in order to 
provide social assistance for its members ( Boletim Informative) 
APENOPE, Jan.-March; and July-Sept. 1986). This association 
faced hard times in the late 1970s and early 1980s when it had 
to face Pernambuco state governments willing to fight its 
militant role (Boletim Informativo APENOPE, Aug.; and Nov. 
1981). The state government policies towards the association 
caused many members to leave it. Besides, as it was not a 
union in terms of the labour law, it had no rights at all to 
receive a share of the imposto sindical (union tax). Thus, 
this association was unable to provide suitable social 
assistance. On the other hand, the association’s newspaper 
shows that its officials have been emphasizing militancy in 
terms of demanding better wages and working conditions. There 
has been then a continuous fight to avoid the effects of high 
inflation on wages. Another major theme that has been present 
in lists of demands put forward by the association is the 
quality of education provided by the federal and state 
governments.
The several newspapers published by the different 
political groups linked to the Teachers* Union also reveal a 
commitment towards a more militant role. One of these groups 
(Cf. Desatrelart Nov. 1979), still as an opposition group, in 
analysing the role the unions should perform in society, says
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that they should fight against the imposto sindical (union
tax) because it meant the unions being controlled directly by
the Ministry of Labour and that
"We believe in unions as organizations dedicated to fight 
[for their members] and not to be philanthropic 
societies. We must demand that the INP£> renders medical 
and odontological assistance. With the extinction of the 
imposto sindical and of its structure, we will be 
undermining the bases of populism, empreguismo and 
peleguismo ",
Later on, this group, already running the union, 
elaborated a proposal for the union to become independent in 
terms of finances because, until 1988, the Ministry of Labour 
regulated the use of the imposto sindical (union tax) and this 
union could not spend this income as it liked (Cf. Quadro e 
Gizt Sept. 1988). However, in the meantime, one can find that 
the union had a number of agreements with physicians, dentists 
and pharmacies to give its members social assistance which 
shows that avoiding such a task is very difficult (Cf. Boletim 
Sindicalt May 1981; and A Classe, Aug. 1983). In 1986, in 
order to perform its tasks, the Teachers’ Union employed 11 
people to look after its «bureaucracy». It did not maintain 
a medical service of its own as did many other unions. 
However, it maintained an agreement with a physician and a 
dentist for them to see the union's members (CEAS/FUNDAJ, 
questionnaire data [1986]).
Finally, the Data Processing Workers' Union represents
20 The Brazilian national health service (my note).
21 This word derives from emprego (job) and means in the 
Brazilian political jargon the practice of employing lots of 
peoples in order to bargain favours, that is, the practice of 
patronage.
22 This word derives from pelego (See footnote 1) and 
means its systematic practice.
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an extreme case in which there are no social and medical 
services at all. This union, unlike other unions, was founded 
in 1985 when the military government had come to an end. The 
group that has run the union is linked to the Workers’ Party 
(PT) and to the Workers’ United Central (CUT). As might be 
expected they refuse to accept the role of the unions as 
providers of social and medical assistance. Thus, it has 
sought to exert only functions that imply the organization of 
workers for demanding, collective bargaining, wage campaigns 
and agreements, and strikes.
TABLE 3.4. AGREEMENTS MAINTAINED BY THE UNIONS
AGREEM. MEDICAL DENTAL LEGAL
ADVICE
EDUCA­
TIONAL
LABORA­
TORY FOR 
MEDICAL 
ANALYSISUNIONS
Tea­
chers * 
Union
Yes Yes No No No
Metal. 
Union
Yes No No No Yes
Urban W. 
Union
Yes Yes No No Yes
Bank W. 
Union
Yes No No Yes Yes
Tea­
chers ’ 
Associa.
Yes Yes No No No
Data 
Process. 
Workers’ 
Union
No No Yes No No
Source: CEAS/FUNDAJ (Questionnaire data [1986])
The only social service maintained by this union is legal 
assistance. However, this sector deals only with labour 
matters. In other unions, it is very common for their lawyers
to deal with any legal questions ranging from labour matters 
to divorces, and civil and criminal offences committed by 
unions’ members. This union’s officials opted for maintaining 
only a legal service to deal with problems arising from the 
workplace or related to collective bargaining and wage 
agreements (Boletim APPD-PE, 17 May 1982; and interview No. 
35) .
TABLE 3.5. OFFICIAL COMPLAINTS ABOUT HEALTH AND SAFETY TO 
THE REGIONAL LABOUR OFFICE (DRT)
YEAR 1986 1987 1988 1989
UNIONS
Metalw.Union 21 46 39 19
Bank W. 
Union*
0 0 9 3
Dt.Proc.W . 
Union**
0 5 2
0
Urban W. 
Union
4 7 5 2 1
Teachers * 
Union
3 6 3 0 1
Teachers * 
Associa­
tion***
0 0 0 0 1
Source: Regional Labour Office (DRT)/Department of Health 
and Safety
(*) This union does not present official 
complaints, but timetables for joint 
supervision with the Department of Health and 
Safety.
(**) This union does not present official 
complaints, but timetables for joint 
supervision with the Department of Health and 
Safety.
(***) xhe association was not formally entitled to 
denounce labour law breakers to the 
Department of Health and Safety or to ask for 
an inspection on several aspects related to 
teachers’ health and safety at schools 
because of its juridical status (See chapter 
II).
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An official says:
"In some [Brazilian] states the unions of data processing 
workers maintain some agreements for medical assistance. 
However, we don’t maintain any kind of medical 
assistance. We have some lawyers who deal strictly with 
labour matters and demands, and we work jointly with 
health experts to detect some occupational diseases" 
(Interview No. 24).
This means that they have been trying to avoid the image 
of a union as a legal and medical office. On the other hand, 
this does not mean that they have held a strict legal 
viewpoint on labour problems as the «old» officials of the 
Bank Workers* Union did. On the contrary, this service is 
thought to be one of the means to fight the employers because 
they have been undertaking a number of other industrial 
actions in order to get their demands.
They have been successful in implementing a model of
unionism in which the unions exert only the function of
organizing employees at the workplace. However, this does not
mean that these unionists are not concerned with the data
processing workers’ health. Indeed, they have promoted many
seminars on occupational diseases affecting such workers.
Moreover, they have been working, along with other data
processing workers* unions in the country, in order to detect
new occupational diseases affecting workers in the data
23processing industry . Nevertheless, contrary to the common
23 Data processing workers from all over the country have 
been promoting national meetings to discuss specifically 
occupational diseases in their trade. According to a union 
official (Interview No. 28), the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) recommends that each worker should not 
perform more than 8,000 keystrokes per hour. However, many 
employers insist on 16,000 keystrokes per hour, which provokes 
several diseases affecting the tendons of their hands (Cf. 
Informe Sindical, 28 Sept.-11 Oct. 1987). On the other hand, 
in an inspection carried out by the Department of Health and 
Safety of the Regional Labour Office (DRT) jointly with
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practice, they have been campaigning for the Ministry of 
Labour and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to 
recognize such diseases as caused by the labour process. This 
means that the State is to be responsible for the health of 
the workers and not the union, which is to fight for better 
wages and working conditions.
Thus, the expenditure of this union is mainly related to 
communication (newspaper, pamphlets, bulletins, etc.) and 
education. However, for them education means the existence of 
short courses related to history of trade unionism and on 
workplace problems in order to prepare the workforce for any 
labour disputes. They have also been promoting seminars to 
discuss health injuries caused in the labour process as 
referred to above. These officials recognize that this has 
been possible thanks to the relatively high wages earned by 
professionals in this industry. Therefore, data processing 
workers are less dependent on socio-medical assistance from 
their union (Interview No. 24).
officials of the Data Processing Workers* Union in 16 data 
processing companies of varied sizes, the following problems 
regarding health and safety were found: 1) non-adjustable
chairs (13 firms); 2) exposed wiring (9 firms); 3) no archives 
(8 firms); 4) no stool for feet (7 firms); 5) no periodic 
checks against occupational risks (7 firms); 6) non-adjustable 
tables (7 firms); 7) more than 8,000 keystrokes per hour (6 
firms); 8) no medical examination (5 firms); 9) irregular 
working breaks (5 firms); 10) unreliable fire extinguisher (3 
firms); 11) assessment of performance by number of keystrokes 
(3 firms); 12) toilets without separation by sex (2 firms); 
13) temperature below permitted limit (2 firms); 14) no 
drinking fountain (1 firm); 15) no fire extinguisher (1 firm); 
and 16) no Internal Committee for the Prevention of Accidents 
(CIPA) (1 firm) (Source: Relatorio Tecnico de Programa de
Fiscalizagao, 31 Aug. 1990).
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4. UNIONS’ FINANCIAL SITUATION
In Brazil the labour code reads that every worker, union
member or not, in the country must contribute one-day wage to
the unions every year. This is called imposto sindical (union 
24tax) . Along with this tax, which is distributed amongst all 
unions and union federations and confederations of the 
country, every worker who is a union member must pay the fees 
set up by his/her union. Finally, as wage increases negotiated 
by the unions are applied to all workers, members and non­
members of the unions, most of the unions have set up clauses, 
which read that all workers including non members must pay 
something to cover the costs of the campaign and also to share 
out costs more fairly amongst all the beneficiaries, including 
non members who are indeed free-riders receiving full 
entitlement to wage increases "without doing anything" 
(Martins [1979:130]).
In most of these cases, the quality and size of social 
and medical services maintained by the unions indicates their 
financial situation. Apart from the Data Processing Workers’ 
Union, all unions in the present study provide their members
24 Details on the imposto sindical (union tax) are given 
in the following works: Almeida & Lowy [1976:104]; Alves
[1989:42-3] ; Costa [1986:148-63]; Ferrante [1978:43] ; Fuchtner 
[1980:60-2]; Humphrey [1979a:72]; and Keck [1984:27] and 
[1989:253]. Summaries of the positions of the different union, 
political persuasions on this tax are given in Resolugoes do 
Congresso dos Metalurgicos de Pernambuco, 1985 (The position 
of militants linked to the Workers’ Party [PT]) and in an 
article by James Beltrao, president of the Teachers* Union of 
Pernambuco (1985), published in Informe Sindical, 8-14 July 
1985 (The position of militants linked to the Brazilian 
Communist Party [PCB]). The former wanted to finish the union 
tax at once, while the latter favoured a gradual elimination. 
For a summary of the position of some Pernambuco urban unions 
on the impact of such a tax on union life, see Soares [1984: 
97-8].
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with some sort of medical assistance. Thus, the cases of the 
Metalworkers’ , of the Urban Workers’ , and of the Bank Workers’ 
Unions seem to show that they have maintained a reasonable 
financial situation. On the other hand, both the Teachers’ 
Union and Association have had a weaker financial situation. 
One might think that the quality of their social services is 
due only to their officials’ ideologies. However, it may well 
be due to the financial situation of these two organizations 
since they did not terminate such services. One learns that 
these two labour organizations have had difficulties over the 
years in publishing newspapers due to scarcity of funds. 
According to union officials (CEAS/FUNDAJ [1989]), this is one 
of the main problems the unions face. It affects not only the 
social and medical services, but also the organization of wage 
campaigns and the membership at the workplace.
On the other hand, until 1988, the labour law prohibited
the use of union tax income or any sort of union income for
the purposes of forming a strike fund (Cf. M.H.M. Alves [1984: 
90]). This means that unions could not use their income to 
enable workers to go on strike for a long time. However, they 
can spend it on bulletins, leaflets, posters and so on.
How have the unions managed to support strikes and other 
activities? First of all, it must be said that employers do 
not automatically stop paying wages during strikes. Until 
1988, this was set by the labour courts. The legality of
strikes had to be judged by these courts. Being considered
legal a jurisprudence was formed that wages should be paid 
during strikes. On the other hand, when collective agreements 
were settled through direct negotiation between employers and 
unions, a clause related to this matter was commonly agreed.
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Since the Constitution of 1988, the labour courts no longer 
have the power to judge whether strikes are legal. However, 
agreements have been developing in almost the same way. When 
the labour courts are asked by either employers or unions or 
both to arbitrate a dispute, a clause regarding this matter 
has been put forward, and the same happens in direct 
negotiations between the parties involved in the dispute (Cf. 
interview No. 54).
Because the union finances were strictly controlled by 
the Ministry of Labour the unions had to provide a detailed 
budget about their expenditures (Cf. Alves [1989:43]; and 
Humphrey [1979c:225]). Thus, the unions could not spend much 
money on strike propaganda or on food for strikers when their 
employers cut payments (Alves [1989:43]). Two cases illustrate 
how unions managed to get this problem resolved. During the 
1979 strike I described in chapter II, teachers, from state 
and private schools alike, found themselves in a stalemate as 
they could not afford their strikes going any further. As I 
said above, these two unions have faced financial crises over 
the years. Then, they promoted a kind of toll. In other words, 
they formed groups of teachers who stood in the main streets 
of Recife collecting contributions from drivers and, at the 
same time, explaining the causes of the strikes (Jornal do 
Comercio, 31 May and 1 June 1979). On the other hand, the
Metalworkers* Union adopted a different tactic. Its officials 
created a strike fund and invited all metalworkers to 
contribute to be used if any strike broke out in the metal and 
steel industries (Informe Sindical, 3-9 June 1985). Thus, they 
could afford the costs of maintaining strikes without the 
control of the Ministry of Labour.
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TABLE 3.6. THE BUDGET OF THE URBAN WORKERS’ UNION - 1981/82
(In Cruzeiros of 1981)
INCOME
Tax Income.............. 4, 988 , 632 . 80
Social Income.............. 8,505,710.40
Extra Income............... 5,349,902.40
TOTAL...................... 18,844,245.60
EXPENDITURES
General Administration..... 6,949,038.32
Social Assistance.......... 8,626,689.60
Other Social Services...... 615,261.60
Surplus.................... 2,653,256.08
TOTAL...................... 18,844,245.60
Source: O Eletricitario, April-May, 1981
It is difficult to give full details about union finances
in Brazil because most of them do not keep good records, in
spite of the tough controls of the Ministry of Labour, and
when they do they are not willing to give outsiders full
information on this subject. In the case of conservative union
officials, there is a widespread belief that most of them
use(d) union money for themselves and that there was (is) a
strong chain of corruption, although it is mere speculation
25for the researcher to write about that .
25 For similar problems concerning Latin America, see 
Roxborough [1981:86]; on the Mexican case see Roxborough 
[1984:109-19]; and on the Argentine case see James [1988:161- 
86]. James writes that:
"...These sums [of money] provided the basis for a whole 
range of social services offered by the unions to their 
members and also, given the concentrated centralism of 
most union structures, put an immense source of patronage 
and pressure at the disposal of the central leaders" 
(p.169).
Cf. also Clegg [1976:44] on the American case. For 
denunciations of corruption and misuse of union funds in 
Pernambuco, see Jornal do ComSrcio, 27 and 29 May 1979
(Corruption in the Teachers’ Association); Jornal do Comerciot
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However, the table above can give us some idea about how 
unions spend their money. It is a budget provided by the Urban 
Workers* Union. As described above, this union has tried to 
be militant while maintaining social assistance services. 
Although this table refers to an early period when this union 
had just been won by militant unionists, it gives us a 
realistic idea about union expenditures. If we do not consider 
the amount referred to as surplus, we realize that more than 
50% of the expenditures were spent on social assistance 
services. Moreover, there are only expenditures with social 
services and the union’s management.
5. INTERNAL GOVERNMENT AND ORGANIZATION AT THE WORKPLACE
For a long time unions in Brazil had very small boards 
of directors. These boards were made up of a president, a 
secretary, and a treasurer. This reflected the amount of tasks 
the unions performed. As many of them only performed tasks 
related to social assistance services, there was no pressure 
for a large body of unionists devoted exclusively to union 
work. The data available for Pernambuco over a period of more 
than 40 years shows that the unions have followed this 
pattern. The unions had, of course, some deputies, but they 
did not take part in the unions* administration after being
12 and 20 June 1979, and 11 Nov. 1987 (Corruption in the 
Dockers* Union); O Eletricitario, Feb. 1981 (Corruption in the 
Urban Workers* Union); Folha Sindical, July 1984 (Corruption 
in the Fishermen’s Union Federation); Ze Ferrugem Metalurgico> 
no month, 1984 (Corruption in the Metalworkers* Union); Jornal 
do ComSrcio, 13 Nov. 1985 (Corruption in the Construction
Workers’ Union); and Jornal dos Bancarios, Jan. 1989 and 
Jornal do Comercio, 1 and 2 June 1989 (Corruption in the Bank 
Workers’ Union).
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elected. The unions also have a body called Conselho Fiscal 
(Fiscal Council) which supervises union finances, but just as 
in the case of the deputies, they were not active in union 
life. Thus, the real power in Brazilian trade unions has 
remained within this «nucleus of power» (Cf. Soares [1984]; 
and Morais [1988]) formed by the posts mentioned above.
Only during the 1980s, when most of the unions began to 
experience changes in their internal affairs, did their boards 
of directors start to enlarge. Other roles in addition to 
social services began to be performed and other posts were 
created. In the case of the Urban Workers* Union, the board 
of directors only increased in size after the first term of 
the militant unionists in power. Until 1983, this union was 
run by 3 directors. In that year, this number increased to 7 
directors reflecting the expansion of the union’s role. The 
Metalworkers* Union increased in size slightly in 1978 with 
5 directors which was consolidated after radical unionists 
took over the union in 1981. The same is true for both the 
Teachers* Union and Association and the Bank Workers’ Union. 
Finally, the Data Processing Workers* Union established 7 
posts when was founded in 1985 (Data from the unions* 
individual files in the Regional Labour Office [DRT]).
Some of these unionists are full-time officials whose 
wages are paid either by their employers or by their unions 
depending on what is agreed during the renewal of annual 
contracts. The table below shows the distribution of union 
officials. The most striking feature of this table is that, 
until 1986, both the Teachers* Union and Association had been 
unable to negotiate employment of any of their directors as 
either full- or part-time officials. On the other hand, most
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of the officials who are freed from the workplace in order to 
perform union duties have their wages paid by their employers.
TABLE 3.7. UNION OFFICIALS - SITUATION TO PERFORM UNION TASKS
SITUATION FULL-TIME PART-TIME
UNIONS
Teachers’ Union None None
Metalworkers * 
Union
4(U)*
2(E)**
1(E)
Urban Workers’ 
Union
7(E) None
Bank Workers’ 
Union
11(E) None
Teachers’ 
Association
None None
Data Processing 
Workers* Union
4(E) None
Source: CEAS/FUNDAJ (Questionnaire data [1986] )
(*) Officials’ wages are paid by the union 
(**) Officials’ wages are paid by the employer
Finally, the organization of these unions at the 
workplace remains to be analysed. There is no strong tradition 
of union organization at the workplace level in Brazil. This 
is due largely to the labour legislation which prohibited 
direct and close connections between trade unions and the 
workplace. The first true attempts to establish such 
organizational links occurred from the mid-1970s, as I pointed 
out in chapter I. Sometimes the organization of factory 
committees took place without any links with the unions and 
in some cases it took place as a strategy of certain political 
factions within the labour movement in order to oppose 
conservative unionists (For an early statement of a «new 
unionism» official on the links between the unions and these 
committees, see Silva [1979:94-5]).
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The same is true for Pernambuco. I have already described 
the case of the Metalworkers* Union in which workers formed 
a clandestine factory committee in the 1970s. During the 1980s 
many unions tried to establish or, at least, to stimulate the 
creation of such organizations in spite of the resistance of 
employers to accept them. Such committees have been viewed by 
employers as excessive union power inside the factories which 
could worsen labour conflicts. On the other hand, radical 
militants and unionists think of it as a means to increase 
union power.
The data available shows that such committees do not have 
necessarily organizational links with the unions. In the case 
of the metalworkers in the 1970s, the workers who created the 
factory committee were even opposed to the union officials. 
The next experience of such a committee in Pernambuco was also 
in the metal industry. In 1984, the metalworkers formed their 
first factory committee, which was the first one in the whole 
of the Northeast region.
Between 1981-84, 86 plants in this sector were closed
2fidown in Pernambuco with the loss of hundreds of jobs . In 
1984, the then state-owned COSINOR was also to be closed down. 
However, its employees fought the measure and won. At the end, 
as a result of the negotiations, they also won the right to 
form a factory committee with 11 members plus 11 deputies 
(Centro Josue de Castro [1988:49-50]; and interview No. 7).
9 c
According to data provided by Inter-Union Office for 
Statistical and Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE), in 1984 the 
rate of unemployment in Pernambuco in this sector was as 
follows: 33% in the mechanical sector, 13.7% in metallurgy, 
and 22.2% in the electric-electronic sector. In 1983-84 two 
out of ten workers from these sectors were dismissed in 
Pernambuco (Folha Sindical, March 1985).
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In the final agreement signed by employees and the management 
these 22 workers were granted job stability while their term 
in office lasted. However, after some months almost all of its 
members were dismissed and this committee was wound up when 
management, regardless of delegates1 right to job tenure 
established in the agreement, dismissed them. Thus, this first 
experience of a factory committee in Pernambuco finished (For 
a similar case in the Ford plant in Sao Paulo, see Alves 
[1989:63-4]. This factory committee was the first to be 
accepted by the management in Brazil, as agreed through a 
formal agreement between the parties in July 1981. However, 
all of its members were later dismissed).
However, it must be stressed, this committee was not a 
part of the union’s organizational structure. Indeed, it was 
independent of the union though they worked closely because 
its creation had been stimulated by the union and delegates 
were sympathetic to union officials* ideological beliefs.
Along with this type of organization, the union has 
sought to organize workers at the workplace through some 
committees granted by the labour legislation. Thus, it takes 
advantage of the existence of the Internal Committees for the 
Prevention of Accidents (CIPAs) in order to expand its 
organization amongst workers (For a similar case, see 
Mangabeira [1991]. On the role of CIPAs in the Brazilian 
labour relations, see Paiva [1986]). As the members of such 
a committee are elected and are granted job stability by law, 
the union officials seek to campaign for workers who have 
close links with the union. Thus, they have been able to 
expand the union organization inside plants (Interview No. 
12).
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A much commoner experience has been that of delegates in
27each plant who do not form a committee . Many of them are
not necessarily union delegates, but workers* delegates. It
means that sometimes conflicts occur between delegates and
union officials. These delegates have been elected in some
sectors. In the power and water sectors, the Urban Workers*
Union has organized and stimulated the existence of this form
of representation. In this case, delegates are elected one for
every 50 workers and they are subject to certain union rules,
that is, they are part of the union organizational structure.
The same is not true for the Bank Workers* and the Data
Processing Workers* Unions. In the banking sector the
existence of delegates was well established long before
radical unionists took over the union in 1988. At the
beginning such delegates started to be elected in the federal
state-owned Banco do Brasil. They formed the original group
of militants who began to systematically oppose the
conservative officials who ran the union until 1988. Such
organizational forms of representation started to spread in
the mid-1980s and workers from other banks elected their own
representatives. However, it must be said, these delegates
28have only been elected in state-owned banks . Nowadays, the 
relationship between the union officials and delegates is much 
closer because of common ideological and party militancy. 
Nevertheless, the delegates remain proud of their independence 
towards the union expressing this feeling by saying that they
27 For an European experience in which delegates played 
a major role, see Regalia et al. [1978].
28 Along with Banco do Brasil, there are delegates in 
Caixa Economica Federal and Banco do Estado de Pernambuco.
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are not union delegates but workers* delegates (Interviews 
Nos. 44 and 45) .
In the data processing sector as well the workers of the 
five state companies established in Recife have been electing 
delegates. The union has been using these delegates to form 
new union leaders and, at the same time, represent the union 
at the workplace. So far the only workers’ committee in the 
private sector was formed in 1989 by employees of PROCENGE, 
which was created as a part of the collective agreement signed 
between employees and the management (Informe Sindical, Aug. 
1989). Just as in the case of the Urban Workers* Union this 
form of representation has been stimulated by the union, 
although the delegates remain independent of it. However, 
differently from the case just described above these delegates 
act more like plant committees.
There are the extreme cases of both the Teachers* Union 
and Association which do not have any delegates or anything 
resembling a school committee. In the case of the former, it 
seems to be due to strong opposition of the private school 
owners to allowing such a form of representation inside the 
schools. There are plenty of complaints in the union’s 
newspaper about schools* owners who do not permit even union 
officials to go into schools to deliver newspapers, bulletins 
or leaflets to teachers (Cf. Quadro e Giz, Aug. 1987). In this 
case, this union has not yet achieved, as pointed out above, 
the right to have at least part-time officials. Thus, it is 
difficult to envisage how they could win the right to have 
delegates or committees if they have not even won the right 
to have either part- or full-time officials. However, it is 
not clear why the Teachers* Association does not have
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representation at school level. One clue could be the tough 
policies of several governments towards the association. As 
pointed out above, this contributed to weaken the association 
during early 1980s. Its policy has been one of stimulating the 
creation of branches throughout the state rather than 
establishing school committees. One must remember that schools 
are spread over the state while other sectors, possibly with 
the exceptions of power and water industries and banking, are 
not.
TABLE 3.8. MEANS USED BY THE UNIONS TO CONTACT THEIR MEMBERS -
1986
MEANS FIRST MEANS SECOND MEANS THIRD MEANS
UNIONS
Teachers’ 
Union
Visits to the 
Workplace
Assemblies Telephone/ 
Local Press
Metalwor­
kers ’ Union
Visits to the 
Workplace
Union
Newspaper/
Bulletins
Diretores de 
Base
Urban 
Workers * 
Union
Union
Newspaper/
Bulletins
Visits to the 
Workplace
Car With 
Speakers
Bank 
Workers * 
Union
Union
Newspaper/
Bulletins
Local Press/ 
Car With 
Speakers
Assemblies
Teachers * 
Association
Through Other
Association
Members
Union
Newspaper/
Bulletins
Visits to 
the
Workplace
Data Proces­
sing Wor­
kers* Union
Direct Con­
tact Through 
Of f icials
Union
Newspaper/
Bulletin
Visits to 
the
Workplace
Source: CEAS/FUNDAJ (Questionnaire data [1986])
There are other less important forms of organization at 
the company level. The Metalworkers* Union maintains some 
other forms of representation. They maintain a wage committee, 
and an agreement supervisors committee. While the latter
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supervises annual agreements in order to denounce managers who 
breach them, the former surveys the main demands arising from 
the workplace in order to put forward a common and broad list 
of demands. On the other hand, the Data Processing Workers’ 
Union maintains a health committee which has been working on 
occupational diseases arising from the excessive exposure of 
workers to computer screens and other diseases affecting 
nerves and ligaments of the fingers specific to this industry.
Finally, I would suggest that there is a relationship 
between the increase in the number of officials in the unions 
after 1978-79 and the unions’ relative failure, in Pernambuco, 
to establish a firm network of factory committees. Because the 
law grants job tenure to anyone holding a union post, «new 
unionism» unionists have been trying to combat the opposition 
of employers towards forms of organization at the workplace 
by increasing the number of officials while keeping them at 
the workplace. These officials are called diretores de base 
and act as de facto union delegates by performing tasks which 
are aimed at increasing the «presence» of the union at the 
workplace, and, at the same time, at providing means for a 
better communication line between the union and the shop 
floor.
According to Humphrey [1979a:77],
"...These diretores de base...[are] encouraged to act as 
union organizers in the plants, giving out union 
membership forms, advising workers of meetings, 
representing workers in disputes with management, etc.".
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6. DISCUSSION
Having set up the data, now I can move on to discuss the 
effects (if any) of the process of «bureaucratization» and the 
union organization at the workplace level on the role played 
by trade unions in Pernambuco from the late 1970s.
First of all, the data presented does not clearly support 
the hypothesis that the larger the union «bureaucracy», the 
more conservative the union. Although the cases of the Data 
Processing Workers* and of the Bank Workers* Unions, and both 
of the Teachers* Union and Association support such a 
hypothesis, the cases of the Metalworkers* and of the Urban 
Workers’ Unions do not. I would suggest that the level of 
militancy is much more related to union officials* ideological
beliefs than to the size of the union «bureaucracy», being the
29result of these beliefs and not the contrary . Gongalves 
[1984:29-30], for instance, makes a similar point when he 
suggests that, although the scale of medical and legal 
services may be a good indicator of conservative practice, it 
cannot be regarded in absolute terms as synonymous with 
conservative unionism, since many militant unions have been 
trying to combine radical policies with social assistance 
services.
The Bank Workers* Union’s conservative officials did not 
build a large «bureaucracy» first and then became 
conservative. Indeed, they constructed such a large
29 Here I am not forgetting the role of the Brazilian 
state in imposing the scale and shape of union 
«bureaucracies». I am only trying to isolate the different 
variables in order to clarify the relationship among them. 
Thus, I am suggesting that an emphasis on the negative impact 
of the union «bureaucracy» upon militancy may be misleading.
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«bureaucracy» because this was their commitment concerning the 
main aim of a union. The analysis of the union’s newspaper 
shows that they believed that the principal role a union had 
to play was to provide the rank-and-file with socio-medical 
assistance. Both the cases of the Metalworkers* and of the 
Urban Workers* Unions show that union officials who espouse 
radical ideologies managed to make their unions become 
militant organizations while keeping and even increasing 
socio-medical services. They have been running their unions 
for more than a decade and they could well have discontinued 
such services. Apart from political wisdom and responsiveness 
to the membership’s interests, as one remembers the demands 
of the rank-and-file for better and larger social assistance, 
they have been able to combine these two opposite faces of the 
union life, their unions being better known for their militant 
role than for their social services. On the other hand, one 
might speculate that if the Data Processing Workers* Union and 
both the Teachers* Union and Association were won by 
conservative unionists, whether such unionists would become 
radical because of the small scale of these unions* 
«bureaucracies». Certainly this is not the case. One would 
expect that it would be more likely that such unions would 
increase their social services, depending, of course, on their 
financial situation.
Roxborough [1984:113] has found, by analysing the case
of the automobile workers in Mexico, that:
"The existence of a number of union officials who are 
able to devote their full working week to union business 
clearly strengthens the union vis-a-vis management".
However, this is not true for the case of Pernambuco. For 
opposite reasons, the cases of the Bank Workers* Union and
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both of the Teachers’ Union and Association show that there 
is not a direct relationship between the number of either 
full- or part-time union officials and the tendency for the 
unions to be more or less militant. Firstly, the Bank Workers* 
Union has the largest number of full-time officials completely 
freed from their workplaces in order to deal solely with the 
union’s businesses. However, as has been shown throughout 
these chapters, the conservative officials did not use this 
to strengthen their position when confronting management. 
Secondly, on the opposite side there are the cases of the 
Teachers* Association and Union. They do not even have part- 
time officials. All their officials are able to do is to spend 
their free time dealing with union matters. When organizing 
their timetables for the weekdays at the unions these 
officials have to take into account their own timetables at 
the schools at which they work or they have to hold their 
meetings in the evenings. In spite of these limitations they 
have been able to keep their unions relatively strong when 
facing management.
Finally, the cases of the Metalworkers’, of the Urban 
Workers’, and of the Data Processing Workers* Unions, all of 
which have a medium number of full- and part-time officials, 
do not contribute to demonstrate a clear link between the 
number of union officials completely devoted to union 
businesses and the strength of the union before management. 
They have been as militant as the Teachers’ Union and 
Association in spite of the differences between them in terms 
of their relative numbers of full- and part-time officials. 
On the other hand, these three unions were, until 1988, more 
militant than the Bank Workers* Union though this union had,
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at the time, more full-time officials than any of them.
Once more the explanation seems to lie on ideological 
grounds. The number of full- and part-time officials does not 
matter as much as their ideological principles do. Now, if we 
consider all unions together the only explanation which unites 
their individual political experiences is one related to the 
ideological commitments of their officials. In the case of the 
Bank Workers’ Union, the conservative full-time officials used 
their time to manage and improve the socio-medical services 
the union offered, which constituted its main activity until 
1988. The Teachers* Union’s and Association’s officials have 
been using their time for other purposes than solely the 
management of socio-medical services. The officials of the 
other three unions who are full-time have been using their 
time for several purposes, the management of medical services 
being the least important. This allocation of time seems to 
be related to the ideological beliefs of these unionists, that 
is, they have been using their time and strength (or lack of 
it) according to what they believe to be the most important 
feature(s) of union life.
Now I turn to the impact of the union organization at the 
workplace level on the policies put forward by the unions. It 
seems that there is a direct relationship between organization 
at the workplace and the level of militancy. Apart from the 
school sector, there have been the experiences of factory 
committees or delegates, which have helped to strengthen the 
unions or radical groups when facing management. In spite of 
the lack of a clear link between the unions and delegates and/ 
or factory committees, these forms of organization have been 
playing an important role in labour relations mainly since the
140
early 1980s. The Metalworkers*, the Urban Workers’ and the 
Data Processing Workers’ Unions have been stimulating such 
forms of organization as a means to strengthen themselves 
before management. This has clearly happened in the data 
processing industry in which bargaining power has been greater 
in the state-owned companies, the ones where workers have 
elected delegates. A similar process can be found at the 
banking sector. Bank workers of certain, once again, state- 
owned banks won the right to elect their delegates to 
represent them before management. In the case of the Banco do 
Brasil, the management even preferred to negotiate with them, 
in spite of their radical party and ideological connections 
(Interview No. 51), rather than with the conservative union 
officials. The workers of this bank are responsible for most 
of the strikes in this sector. The data available shows that 
most of the strikes in this sector were not organized by the 
union officials. Indeed, they were a result of the 
organization of workers at the workplace level.
The Metalworkers* Union illustrates this case very well. 
One remembers that the beginning of the opposition group, 
which took over the union in 1981, happened around a 
clandestine factory committee. Also one of the most militant 
plants in this sector - the COSINOR plant - established its 
factory committee during the 1980s (Cf. Lima [1991:17]).
These workers’ committees play the role of making the 
contacts between the unions and workers much closer. They are 
also responsible for supervising agreements as well as 
denouncing managers who breach the labour law. They have been 
a means to survey what workers wish to set in the lists of 
demands during renewals of annual contracts. Finally, the
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delegates usually participate in the wage committees elected 
by workers to negotiate wage increases and other demands that 
they wish to win.
What this chapter has shown is that the impact of the 
internal apparatus, «bureaucracy» and several forms of 
organization at the workplace on the policies put forward by 
unions in Pernambuco during the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s depended very much on the ideologies and party 
commitments of their officials. Whether a union was more or 
less conservative or radical depended much on their officials’ 
viewpoint on the role of unions in society. Therefore, the 
impact of big or small union apparatuses on union politics 
should not be viewed a priori as bringing about a conservative 
role (in the case of a big union apparatus) or a radical role 
(in the case of a small union apparatus).
This chapter also shows that the emergence of young, 
radical union officials and militants contributed to changing 
the unions’ profile. When, at the beginning of the 1980s, they 
started to take over some unions it was realized that they 
could not, in most cases, abandon social assistance services 
at all. However, as they thought of unions within a radical 
tradition, they have been managing to make unions perform a 
more militant role, which means that there is not, at least 
in this case, a determinist relationship between the size of 
union «bureaucracy» and union politics. In other words, the 
young union officials who emerged in the wake of the «new 
unionism» in Pernambuco put forward new policies that meant 
a strong change in the practices of the unions towards labour 
problems and conflicts. These changes were not only related 
to how to run the unions or which role the unions are to play
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in society, but also to the relationship between the unions 
and their organization at the workplace.
Finally, it also shows that the new practices put forward 
by trade unions in Sao Paulo during the 1970s spread to other 
regions of the country. On the other hand, the experience of 
a «new unionism» which started in the private and modern 
sectors of the economy also spread to the public sector as 
well as to the traditional and tertiary sectors. This means 
that in the decade following the 1978-79 strikes of the 
metalworkers in Sao Paulo, the «new unionism)) acquired a new 
dimension. In other words, the experience represented by the 
trade unions in Sao Paulo of a new practice of unionism has 
found firm grounds in other regions of the country and in 
other sectors of the economy.
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CHAPTER IV
TRADE UNIONS AND INTERNAL DEMOCRACY
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the nature of 
internal politics in the unions of Pernambuco from 1979. In 
other words, I discuss the degree of democracy existent within 
the unions I am investigating. If we look back to the period 
just after the 1964 coup it is difficult to speak about 
internal democracy in Brazilian trade unions. In fact, it was 
very difficult for left-wing militants to participate in 
unions* affairs or to dispute elections. The data available 
for this period shows that from 1964 up to the mid-1970s the 
groups loyal to the military ruled over the unions 
unchallenged. The emergence of new groups of militant 
unionists provoked calls not only for changes in the role 
unions were to play in national politics, but also for changes 
in the internal politics of the trade unions. It was then 
believed that the necessary changes in the role of the trade 
unions would only occur if the different political persuasions 
and factions inside the unions had the opportunity to spell 
out their opinions, demands, and projects, and more 
importantly, a chance to implement them. Moreover, the 
continuous presence of unchallenged and undemocratic leaders 
was assigned as the main factor behind the poor performance 
of the unions in terms of political fights for getting, for 
instance, better wages and working conditions. Thus, early
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statements by militants called for increasing participation
in union life through the presence of union members at their
general meetings. As early as 1978 a group of militant workers
of Greater Recife issued a document in which they declared:
"We know that nowadays the unions are tied and ruled by 
pelegos. However, unions are ours, and we, the workers, 
must rule them ourselves. For this, we have to be present 
in the unions; we have to demand more meetings; we have 
to voice, during the meetings, our real problems; we have 
to press union officials to demand labour law’s 
enforcement; we have to launch candidates that represent 
the true interests of the working class" .
Such calls continued to be voiced throughout the 1980s 
in labour general meetings by different political persuasions 
that acted inside union life. Therefore, I intend to analyse 
to what extent democracy has existed and the conditions under 
which it has worked within the unions I am investigating since 
1978. A number of qualitative and quantitative data will be 
used to achieve such aims.
To begin with, I analyse the main theories of union 
democracy, namely those of Michels, Lipset et al. , and 
Edelstein and Warner. Of these, the most influential has been 
that of Edelstein and Warner who have developed an electoral 
model to analyse the degree of democracy in trade unions. I 
will move on to present some theoretical critiques of such a 
model. I will also describe historically the dynamics of 
internal politics in the unions of my sample with special 
emphasis upon the period from 1979 until 1989. This will allow 
me to set up the data for an empirical test of the electoral
30 Pamphlet issued on 30 April 1978 by a group of 
weavers, metalworkers, construction workers and joiners to 
commemorate the May Day of 1978. See also contribution of 
Almir Pazzionotto to the round-table discussion in the journal 
Escrita Ensaio [1978:30], in which he expresses the same view 
about democracy in Brazilian trade unions.
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model. Having been used to some extent by different scholars, 
I will be using the data from the Pernambuco unions in order 
to clarify whether this model actually allow us to grasp this 
phenomenon. Finally, a number of variables, which have not 
been taken into account by the electoral model, are considered 
in order to broaden our understanding of what union democracy 
may mean.
2. THEORIES OF UNION DEMOCRACY
2.1. Michels, Lipset, and Edelstein and Warner on Union
Democracy
Union democracy has not only been a major political 
aspect of discussions amongst militants calling for internal 
changes in their unions, but also an important subject 
discussed by sociologists since Michels announced his famous 
«Iron Law of 01igarchy» in his Political Parties [1962]. In 
this book he analysed the exercise and maintenance of power 
within the parties and unions which he regarded as democratic, 
that is, the socialist ones. His central thesis can be 
identified as follows: an oligarchic group always appears in 
formal democratic organizations, which sets serious obstacles 
to the maintenance of democracy in such organizations (See 
Wippler [1986]. For a different and fascinating approach, see 
May [1965]).
Michels did not refuse a priori the idea of the existence 
of a formal democracy. On the contrary, his presupposition was 
that, at the level of formal organizations in modern 
societies, there would exist room enough for the exercise of
146
democratic power. However, he stressed that trends towards a 
progressive oligarchization of the groups that hold power 
would inevitably arise. Socialist organizations - parties and 
unions - had emerged within the political democracies of 
modern societies as a way through which workers could defend 
their rights and face the bourgeoisie. However, the necessity 
for fast and secure decisions provoked the appearance of a 
bureaucratic, specialized and centralized body for making 
decisions (Hemingway [1978:4]; Hill [1981:133-4]; and 
Przeworski [1985:14]).
On the other hand, to face systematic conservative
attacks, socialist bosses would have to reinforce their 
organizations to protect themselves against such attacks, even 
if it were necessary to transform radical ideas into moderate 
ones, which could be accepted by the conservative 
establishment. Hill has coined the term goal displacement to 
mean this "process whereby union members* goals are 
subordinated to other interests" [1981:133].
Thus, these former democratic bosses became conservative, 
attached to power, and unwilling to face elections (For a 
graphic scheme of the origins of oligarchy according to
Michels, see Hartmann [1979:72]). However, this conservatism 
did not arise only through institutional imposition - increase 
of the number of the rank-and-file, progressive 
differentiation of tasks, and so on - but also through the 
private interests of certain bosses. Michels paid particular 
attention to socialist leaders of proletarian extraction as 
those who would be more attached to their jobs either because 
of lack of personal wealth or because they lost the habit of
working (Cf. Martin [1978:101], The following quotation is
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clear on this aspect:
"It is especially in the ex-manual worker that the love 
of power manifests itself with the greatest intensity. 
Having just succeeded in throwing off the chains he wore 
as a wage-labourer and a vassal of capital, he is least 
of all disposed to endue new chains which will bind him 
as a slave of the masses” (Michels [1962:302]).
This trend toward oligarchy would be eased by the 
renunciation of the electorate and the incompetence of the 
masses in truly exercising power. Thus, the bosses would be 
elected to deal with everyone’s interests, liberating the 
masses of further obligations. Through this apathetic and 
passive game the two parties would take care of each other’s 
inner wishes: the leaders could maintain their power without 
inopportune questions and the masses could maintain their 
apathy before power. The masses would only be woken up from 
their apathy when the bosses felt threatened by the emergence 
of new leaders willing to voice criticisms about those holding 
power. The old leaders would then try to call the masses to 
legitimate themselves against the opposition. At the same 
time, they would try to gain the new leaders for their side. 
In this way, it seems, Michels believed that there exists an 
inevitable trend towards a gap between leaders and rank-and- 
file, and that any renewal of the leaders would occur 
primarily through the selection and co-option of external 
leaders than through democratic means by which the membership 
would actively choose its leaders.
Moreover, Michels pointed out another factor that also 
contributes to the gradual conservatism of a political party: 
its relationship with the State. According to Michels, the 
State is a centralizing power. Thus, it was necessary to 
create a revolutionary party which would be able to oppose it.
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However, to reach this aim the revolutionary party had to use 
the very bases upon which the State is founded: authority and 
discipline. In the daily fight against state power spontaneity 
is a negative feature. The fight against the State needs 
bureaucratic, disciplined organizations and leaders. Thus, the 
core of these organizations turns into what they fight 
against, this being summarized by Michels*s belief that a 
revolutionary party is a state within the State.
Another important work about this subject is Union 
Democracy (Lipset et al. [1977]). In this book the authors
discussed Michels*s iron law of oligarchy through a systematic 
study on power structure in the International Typographical 
Union (ITU).
The authors generally accept Michels*s thesis (Cf. Lipset 
et al. [1977:393-418]; Roxborough [1981:94] and [1984:133]; 
and Martin [1978:102]). Thus, the fact that the International 
Typographical Union (ITU) was a democratic union should be 
seen as an exception - or a «deviant case» as Martin calls it 
- to the iron law of oligarchy, and not as a negation of such 
a thesis. Therefore, when studying the International 
Typographical Union (ITU), they point out the importance of 
the existence of a two-party system which would maintain the 
internal democracy in this union (Cf. Hill [1981:135]). 
Clearly, they take their model from the American party system 
in which two parties fight for places in the National Congress 
and/or for the top post in the White House. That is, their 
definition of democracy emerges from the existence of a formal 
system of choice between two factions during electoral periods 
(Cf. Hemingway [1978:7]). As they point out:
"...We have equated democracy in the ITU with the fact
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that the membership of the unions has the right to choose 
between two parties representing opposing approaches to 
trade-union action" (Lipset et al. [1977:53]).
Thus, the possibility given to the rank-and-file to 
choose between opposing factions and the existence of a 
permanent opposition are tantamount to a warranty of the 
maintenance of the democracy within the International 
Typographical Union (ITU), which avoids its degeneration into 
an oligarchy.
However, this system was historically built. The authors 
point out a number of social causes which contributed to the 
formation of the two-party system. At the beginning of its 
history, the International Typographical Union (ITU) was 
governed by a small group. Progressively the existence of 
secret societies, which acted within this union, started 
establishing this type of system against the possible 
manoeuvres of leaders with oligarchic tendencies. Moreover, 
the existence of informal groups that help to maintain 
communication and contact between leaders and the membership 
plays an important role in preventing a possible gap opening 
between the former and the latter. These informal groups are 
intermediaries which narrow the gap between leaders and the 
rank-and-file, for through them individuals participate more 
actively in the International Typographical Union (ITU)’s 
affairs. By doing so, the rank-and-file becomes aware of the 
importance of their participation, which becomes clear through 
their responsibility to exercise frequent censure through 
referendum on policies put forward by the leaders. As the 
rank-and-file is frequently called to decide, through 
referendum, on important aspects regarding the union’s life, 
this has contributed to the avoidance of oligarchic
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tendencies.
As an outcome from this former point, another factor that 
causes oligarchic degeneration - bureaucratic and centralized 
administration - would be neutralized by the active 
participation of the membership on decisions within the union.
The authors also point out another factor that 
contributed to building the democratic system of the 
International Typographical Union (ITU): local autonomy. That 
is, the several unions that form the International 
Typographical Union (ITU) are autonomous to an important 
degree, which refers to the possibility of making decisions 
and taking actions without the interference of the central 
power. Thus, since these regional unions, which are part of 
the International Typographical Union (ITU), maintain their 
autonomy, they play an important role in maintaining democracy 
and avoiding manoeuvres towards a more centralized 
administration.
Finally, another important factor analysed by the authors 
is the constitutional warranty of the existence of opposition 
groups. Although one simple constitutional warranty does not 
mean the existence of an opposition, it avoids authoritarian 
and oligarchic means in the bosses’ hands to limit or suppress 
opposing groups, for the end of the opposition could mean the 
end of democracy within the union or even the very end of the 
union.
A third important contribution to the analysis of union 
democracy is the book by Edelstein and Warner [1975]. Contrary 
to the conclusion of Lipset et al. , who generally give support 
to Michels’s thesis, these authors do not accept the idea of 
an inevitable slide towards oligarchy. They start by showing
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that there is a continuity between democracy and oligarchy and
that, in some moments, it is almost impossible to define
precisely what each is. Thus, it is better to speak about
degrees of democracy or oligarchy. However, democracy could
be defined as follows:
"Democracy in a large organisation or a society is a 
decision-making system in which the membership actively 
participates, directly and indirectly through its 
representatives, in the making and implementation of 
policy and in the selection of officials, for all levels, 
on the basis of political equality and majority rule. 
Furthermore, the system operates on the basis of the 
accountability of officials, the legitimacy of 
opposition, and a due process for the protection of the 
rights of individuals and minorities. Each aspect of 
democracy can be achieved to a different degree and there 
is probably no way to characterise the overall degree of 
democracy except on the basis of crude judgment. However, 
these aspects of democracy are probably to some extent 
mutually interdependent and supporting" (Edelstein & 
Warner [1975:30]).
On the other hand, oligarchy means that,
"Given democratic norms and an absence of organizational 
obstacles, attempts to displace the top leaders will 
certainly be made. If there is indeed a structured way to 
compete for top posts, e.g., electoral machinery, this is 
in fact used. Thus, the absence of regular use of such 
machinery (and, of course, its absence) is a sign of 
control over the organisation by a limited number of 
individuals on a non-competitive basis: in other words,
of control by the few, with perhaps a disproportionate 
weight given to a single individual among them" 
(Edelstein & Warner [1975:33]).
The organizational theory of union democracy built by 
Edelstein and Warner has a number of conditions which allow 
them to assess the degree of democracy in a given union. First 
of all, the effectiveness of the opposition is a clear 
condition arising from their definition of democracy 
(Edelstein & Warner [1975:65]). On the other hand, such 
effectiveness is represented by the existence of disputed 
elections, this being a second condition for democracy. 
Moreover, as a third condition, the opposition must have fair
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conditions to defeat the incumbent(s) (Martin [1978:103]). 
Therefore, this condition could be spelt out as the ability 
of the opposition to receive a fair share of the votes. This 
means that the closer the elections the more democratic the 
union (Edelstein & Warner [1975:66-68]. Cf. Undy & Martin 
[1984:190]). Finally, if the opposition is strong enough to 
win elections, the turnover of leaders is an important factor 
in measuring the degree of democracy existent in a given 
union^.
The study by Edelstein and Warner, by focusing "upon the 
role of elections in maintaining union democracy" (Martin 
[1978:103]; and Undy & Martin [1984:190-1]), is aimed to 
construct a theory capable of making a diagnosis of the actual 
situation of a given formal organization - unions in this case 
- in terms of the degree of democracy/oligarchy. On the other 
hand, it is also possible to conclude, with the help of their 
model, that democracy within formal organizations will be 
preserved if there are mechanisms to prevent power 
concentration either in a small group’s or in one person’s 
hands.
2.2. A Critique of the Electoral Model
As pointed out above, Edelstein and Warner’s electoral 
model has been enjoying a great deal of influence on studies 
on union democracy. However, it is by no means an
31 These same indicators were also synthesized by 
Roxborough and used to assess the degree of democracy in 
Mexican trade unions (Cf. Roxborough [1984:chapter 7]; and 
Thompson & Roxborough [1982]). In a recent work on union 
democracy in Brazil, Mangabeira [1991] uses these same 
indicators coupled with two others of her own.
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uncontroversial model.
Some scholars have criticized it on a number of points, 
namely its inadequacies to assess fully such a phenomenon. 
Hill [1981:135], for instance, points out that Edelstein and 
Warner’s conception of a democratic structure is very 
restricted, because findings of close elections, for instance, 
could be interpreted as implying incompetence and unpopularity 
of union officials as well as democracy. Moreover, he also 
points out, specifically in relation to Britain, that most 
union officials are appointed instead of being elected.
Martin [1978:103] also points to the same problem when 
he says that the focus of this model on elections is "too 
narrow because politics is about power, not simply 
elections...". Moreover, he criticizes the electoral model by 
saying that:
"Overwhelming leadership victories may be due to 
effectiveness in carrying out the wishes of the majority 
of union members, not to the lack of union democracy. 
Close election results and a high turnover in union 
officials are as likely to indicate incompetence as 
internal democracy" (Martin [1987:228]).
A number of other criticisms can be put forward. By 
focusing exclusively on elections this model does not allow 
us to understand the processes through which politics actually 
happens inside the unions. In fact, if the data reveals the 
persistence of close elections, it tells us nothing about how 
the groups deal with each other. In other words, closeness of 
elections says nothing about tolerance towards opposition 
groups and how they are treated, i.e., there is no way to 
assess phenomena such as violence, threats, false accusations, 
etc., let alone external factors which exert important 
influences on the profile of different groups, i.e., on
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unions’ internal politics. In fact, the existence of a 
permanent and organized opposition does not depend solely upon 
the wishes of officials and/or of the opposition. In the 
political context of Brazil of the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
the existence and survival of radical officials and opposition 
groups depended to some extent on the government’s and 
employers’ approaches towards labour militancy. Therefore, a 
narrow focus on elections and the existence of organized 
opposition groups is misleading since it hardly takes such 
aspects of union life into consideration.
Moreover, Martin’s remarks that close elections may 
indicate incompetence seem to be related to some cases current 
in Pernambuco, as we will see. From 1964 until the late 1970s 
unions were run by conservative officials detached from the 
rank-and-file. These officials were only concerned with the 
policy of providing union members with social services. In 
fact, matters like campaigns for wage increases or better 
working conditions did not exist. In this case, their 
disappearance from union politics in the cases where they were 
defeated by the new radical militants does not necessarily 
mean intolerance of the new officials nor that democracy does 
not exist in these unions.
The electoral model does not provide any insight into the 
process of real politics either. By real politics I mean the 
processes through which daily politics happens, elections 
being only one moment within a whole set of complex phenomena. 
Therefore, the very process of «making» politics which 
involves calculations of one’s own political and 
organizational assets as well as those of the other sides, 
negotiations, and alliances goes undetected. As we will see,
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alliances may cause changes in the ruling groups which are not 
revealed by the electoral model. They may also be the result 
of complex negotiations which in turn result in uncontested 
elections. Therefore, in this case, the existence of 
uncontested elections does not necessarily mean lack of 
democracy within the unions, but a great deal of negotiations 
in which there may reside a great degree of tolerance towards 
different political persuasions.
Finally, a narrow focus on elections does not allow us 
to assess an important political phenomenon, i.e., 
representativeness and responsiveness of the unions to the 
membership. Although some unions may have a poor record of 
contested elections, this tells us nothing about channels 
through which unions may establish a network of communications 
with the rank-and-file in order to get to know what demands 
arise from the shop-floor and how to meet them.
The emergence of the «new unionism» in Brazil has meant 
the establishment of a number of channels which have helped 
to close the gap between the membership and the leaders. The 
existence of workers’ committees and several committees aimed 
to deal with matters such as negotiations of wage increases, 
and health and safety at the workplace seem to indicate that 
«new unionism» unions have been trying to be responsive to the 
workplace. On the other hand, the enforcement by «new 
unionism» officials of the unions* constitutional obligations, 
for instance, that wage agreements are to be ratified by a 
general assembly, means that they have been trying not only 
to be responsive to the unions* members, but also that the 
rank-and-file can exert control on leaders’ policies. Recent 
evidence suggests that union democracy is linked to
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"representativeness [what means] the extent to which... 
leaders’ policies and perspectives mirror and demonstrate 
a commitment to the interests of the membership. The 
interests of the members to be taken into account are 
their expressed interests, rather than any latent or 
implicit interests as perceived by the... leaders [and 
to]...accountability, the extent of consultation of and 
reporting back to the membership as well as adherence to 
membership decisions" (Fosh & Cohen [1990:107-8]; Cf. 
Heery & Kelly [1990:75-106]).
The same point is stressed by Hill [1981:137-9]. 
According to him, important aspects of union democracy such 
as the impossibility for unions to coerce their members, the 
fact that the discretion of labour force to use its collective 
power of labour is not necessarily tied to the unions, and the 
significance, in the British context, of direct negotiations 
between the membership and the employers are not often taken 
into consideration in analyses of such a phenomenon.
Therefore, a restricted focus on electoral results may 
be misleading because, as stressed above, union politics has 
a meaning which is larger than shown by closeness of 
elections, existence of contested elections, or existence of 
a permanent and organized opposition and turnover of leaders. 
As the evidence seems to suggest, some unions may have 
provided frequent contested elections, but have a poor profile 
of responsiveness towards the membership, and vice versa.
In the following sections this discussion is deepened 
through a historical analysis of union politics in Pernambuco, 
an empirical test of the electoral model, and finally the 
analysis of the phenomena mentioned above which are not 
grasped by the electoral model.
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3. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNAL UNION POLITICS IN
PERNAMBUCO
Now I can move on to analyse the nature of internal 
politics in trade unions of Pernambuco since 1978. Although 
no major specific study on this subject has been undertaken 
in Brazil, a research carried out in 1981-82 on the structure 
of union representation has found that there was a moderate 
tendency for officials to be re-elected in unions with leaders 
of "great [political] influence" and in unions which represent 
"workers of important economic sectors". In unions which 
represent "workers of small industries" there was a high ratio 
(0.93) of re-election (Cf. Gonsalves [1984:30-1]; and Silva 
[1984]).
On the other hand, the existence of several political 
persuasions inside the union movement since the mid-1970s 
justifies the analysis of the conditions under which democracy 
(or lack of it) works in Pernambuco. In fact, the split of the 
labour movement in the early 1980s into two major factions 
means that many unions have been facing disputes through the 
political fights undertaken by such factions (Cf. Keck [1989: 
277]). Besides, even some of those unions dominated by one 
single major faction have been facing political and electoral 
disputes because of challenges from small factions which are 
part of larger alliances within these major factions. To put 
it clearly, while the Workers’ United Central (CUT) and 
Workers’ General Central (CGT) form the two major union 
centrals within the Brazilian labour movement, these same 
centrals are formed by a myriad of political persuasions that, 
sometimes, find themselves in political and electoral disputes
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against each other.
Although my analysis refers to the period from 1979, it 
is important to set up a historical description of how 
internal politics has been working inside the unions I am 
investigating. The data available for most of the unions does 
not allow me to undertake a deeper analysis of this phenomenon 
in a historical perspective, but a few words can be said about 
the individual cases.
The data available for the period before 1964 refers 
mainly to the constitution of the board of directors of each 
union. Therefore, I can merely speculate about the turnover 
of the leaders during this period.
As elections were, by law, due every two or three years, 
such officials were not appointed, but elected. During this 
period the rank-and-file was called to vote for a slate on 
which the presidency was the only definite post. Commonly, a 
group of unionists would present themselves as candidates 
forming a slate. Once elected the president would then 
distribute the members of the slate to the several posts which 
constituted the union’s administration.
3.1. The Bank Workers’ Union
The data on the Bank Workers’ Union for the period 
between 1942 and 1964 shows a high turnover of officials from 
election to election. Elections were then held every two 
years, and the data shows that in each election, with the 
exception of the 1944 election, this union faced a total 
renewal of its officials up to 1964. Its first board was 
elected in 1942, having been re-elected in 1944. In 1946 these
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officials resigned, for unspecified reasons, just before the 
due election. This union was then ruled by several committees 
until 1948, when an election took place and a new board was
elected. From then on up to 1964 no official survived the next
32election , although there is no evidence at all to explain 
such a phenomenon, be it in terms of the union’s constitution 
through which some sort of obligation would exist in order for 
the union to renew its officials, or be it in terms of 
internal political mechanisms through which heir-apparent 
candidates were elected.
In April 1964, this union was subject to intervention by 
the military and a three-men board was appointed to run the 
union’s affairs. A major change, affecting not only this 
union, but also other unions in the country in the post-1964 
is that all union posts became definite before the elections. 
Many unions introduced a change by which the rank-and-file 
would no longer vote for a slate in which the president once 
elected would distribute the posts to the other members of his 
slate. In other words, during this period the membership 
started voting for a slate knowing beforehand who would be 
responsible for each aspect of the union’s administration.
An election took place in October 1965 and the new 
elected group maintained power up to 1988. The changes that 
occurred from term to term during this period were due to a 
number of factors which had nothing to do with votes and 
elections. These changes were in fact due either to political 
alliances or to individual decisions not to stand for the next 
election. This seems to confirm the findings of another
32 This data was collected from the individual union’s 
file in the archive of the Regional Labour Office (DRT).
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research carried out in Pernambuco and Paraiba states. In 
fact, Soares [1984] carried out a large research on rural and 
urban trade unions in these states and he found that in most 
of the unions the officials used just to change through 
rotation the main posts, while replacing some officials who 
were in charge of non-important posts in the unions’ hierarchy 
(Cf. Centro Josue de Castro/CEDEC [1983]).
In the 1967 election 5 out of 7 directors did not stand 
for re-election, and the same is true for the 1970 election. 
Among the new officials elected in 1967 was the man who was 
to dominate the union’s life until 1982 when he gave up union 
life: Julio C. de F. Cavalcanti. Firstly, as deputy secretary, 
and successively as its general secretary, vice-president, and 
president he dominated the union’s life and imposed his own 
view on how the union should act and on what it should and 
should not do. This official and his group espoused a 
conservative view on the role the union was to play. He often 
declared his support to the military government’s wage and 
economic policies, even when other conservative unionists 
disapproved of them.
In each of the elections held in 1973 and 1974^ 3 out 
of 7 officials did not stand for the next election. The 
union’s president decided not to stand for the next election 
due in 1976 and his deputy was, then, elected once again 
without contest and 2 new names appeared on the board of 
directors.
33 There are records in the individual file of this union 
in the archive of the Regional Labour Office (DRT) that an 
election was held on 29 October 1974, that is, just one year 
after the 1973 election. There is no information about why it 
occurred.
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This group was to face its first electoral challenge in
the election of August 1979. In April the first signs of the
formation of an opposition appeared (Interviews Nos. 23 and 
45). Also a newspaper reported that "about 60 bank workers
[had] gathered to form a slate to dispute the election"
(Jornal do Comercio, 13 May 1979). Most of its members were
employees of the state-owned Banco do Brasil. They used to 
discuss the economic situation of the country, political 
issues, and matters concerning wage problems and the role 
played by the union. As early as their second meeting they 
learned that elections for renewing the union’s board of 
directors was due in the coming August. Thus, there followed 
a lengthy discussion on whether or not to participate and 
challenge the then ruling group. According to the union’s 
rules, they had only 15 days to register their slate of 18 
candidates. This was a very short time to organize and form 
a slate in order to compete for the union’s offices. Moreover, 
the number of people the union rules demanded to form a slate 
outnumbered the number of people who had begun to meet. On the 
other hand, even some of the people in the opposition group 
could not take part in the elections, for they had been in 
their job for too short a period of time. Therefore, they were 
not qualified for the next union elections either as voters 
or as candidates. As the group decided it should compete in 
these elections, it had to form a very diffuse slate. It had 
to call for the participation of some bank workers who simply 
accepted that they would compete without further commitments 
to this opposition group (Interviews Nos. 23, 44, 45 and 47). 
On May 13th, this opposition group registered their slate 
(Jornal do Comercio, 16 May and 19 June 1979). Accusations of
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fraud followed the election (Interviews Nos. 23 and 45) and 
a federal judge suspended it and ordered a new one to take 
place (Jornal do Comercio, 4 Sept. 1979). According to members 
of the opposition group, it was not possible any longer to 
fairly dispute the new election at that time, for the group 
had run out of physical strength, and financial and 
organizational assets.
After the election a «witch-hunt» followed. All employees
of private banks who had participated were dismissed and the
opposition group had to start work from scratch. The
opposition survived the process through a small number of
militants who worked for the state-owned Banco do Brasil (Cf.
0 EletricitariOi April-May 1981; and interviews Nos. 23, 44,
45 and 47). However, the impact of the 1979 election and the
dismissals that followed it on the composition of this
opposing group did not allow it to stand for the next election
due in 1982. Another factor was its lack of ability to
mobilize sectors of the rank-and-file who were discontent with
the way the union officials had conducted the latest wage
campaign. The membership complained that the union was run by
a group of traitors. Instead of supporting an opposing group,
many members preferred to disaffiliate (Cf. interview No. 45.
On the relationship between member [ dis]satisfaction and
participation in unions, see Glick et al. [1977]). After some
meetings the opposition group decided that it would not be in
34a position to contest the coming election .
34 According to the ruling group, the fact that there 
would be only one slate
"Is an undeniable proof of all bank workers* confidence 
in us, who have been fighting against injustices 
practised by the bankers" (Cf. 0 Defensor, July 1982).
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The opposition militancy continued, however, and spread 
to other state-owned banks and even to some private banks. 
These militants of the opposition opened a current account to 
receive contributions from bank workers. They also received 
contributions from other bank workers* unions in the country, 
which were run by «progressive» officials. Thus, they were 
able to meet the costs of electoral and wage campaigns. Other 
unions in Pernambuco also gave them support, as they met 
frequently in the Metalworkers*, the Data Processing Workers*, 
and the Telecommunications Workers* Unions* headquarters.
On the other hand, following pressures from other union 
officials, the president decided not to stand for the next 
election due in 1982. Also some of the officials were not 
satisfied with the way the president had conducted the 1982 
wage campaign and negotiations, and put pressure on him to 
retire. Even before the election his deputy - the leader of
or
the rebellion - acted as de facto president (Cf. O 
Defensor, Sept. 1982).
An election was held in September and the slate named 
Conciliagao (Conciliation) won it having as its president the 
former deputy-president, or vice-president (Diario de 
Pernambuco, 1 Oct. 1982; and 0 Defensor, Nov. 1982).
The next election was held in 1985. During the campaign 
for the union’s election there was a wage campaign. While the 
union officials called for meetings at the union’s assembly
35 Cf. his open letter to the rank-and-file, O Defensor, 
Nov, 1981, annexe; and 0 Defensor Especial No. 3, Aug. 1985, 
where it said that:
"Thanks to Severino Helio [the leader of the rebellion], 
the vicious circle, which permitted Mr. Julio Cesar to 
stay as the boss of the union since 1964, was broken 
down".
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hall, the opposition group promoted rallies and protest 
marches as a weapon to win the bank workers* demands (Informe 
Sindical, 30 Sept.-6 Oct. 1985)^. For the union's election, 
while the ruling group registered a slate with only one change 
(O Defensor, Aug. 1985), the opposition group tried to widen 
their support by forming a slate with employees from the 
federal Banco do Brasil and Banco do Nordeste do Brasil, from 
the Pernambuco owned Banco do Estado de Pernambuco, and from 
some private banks. Its campaign was developed as a street 
campaign through distribution of pamphlets, posters, and 
rallies (Interviews Nos. 23 and 45; Cf. Informe Sindical, 30 
Sept.-6 Oct. 1985; and Folha Sindical, Sept. 1985). However, 
as the work of militants in private banks was quasi- 
clandestine, it lacked a deeper support from the majority of 
these banks’ employees. Thus, it happened that the opposition 
group won in the public banks, but was defeated in the private 
banks. This led to them being beaten in the elections, as the 
bank workers in the private sector outnumbered those employed 
in the public sector. The majority of the ruling group was as 
few as 784 votes (Informe Sindical, 30 Sept.-6 Oct. 1985).
Before the 1985 election there was a split in the 
opposition. A group decided to try an alliance with the ruling 
group and to oppose it «from inside», while another one 
decided that it should continue as an opposition group 
fighting the ruling group through the organization of the
00
Meanwhile, through the union newspaper, the union 
officials accused the opposition group of being bankers’ 
agents provocateurs (See O Defensor, June 1985).
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37grassroots (Interviews Nos. 23 and 47) .
FIGURE 4.1. BANK WORKERS’ UNION - ROTATION OF OFFICIALS
1979 1982 1985
President  ►President-------- ►President
Vice-President—  Vice-President-------►Vice-President
Secretary------------ ► Secretary------------► Secretary
Treasurer Treasurer------------►Treasurer
AssDirector---- ► As sDi rector----------► As sDi rector
►LabAffDirector LabAffDirectorLabAf f Director-^ "
PubReIDirector PubReIDirector------ ►PubReIDirector
Source: Morais
In an election whose features were violence and 
accusations of fraud against the ruling group, the opposition 
finally defeated, in 1988, the group that had been ruling the 
union since 1965. It was necessary to hold a second ballot 
because the opposition did not have a clear majority in the 
first poll. The opposition group’s slate was based mainly on 
state-owned banks because of the reasons already mentioned, 
that is, the attitudes of private banks employers towards 
their employees willing to take part in an opposition slate. 
Twenty-one out of the new 24 officials are state owned banks’ 
employees. The union’s executive is formed by seven officials. 
Only one official out of these seven unionists is a private 
bank employee.
37 The split of opposition groups in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s because of disagreements on strategies to take 
over the unions seems to have been a wider phenomenon in 
Brazil. See M.H.M. Alves [1984:82] for details.
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3.2. The Private Schools Teachers’ Union
The data on the Private Schools Teachers’ Union shows 
that, in the period before 1964, there was a group which 
maintained power without many changes. There is no data 
available for the boards of directors in the 1940s. This data 
is only available from 1951. This first group was reelected 
in 1953, but not in 1955. Unfortunately I do not have data 
indicating precisely either if it was defeated in a contested 
election or if it did not stand for the election. The same is 
true for the 1957 election when a new group took over power 
and ran the union up to April 1964. A superficial analysis of 
boards of directors during this time shows that, as in case 
of the Bank Workers* Union, only small changes occurred. 
However, once again these changes seem to have been due to 
factors others than elections. In each election held between 
1957 and 1964 - a total of 4 - only one official decided not 
to stand for the next election. During this time the union was 
run by a very simple board with as few as three people: a
president, a secretary, and a treasurer.
From the 1957 election on a group seems to have 
established control over the union and dominated it until 
1964. This rule was finished on April 13th 1964 when the 
military intervened in the union and appointed a junta to run 
the union’s affairs. This board was formed by the treasurer 
of the board that had been dismissed (Joaquim Caldas), acting 
as secretary; the secretary of the union during the terms from 
1957 up to 1961 (Alcindo T. de Oliveira), acting as president; 
plus the appointment of an official as caretaker of the 
union’s finances (Alto Nadler). It seems that the intervention
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was a measure aimed chiefly against the union’s president.
None of the appointed directors disputed the election 
which was held on October 23rd 1965. The new officials then 
elected did not dispute the elections of 1967 and a new group 
took over the union. This group also won the 1970 and 1973 
elections without any dispute. At that time, the union still 
kept to the very simple organizational structure of the 1940- 
50s.
On September 19th 1974, this union was once again subject 
to intervention by the government for reasons of financial 
corruption. The new board of directors appointed by the 
government completed the term due to finish in 1976 and 
oversaw a new election on March 12th 1976. The official 
appointed as secretary during the second intervention stood 
for this election contesting the post of secretary. His slate 
won what was an undisputed election. The «new» officials were 
not different from the «old» ones in terms of ideological 
beliefs. They ran over the union in the same way the «old» 
officials had done, that is, as a union that was supposed to 
give its rank-and-file social and medical assistance. There 
was no discussion about wage agreements as these officials 
(had to) accept(ed) the role of the government in establishing 
such increases.
There was no challenge for the election held in 1979. 
However, some signs of dissatisfaction among some militants 
started to appear. This began when the union officials called 
for an assembly for teachers to discuss the 1979 wage increase 
(Cf. Union minutes, 10 June 1980; and 13 Jan. 1981). Since 
1978 some teachers had been meeting to discuss the union 
situation and were willing to oppose its officials (Mendonga
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& Medeiros [1989:8-10]). This group was not a single one in 
ideological terms. It was formed by militants of different 
political persuasions: there were Marxists and Trotskyists
alike (Interviews Nos. 38 and 52). They had thought of 
disputing the union elections of 1979, but they were not able 
to register their slate due to some specific aspects of the 
labour legislation they did not know.
After the 1979 election campaign, this group split, 
dividing into basically two factions in 1980. It seems this 
was due to still unresolved discussions on the Stalinist 
inheritance of the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) (Interview 
No. 52).
For the 1982 union’s elections the opposition group was 
definitely split due to disagreements about how to win the 
union (Interviews Nos. 38, 40 and 52). As had occurred in the 
case of the Bank Workers’ Union, some militants believed 
the best strategy to be an alliance with the ruling group in 
order to take over the union «from inside». According to them, 
if they succeeded, before the 1985 election they would manage 
to throw the pelegos out and integrate other opposing, left- 
wing factions. On the other hand, another faction, mainly 
formed by Trotskyists, thought that "it was necessary to 
immediately cut all links with the «old» unionism to build a 
new, democratic unionism".
Moreover, the union’s president was also willing to 
compromise. The communists were then able to set up an 
alliance with the ruling officials and launched a slate on
38 These militants were communists linked to the 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), Communist Party of Brazil 
(PCdoB), and the Revolutionary Movement 8th October (MR-8).
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which the key post of president was to be retained by the «old 
guard», while the posts of vice-president and secretary were 
to be held by the communists. Meanwhile, the Trotskyists 
launched their own slate. Even before the results were known, 
the Trotskyists denounced what they called «electoral 
manoeuvres)). According to the labour law No. 3,437 of December 
1974, articles 22 and 85, the union’s president should have 
informed the Regional Labour Office (DRT), before the 
election, the route of itinerant ballot-boxes, which he did 
not. The labour office accepted the denunciation and the 
election was invalidated. Finally, the slate of the communists 
and the «old guard» managed to win the second round (Diario 
de Pernambuco, 1, 8 and 9 Feb. 1982). The former opposition
group was then in an unusual situation: part of it was running 
the union, while the rest was opposing it.
The strategy put forward by the communists was only 
partially successful. In fact, before the 1985 election they 
managed to leave the «old guard» outside their slate, but did 
not succeed in establishing an alliance with the Trotskyists. 
The «old guard» was unable to form a slate of their own and 
the left-wing factions once again went divided to the ballot, 
the Trotskyists being defeated.
In spite of all efforts, the internal dispute between 
these factions continued. By October 1985 the officials linked 
to the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB) and the Revolutionary 
Movement 8th October (MR-8) conceived a plan through which all 
union officials would resign from their posts. According to 
the union’s constitution, if this happened it would mean a 
«collective resignation». Therefore, new elections would have 
to take place. The strategy of these officials would then be
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to form only one slate integrating militants of all political 
persuasions (Informe Sindical, 11-17 Nov. 1985). In fact, they 
resigned, but the officials linked to the Communist Party of 
Brazil (PCdoB) did not, which did not characterize a 
«collective resignation» (Informe Sindical, 28 Oct.-3 Nov.
1985; Interviews Nos. 38 and 52). In this case, the union’s 
constitution ordered only a general assembly of the membership 
to take place and the vacant posts to be completed through 
appointment during the meeting by a show of hands. The 
Trotskyist militants managed to get appointed during the 
meeting and the union was then to be ruled by an alliance of 
this persuasion together with the militants of the Communist 
Party of Brazil (PCdoB). Finally, these factions managed to 
reintegrate the militants of the Brazilian Communist Party 
(PCB) for the 1988 election, which resulted in an uncontested 
election. Since then the union has been ruled by an alliance 
formed by the Trotskyists, and militants of the Communist 
Party of Brazil (PCdoB) and Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), 
in which the former have a majority.
3.3. The Metalworkers’ Union
The process of internal politics in the Metalworkers’ 
Union is somehow clearer. The first president was appointed 
by a union general assembly in 1937 (Union minute, 15 Aug. 
1937), Then, he himself appointed the first board of 
directors, which was sanctioned by the general assembly. The 
president resigned in 1940 due to health problems and his 
deputy completed this first term. This group did not stand for 
the next election, which was held in 1941. An uncontested
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election took place on December 11th in a general assembly 
(Union minutes, 9 and 11 Dec. 1941. Cf. Centro Josue de Castro 
[n/d:20-1] and [1988:19-20]).
In 1943, a member of the union’s fiscal council, Jose 
Viana, started accusing the executive board of financial 
corruption and demanded, with the support of seventy members 
(Union minute, 26 Sept. 1943), a general assembly to take 
place in order to dismiss the board of directors. The assembly
took place with the presence of a number of members of the
39political police (Union minute, 27 Oct. 1943) and ended in 
a street-fight. One month later, Jose Viana agreed to withdraw 
his accusations in order to take back his posts in the union 
(Union minute, 19 Nov. 1943). As a result of the agreement, 
another member, who had been responsible for collecting 
signatures among his fellow-workers for the petition to call 
the assembly, was expelled from the union (Union minute, 19 
Nov. 1943).
In 1945, Jose Viana was himself elected as president 
through an uncontested election (Union minute, 29 Nov. 1945). 
He remained as president until 1950 when, for reasons of 
financial corruption, he was dismissed by the Regional Labour 
Office (DRT) (Union’s file at the Regional Labour Office 
[DRT], card No. 37; and Union minute, 20 Oct. 1950). When 
facing the charges he tried to persuade the assembly to ignore 
them, but the Regional Labour Office (DRT) did not consider 
his case and appointed Joao X. da Silva as interventor. Jose
39 According to union documents, it seems that Jose Viana 
had been a Political Police’s informer (Cf. Centro Josue de 
Castro [1988:21]). However, according to an official of his 
group, he was expelled from the union in 1964 by the military 
because of his close contacts with the Brazilian Communist 
Party (PCB) (Cf. interview No. 6).
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Viana continued to participate in the union’s life and managed 
to escape a criminal charge against him. The intervention 
ended on July 31st 1952 and an election was held in September 
(Union’s file at the Regional Labour Office [DRT], card No. 
31/1). The interventor was elected as president and Jose Viana 
as secretary. On this board there was also an official who was 
to control the union for the next two and a half decades: Jose 
Calixto Ramos. From 1954 up to 1964 Jose Viana managed to be 
re-elected every two years as president of the union with 
small changes in the composition of the executive board. 
During this period, the only contested election took place in 
1954, but Viana was elected with 58% of the votes (Union 
minute, 2 Aug. 1954).
In April 1964 the union was intervened in by the military 
and Jos6 Viana was expelled from it (Ministry of Labour, 
decree No. 83, 13 April 1964). He was not allowed to stand for 
the next election held in 1965. Instead, one official of his 
group - JosS Calixto Ramos (Union minute, 12 Aug. 1965; Centro 
Josue de Castro [1988:36]; and interview No. 6) - was elected 
and dominated the union up to 1981. Jose Viana never returned 
to the union’s life. During this period no contested election 
existed in this union and the changes that occurred in the 
union’s governing body were due to personal reasons or 
rotation of leaders.
In 1974, Calixto Ramos was elected vice-president of the 
National Confederation of Industrial Workers (CNTI) and had 
to leave for Brasilia. In the 1975 union election he stood for 
secretary in order to continue performing his duties in 
Brasilia. He stood only for a minor post in the 1978 election. 
However, he himself appointed the members of his group’s slate
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(Interview No. 6).
However, a group of' young metalworkers linked to the 
Catholic Church began to meet regularly. These militants 
formed an opposition group, which in 1981 won the union's 
elections. At the beginning they did not constitute an 
opposition group to the officials of the Metalworkers’ Union, 
for they used only to meet other fellow workers from other 
economic sectors in order to discuss common problems.
In 1974, they created a clandestine group at the steel 
plant SOCIC (For a similar case in the ABC paulista region, 
see Alves [1989:49-50]). They used to discuss labour problems 
and even formed a small library with books about workers' 
fights and the labour movement (Cf. interview No. 7). They 
also organized a small strike without the union’s support at 
a time when organized labour resistance still faced hard 
repression.
Only in 1978 did they appear as a more organized group. 
In this year they began to attend the union's meetings, but 
were unable to form a slate to compete in the union’s 
elections. In 1979, they created a newspaper called Ze 
Ferrugem through which they were able to criticize the union 
officials’ high wages, for instance. At the same time, they 
were involved in the formation of an inter-union organization 
to promote demonstrations, rallies, and to fight those 
unionists known as pelegos. Finally, in 1981 they won the 
union’s election, with a majority of 506 votes (Centro Josue 
de Castro [1988:39-45]; Union minute, 23 April 1981; O 
Eletricitario, June 1981; and interviews Nos. 5, 8, 11 and
12).
174
FIGURE 4.2. METALWORKERS’ UNION - ROTATION OF OFFICIALS
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Source: Morais
These two groups clashed again in 1984 and Calixto 
Ramos’s group was once again defeated. The radical officials 
won 80% of the votes, with a majority of 2,250 votes (Union 
minute, 5 April 1984; interview No. 6; Ze Ferrugem 
Metalurgicot no month, 1984; Centro Josue de Castro [1988:53]; 
and Folha Sindical, July 1984 and May 1985). It is worth 
noting that however isolated this fact may be, it seems to 
lend support to Hill’s and Martin’s remarks about the 
significance of closeness of elections. In fact, although the 
radical unionists won 80% of the votes, this seems to indicate 
the incompetence of the «old» unionists rather than the 
establishment of an oligarchy. As stressed above, the «old» 
unionists represented that sort of unionism non-responsive to 
the workplace. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the 
membership might have voted differently.
Another election was held in 1987, but without contest. 
The changes that have occurred since 1981 have been due to
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internal political processes in which some officials stood 
down, according to them, ”to renew the leadership”.
3.4. The Urban Workers* Union
The data about the Urban Workers* Union shows a very low 
turnover of leaders. Apart from the 1980 election, other 
changes were caused either by external factors (state 
interventions) or by rotation of posts, or individual 
decisions not to stand. In fact, the first election was held 
in 1955, but the officials did not contest the next election 
in 1957. Instead, a new group was elected and dominated the 
union until 1964. Four elections were held between 1957 and 
1964 and the changes that occurred were due to the factors 
just mentioned above. Indeed, apart from the union’s 
president, the other officials moved from office to office 
without real changes. The new officials who appeared in the 
board of directors during these years were few in number.
As with many other unions in the country, this union was 
subject to intervention by the military in 1964. Fernando G. 
de Melo was appointed to run the union’s affairs until 
November 1964, when the military appointed a three-men junta 
to run the union’s affairs until June 1965, when they oversaw 
an election. The members of this junta stood for this 
election, which went uncontested. They did not stand for the 
1967 election and a new group took over the union, without 
contest once again. This group was re-elected in 1969, but now 
they faced another group. However, in November 1970 the 
government intervened in the union again. An inquiry into the 
electoral process showed that the ruling group had rigged the
j
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election. The group was dismissed and an interventor - Antonio 
B. de Souza - was appointed. He run the union until 1974, when 
an election was held. The interventor formed a slate of his 
own and won an uncontested election. However, he did not stand 
for the 1977 election and his deputy was then elected as 
president,
A new election was due in 1980. Nevertheless, the ruling 
group started facing growing opposition from mid-1979. A group 
of radical militants, many of them linked to the Brazilian 
Communist Party (PCB), managed to be elected as members of the 
wage committee, from which they opposed the ruling group (Cf. 
Union minutes, 21 and 26 Sept.; and 18 Oct. 1979; Jornal do 
Comercio, 15 Sept. 1979; and interview No. 33). Three groups 
contested this election (Union minute, 19 Sept. 1980), in 
which the radical militants were elected (O Eletricitario, 
Feb. 1981). Ever since then this group has been re-elected.
The «old guard» disappeared, but this new group has been 
facing growing opposition of militants of a political faction 
linked to the Workers* Party (PT) (Interview No. 46). They 
clashed for the first time in the 1986 election (Diario de 
Pernambuco, 3 Oct. 1986; O Eletricitario, Oct. 1986; and
Informe Sindicalt 29 Sept.-5 Oct. 1986) and again in 1989 
(Informe Sindicalt Aug.; Oct.; and Nov. 1989). The 1989 
election also witnessed a split in the ruling group. The 
union’s vice-president for the 1986-89 term was a member of 
a minor political faction, which decided to pull out from the 
coalition and contest the election with a slate of their own 
(Cf. Informe Sindicalt Nov. 1989; and their electoral 
manifesto Movimento Unidade & Compromissot 1989).
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This new group accused both the union officials and the 
opposition group linked to the Workers* Party (PT) of wishing 
to transform the union into a party appendage. According to 
them, the union officials had subordinated the union’s 
interests to the interests of the Brazilian Communist Party 
(PCB). On the other hand, they said that the militants of the 
Workers* Party (PT) were willing to impose their party view 
on the union regardless of the workers’ plurality of views and 
beliefs^. However, many of its own members were linked to 
the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB) and to 
the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB).
FIGURE 4.3. URBAN WORKERS’ UNION - ROTATION OF OFFICIALS
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Several union electoral pamphlets. Interestingly 
enough, this third group’s slate was called Unidade e 
Compromisso (Unity and Promise). Some of its members had been 
participating in the union’s board of directors since 1980. 
However, as I said above, they disagreed with the group linked 
to the Brazilian Communist Party (PCB). On the other hand, 
their group’s name suggests that they shared, to some extent, 
the communist officials* view on the issue about unity versus 
pluralism in union structure.
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There had to be a run off between the slate of the ruling 
group and the slate formed by the third group. The former won 
this 1989 election (Informe Sindical, Nov. 1989).
3.5. The Pernambuco State Schools Teachers* Association
The data on the Pernambuco State Schools Teachers’ 
Association also shows a very low turnover of leaders. Its 
first president, Adegilson Cavalcanti, was elected in 1967 and 
re-elected in 1969. He did not stand for the 1971 election and 
his deputy was elected as president (APENOPE [1974:1]). The 
nucleus of power in this association - the president, the 
secretary, and the treasurer - run it until 1979 and the 
changes that occurred during this period were due to rotations 
among the officials themselves (APENOPE [n/d:l]).
A major change occurred in 1979. As described in chapter 
II, during the wage campaign of that year, the association’s 
president - Leonidas F. de Lima - was accused by some teachers 
of not pursuing the rank-and-file's proper interests. Instead, 
according to them, he tried to satisfy the state government's 
aims when he seized the keys of the union’s headquarters in 
order to avoid a meeting at which a wage increase would be 
discussed (Jornal do Comercio> 27 and 29 May 1979).
These facts coincided with the election of that year. 
However, before the election the president was dismissed by 
an assembly after being accused of financial corruption 
(Jornal do Comercio, 17 June 1979; and interview No. 22)^.
^ The same fact happened in the Telecommunications 
Workers' Union, in 1983, when its president was also accused 
by the opposition of seizing the keys of the union’s 
headquarters to avoid a general assembly in which wage demands
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The leaders of the rebellion were then elected, without 
contest, to run the association. Leonidas F. de Lima’s group 
disappeared as a political faction inside the association, 
which has ever since been run by the same group which took 
power in 1979. The only real change affecting the political 
structure of the association occurred in 1980 when the 
Secretary for Education of Pernambuco state dismissed its 
president from his job as a state school teacher (Interview 
No. 27; Boletim Informative) APENOPEy Nov. 1981; APENOPE [n/d: 
1]; and Didrio de Pernambuco, 1 Dec. 1981). Although the
association continued to challenge the government’s decision 
up to 1985 by allowing him to be a member of the union’s 
executive board, this meant that without any longer having a 
job in this trade, he could not continue to be the 
association’s president or even a member of it. After that, 
no major changes occurred during this period, in which 6 
elections took place. Only 2 of these elections were contested 
- in 1987 and 1989 (Boletim Informativo APENOPEy Oct. 1982; 
July-Sept. 1986; and July-Aug. 1987; Boletim da CUT, July 
1985; and Oct. 1985; and Folha Sindicaly Sept. 1985).
The group that has ruled over the union is linked to the 
Workers* Party (PT) and has been facing the opposition of a 
faction formed by anarchists and communists. This faction is 
also linked to the Workers’ Party (PT) and major disagreements 
between them seem to be about how to run the union, for, as 
expected, the anarchists and communists have been demanding 
a collegiate government, and a major role to be played by the 
rank-and-file in the decisions taken by the board of directors
would be discussed. Later the assembly dismissed him (Cf, 
Didrio de Pernambucot 2 and 19 July 1983).
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(Informe Sindical, July and Aug. 1989; and interview No. 27).
According to them, the association should be run by a 
collegiate of officials without a formal president. It has 
also criticized the ruling group for preferring negotiation 
to mobilization of the rank-and-file. However, this group has 
been unable to win any election in the association. In the 
1989 elections they were able to win 34.6% of the votes 
(Informe Sindical, Aug. 1989). Even when this association 
merged with two other associations representing state school 
staff in order to form a union in 1990 its officials were able 
to win the votes of the majority of educational workers and 
took over the most of the offices in the new union.
3.6. The Data Processing Workers* Union
The Data Processing Workers* Union is the most recently 
formed of the unions in my sample. It was founded in 1985 
(Union minute, 2 Oct. 1985) and since then only 3 elections 
have taken place, having been held in 1985, 1986 and 1989.
However, in order to have a better understanding of the 
internal political process in this union I have decided to 
look back from 1979 when some militants decided to create a 
professional association which later became the union.
Some left-wing militants started meeting regularly in 
order to create an association to defend their rights before 
their employers (Cf. interviews Nos. 28 and 35). This 
association evolved and in 1985 it was transformed into a 
union. During the period from 1979 to 1985 the association was 
run by the same political group which had founded it. When the 
union was founded some changes occurred in its structure. The
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government’s decree which allowed the creation of this union 
defined it as representative of workers in the data processing 
industry. This was a specificity which did not allow all data 
processing workers to join the union. In other words, those 
data processing workers employed by firms whose main economic 
activity was not data processing services could not join the 
union. Therefore, some workers who were officials of the 
association and did not fit such a condition were not able to 
be members of this union. Thus, when the union was founded the 
same group that had run the association continued to run it 
without many changes (Informe Sindical, July 1989). Since 1979 
this labour organization - either as an association or as a 
union - has never faced a contested election (Cf. interview 
No. 24).
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The changes that occurred were: 1) those arising from the 
specificity of the law; 2) those due to rotation of the 
officials through the posts; 3) those due to individual
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decisions not to stand for the next election; 4) those due to
constitutional demands for the renewal of officials; and 5)
those due to a pre-election process of selection of
candidates. This last form of change is stressed in an
electoral pamphlet of 1989:
"The UNIDADE NA LUTA (Unity through Struggle) slate was 
formed during a democratic process in which union members 
discussed and chose the members of the slate and its 
electoral program. This slate represents a renovation of 
2/3, for only eight officials are candidates to re- 
election" (Electoral pamphlet Chapa 1: Unidade na Luta
[1989]).
A union official adds:
"In 1989, we opted for renewing the board of directors by 
replacing as many officials as we could. So, in the board 
elected in 1989 only 8 out of 24 were members of the 
former board, what means a renewal of 2/3 in the board of 
directors" (Interview No. 35).
4. INDICATORS OF UNION DEMOCRACY
I will not enter into a theoretical and philosophical 
discussion about a precise definition of democracy. Instead, 
in this section, I will use the indicators outlined in section 
2 taken from Lipset et al. [1977] and Edelstein & Warner
[1975] and utilized elsewhere (Cf. footnote 46. See also 
Anderson [1978]) to test the electoral model in order to 
broaden our understanding of how far it actually allows us to 
assess the degree of democracy in trade unions.
The analysis carried out here to test the electoral model
differs from the analysis of Mexican trade unions undertaken
by Roxborough. In fact, he used data related only to elections
for the post of general secretary in those unions, for
"This is the most important post, and if this post does 
not change hands, it is unlikely that other changes in
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the composition of the Executive Committee will be of 
great relevance" (Roxborough [1984:134]).
As there are no elections for individual posts in 
Brazilian trade unions, my data refers to elections in which 
all posts are contested by a slate or slates constituted by 
a number of union members. Some posts of course are 
politically more important than others. For instance, the 
posts of president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer 
are the most important in the unions’ structure and which 
control their political, administrative, physical, and 
financial resources. However, these posts are not contested 
one by one. Instead, a group (or groups) constitute a slate 
to contest all posts. This also means that the indicator 
«turnover of leaders» is, in this analysis, replaced by 
«turnover of the incumbent group». Data on rotation of union 
officials has been supplied in section 3 of this chapter.
Although I have proceeded a historical analysis of the 
unions* internal politics for a period of over forty years, 
the statistical data used below refers only to the period 
between 1978 and 1989. This is so for two reasons: firstly, 
the objective of the work in general and of the chapter in 
particular is to assess the changes that have been occurring 
in union politics since 1978; and secondly, the data referred 
to the period pre-1978 is marked by great discontinuity, which 
does not enable me to make a comparative analysis of different 
periods.
From 1978 up to 1989 26 elections were held in the unions 
I am investigating. Twelve out of these elections were 
contested, what means a ratio of 0.46. As described above no 
contested elections were held in these unions from 1964 up to
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1978, with an exception in the case of the Urban Workers* 
Union in 1970. If we compare these two periods using only this 
indicator, then we can say that these unions have become more 
democratic. This might also mean that the emergence of the 
militant groups calling for changes in the unions* internal 
politics provoked some signs of a rebirth of union democracy.
Nevertheless, if the emergence of new militants provoked 
an increase in the number of contested elections, the data 
shows that more than 50% of all elections went uncontested. 
Perhaps this means, for most of the unions, that while the 
left-wing leaders took them over and consolidated their power, 
the «old guards disappeared as a political faction. Besides, 
even on the left, new groups do not appear to have 
consolidated themselves as opposing groups in most of the 
unions.
On the other hand, in only 3 out of 12 contested ballots 
the opposition was able to win the elections. This means that 
the ratio of turnover of incumbent groups due to electoral 
defeat is 0.25. However, this phenomenon must be detailed. 
Firstly, in all 3 cases left-wing groups won the elections, 
which means that once these groups have taken power they have 
been unbeaten. Secondly, the way the opposition took power in 
both the Teachers* Union and Association is not represented 
in these cases. In fact, the cases only refer to winning power 
through contested elections. As referred to above, in the 
Teachers* Union the opposition was able to take power, first, 
through an alliance, and then through appointment during a 
general assembly. In the case of the Teachers* Association, 
the «old guard» was dismissed by a general assembly before the 
opposition took it over. On the other hand, the Data
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Processing Workers* Union was founded and has been run by 
left-wing militants which means that this union, too, must be 
considered outside those cases of left-wing groups taking over 
unions through contested elections.
TABLE 4.1. UNION ELECTIONS, 1978-8942
Union No. of 
Elections
No. of
Contested
Elections
Ratio of
Contested
/Non-
Contested
Elections
Incusbent 
Groups 
Stands & 
is Defea­
ted (Fre­
quency)
Incunbent 
Group is 
Re-elect­
ed (Fre­
quency)
Re-elec­
tion as a 
Ratio of 
all
Elections
Accusa­
tion of 
Electoral 
Fraud 
(Frequen­
cy)
Teachers’ 
| Union
4 2 0.50 0 4* 1
1
Data Pro­
cessing 
Workers’
| Union**
5 0 0 0 5 1 0 1
Teachers’
Associa­
tion
5 2 0.40 0 4 0.80 0
Metal­
workers’ 
| Union
4 2 0.50 1 3 0.75 0
Urban
Workers'
Union
4 3 0.75 1 3 0.75 0
Bank
workers’
1 Union
4 3 0.75 1 3 0.75 3
Source: Morais
(*) In the 1982 election the ruling group formed an 
alliance with an opposing group.
(**) The number of elections also refers to those held 
between 1979 and 1985 in the Data Processing 
Workers* Association. From 1979 to 1989 there 
were several elections, but I left two out 
because they occurred through a show of hands 
during general meetings and the boards then 
elected had a temporary character.
This data also shows that though the degree of democracy
42 The model for this table and the next one was set up 
by Roxborough [1984:134 and 139] and Thompson & Roxborough 
[1982:206 and 208].
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has increased inside unions in Pernambuco, at least a formal 
democracy has not been fully established in union life.
According to the electoral model I am testing, the first 
indicator of democracy - the existence of contested elections 
- shows that the Urban Workers’ and the Bank Workers* Unions 
are the most democratic with a high ratio of contested 
elections. The Teachers* and Metalworkers* Unions are an 
intermediary case with half the elections having been
contested. The Data Processing Workers* Union could be 
labelled as oligarchic, for no contested elections have ever 
been held there. The case of the Teachers* Association is 
unclear. Although it is not as oligarchic as the Data
Processing Workers* Union, it cannot be labelled a democratic
union in the same way as the Urban Workers* and the Bank
Workers* Unions. Nor is it an intermediary case in the way 
both the Teachers* and Metalworkers* Unions are. These cases 
could be represented graphically as follows:
FIGURE 4.5. CONTESTED ELECTIONS (%)
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Although the data on the turnover of incumbent groups - 
the second indicator of democracy - does not indicate a great 
deal of democracy, it is to some extent consistent with the
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first indicator. First of all, the ratio of turnover is the 
highest for the cases of the Urban Workers*, the Bank 
Workers*, and the Metalworkers* Unions (see column 7 above). 
This is consistent for both the cases of the Urban Workers* 
and the Bank Workers* Unions and to some extent for the case 
of the Metalworkers* Union. They can be said to be the less 
oligarchic unions of the sample. Secondly, the data is also 
consistent for the case of the Data Processing Workers* Union. 
As no contested elections have ever been held in this union 
and the incumbent group has been re-elected since its 
inception, the two indicators are in perfect correlation. On 
the other hand, to some extent, the data is also consistent 
with the case of the Teachers* Association considered by 
itself. The Teachers Association’s case is unclear, according 
to the first indicator, and its ratio of re-election is 
halfway between the extreme case of the Data Processing 
Workers* Union and the cases of the Urban Workers* and the 
Bank Workers* Unions. So far, these two indicators do not give 
us a clear idea of the degree of democracy, though the second 
indicator seems to point to the existence of an oligarchy.
On the other hand, this second indicator is not fully 
consistent in the case of the Teachers* Union. This is truer 
when we compare it with the Teachers* Association. The first 
indicator shows that the Teachers* Union, together with the 
Metalworkers* Union, constitutes an intermediary case with a 
ratio of contested elections higher than the Teachers* 
Association’s ratio of contested elections. However, the 
second indicator shows that the ratio of re-election in 
relation to all elections held in the period for this union 
is 1.0, which means that opposing groups have never been able
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to win contested elections. In other words, this characterizes
an oligarchy. The explanation for this apparent contradiction
might well be that, in this union, the «old guard» was removed
from office, not directly through elections, but through a
complex web of alliances between the various factions acting
inside this union. Therefore, the changes that occurred in the
union’s leadership cannot be detected through the electoral 
4 3
model . Thus, although the statistical indicator does not 
reveal it, changes, which occurred in the leadership of the 
Metalworkers’, the Bank Workers* and the Urban Workers’ 
Unions, also occurred in the structure of power of the 
Teachers* Union.
FIGURE 4.6. TURNOVER OF INCUMBENT GROUPS (%)
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The third indicator of union democracy is the closeness 
of elections. According to the electoral model, if the 
opposition is strong enough to influence a union’s policies 
and strategies this probably means that there is a good deal 
of democracy within the union. The closeness of elections
4 3
I will analyse other changes in union leadership and 
aspects of union democracy that cannot be assessed through 
this model in the next section of this chapter.
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would, therefore, indicate how successful the opposition is 
when addressing important issues by receiving a given amount 
of support, i.e., votes, from the rank-and-file during 
elections.
Although a group may well win several elections over a 
given period either because it has no opposition or through 
a large majority without being characterized as an oligarchy, 
for example in the case of highly popular leaders, according 
to the electoral model, this can be seen as an extreme example 
which does not constitute the rule nor invalidate the use of 
closeness of elections as an indicator of democracy.
TABLE 4.2. CLOSENESS OF ELECTIONS
1 UNIONS Average 
Winning 
Vote (%)
No. of
Elections
Considered
Teachers* Union 62.8 2
Teachers* Assoc.
o
•
00 3
Metalwork. Union 67.9 2
Urban Work.Union** 56.0 2
1 Bank Work. Union 52.9 2
Dta Proc.W.Union 94.2 3
Source: Morais
The statistical data in this table gives support to the 
two indicators I have tested so far. According to these
** Two ballots took place during the 1989 election. 
First, three slates contested it and the results in terms of 
votes were as follows: Slate 1, 37.9%; Slate 2, 30.5%; and 
Slate 3, 30.9%. As none of them was able to win a clear
majority of 50% plus one vote, there was then a second ballot 
with slates 1 and 3. For my calculations I have used only the 
result of the second ballot, I did the same in relation to the 
Bank Workers* Union which faced two ballots in 1988 for the 
same reasons.
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previous indicators, the Bank Workers* and the Urban Workers* 
Unions are the most democratic unions in this sample, which 
is consistent with the results set up in the table above. They 
indicate, in these 2 unions, that when an opposition group 
contested an election they were able to address basic issues 
of the union’s life to the rank-and-file. On the other hand, 
the data is fully consistent with what the indicators 
demonstrate in relation to the case of the Data Processing 
Workers* Union. The average winning vote in this union shows 
no sign of any opposition as demonstrated by the two former 
indicators. Finally, the range of average winning votes in 
each of these unions can be displayed in a way in which the 
most democratic unions - the Bank Workers* and the Urban 
Workers* - occupy an extreme near 50%, while the most 
oligarchic union - the Data Processing Workers* - occupies 
another extreme near 100%, with the Metalworkers* and 
Teachers* Unions constituting an intermediary case with the 
Teachers* Association a still unclear case. In short, this 
indicator is fully consistent with the findings arising from 
the test of the first indicator - existence of contested 
elections.
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The fourth indicator of union democracy refers to the 
existence of a permanent opposition. I have already pointed 
out some features of internal politics in section 3 of this 
chapter. The only union with a permanent opposition from 1978 
up to 1988 was the Bank Workers*. In fact, the left-wing 
opposition formed in 1978-79 has disputed every election since 
then, apart from the 1982 election. Moreover, it acted over 
these years as an organized opposition calling for meetings 
and assemblies, organizing strikes and demonstrations, and 
participating in negotiations and collective agreements. As 
this opposition group won the 1988 election, the role of the 
«old guard» is somehow unclear in the period post-1988. I have 
no evidence so far whether they have been able to constitute 
an opposition group against the new left-wing officials^.
The case of the Urban Workers* Union is different. The 
left-wing opposition was able to defeat the «old guard» as
^ One of the leading «old guard» officials was elected 
in 1990 as a Pernambuco state deputy and is unlikely to go 
back to the internal disputes of the union. Furthermore, the 
union’s president between 1982 and 1988 told me, in a personal 
communication, that he was due to retire in 1991 and was no 
longer willing to be involved in union politics.
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early as 1980. The conservative group disappeared as a 
political faction following its defeat and was not replaced 
by any other faction. Following the split of the Brazilian 
labour movement into 2 opposing factions, militants linked to 
the Workers* Party (PT) and Workers* United Central (CUT) 
established themselves as an opposition and disputed the 1986 
and 1989 elections and have been acting since then as an 
organized faction in the union. Finally, in 1989 the ruling 
group also split into 2 factions. Four union officials decided 
to leave and formed another slate to dispute the 1989 
election. However, in spite of their success in that election, 
when they were runner-up and contested a second ballot, there 
is no evidence to say that they will constitute an organized 
opposition in the way that the militants of the Workers* 
United Central (CUT) do.
Although the case of the Teachers* Association is unclear 
under the 3 indicators used so far, its situation under the 
fourth indicator is close to the Urban Workers* Union. In 
1979, the conservative president was forced out of the 
association and replaced by left-wing militants. There was 
then a gap from this year up to 1987 without any contested 
election or signs of an opposition. In 1987, some anarchists 
and communists formed a slate to dispute the election, which 
they did again in 1989. However, there is no evidence either 
that they have been acting as an organized faction in the same 
way as the opposition groups of the Urban Workers* and the 
Bank Workers’ (before 1988) Unions, or that they have been 
able to influence the association’s strategies and policies 
as in the case of the Bank Workers* Union.
The case of the Metalworkers* Union illustrates another
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path. It is unique in the way that the «old guard» was able 
to survive their first defeat to the left-wing opposition. In 
fact, in most of the unions conservative unionists disappeared 
as a political faction after being defeated by left-wing 
militants. However, in this union the «old guard» was able to 
keep itself organized and contested the 1984 election. After 
that they disappeared and no opposing groups have emerged in 
this union.
Left-wing militants were also able to take over the 
Teachers* Union. Nevertheless, as I have already pointed out, 
this happened through a number of alliances, coups and 
counter-coups. Left-wing militants were already able to 
influence the discussion about wage demands as early as 1979. 
Following this wage campaign they split into two factions, as 
already described. The militants linked to the Workers* Party 
(PT) and Workers* United Central (CUT) continued to be an 
opposition group up to 1985 when they managed to gain 
appointments to some posts of the union. Signs of groups 
acting as an organized opposition disappeared in 1987 when all 
factions merged into a single alliance, which has run the 
union since then.
The Data Processing Workers* Union represents an extreme 
case where no opposition has ever emerged. Since 1979 when 
militants founded an association, which was transformed into 
a union in 1984, all left-wing factions have been able to 
maintain an alliance to run the union. This does not, of 
course, signify a smooth process without internal divisions. 
During the discussions on transforming the association into 
a union, a faction
"wanted it to be a pelego union, a middle-class biased
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union. However, these people were defeated during the 
discussions by CUT’s militants and pulled out of the 
union" (Interview No. 24. Cf. interview No. 35).
However, this does not affect the findings displayed so 
far about the dynamics of internal politics in this union, 
according to the electoral model.
5. THE ENVIRONMENT FOR UNION DEMOCRACY
As pointed out above, there are some criticisms of the 
electoral model. I myself pointed out some theoretical aspects 
of internal union politics which are not taken into 
consideration by the electoral model.
I will take the general meaning of these criticisms as 
a starting point for analysis of other aspects of internal 
politics in the unions that I am investigating. The indicators 
used so far in section 4 give us a clear picture of the state 
of internal union politics in terms of the strength of 
different political factions only when they contest elections. 
However, in spite of the internal consistency these indicators 
may show, they do not allow us to understand the dynamics of 
«submerged» politics translated, for instance, into pacts and 
alliances which cannot be detected by the electoral model; nor 
do they allow us to analyse the actual conditions (for 
instance, violence, threats, insults, accusations, dismissals, 
etc.) under which opposing groups exist and act. Finally, they 
do not allow us to understand the very process through which 
the groups receive support, i.e., the process of policy making 
and delivery of goods.
Therefore, in this section, I intend to analyse other 
aspects of internal politics in order to draw a more balanced
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view of internal politics in these unions. This section is 
divided into four subsections as follows:
5.1. Attitudes Towards Opposing Groups
Patterns of democracy do not evolve only from the
performances of the different political factions in elections,
but also from the extent to which ruling groups are willing
to tolerate opposition. Martin [1987:229] says that:
"The political culture - the complex of values, beliefs 
and emotional attitudes surrounding political 
institutions - acts as a constraint upon union leaders 
directly and indirectly through its influence upon 
membership beliefs about the legitimacy of particular 
political practices".
This means that sometimes ruling groups, unwilling to see 
their policies and strategies contested in assemblies or be 
defeated in elections, may take a tough approach to opposition 
groups, violence being an extreme case. In other cases, 
opposition groups are constitutionally allowed to use the 
union’s premises to discuss plans and to organize themselves. 
Thus, this subsection is mainly related to internal processes 
by which democracy actually works, as in cases of violence and 
accusations involving different groups acting inside the 
unions, and to cases where opposition groups are entitled to 
use the union’s headquarters as a place to meet.
Not all unions have faced problems of violence and/or 
exchange of serious accusations, or have constitutional 
clauses obliging ruling groups to accept opposition groups. 
Therefore, my analysis is based on events which do not involve 
all unions subject of this investigation. However, these 
events should not be seen as particularities of some unions*
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internal politics, for as political phenomena they can happen 
in any political organization.
So far the most extreme means of intimidation against 
opposition groups is the use of various forms of violence. 
Although the Bank Workers* Union is the most democratic union 
under the indicators of the electoral model, it has faced an 
uneasy history of violence since 1979. The opposition was able 
to challenge the ruling group throughout the 1980s, although 
this happened through a process in which the opposing and the 
ruling groups exchanged serious accusations and sometimes had 
to fight each other physically. As I mentioned above, since
1978 some militants started criticizing the union’s president 
by saying that he was a pelego and was not interested in 
organizing the rank-and-file. The opposition was organized in
1979 and was always an active voice during wage campaigns and 
collective agreements in the period until 1988. In November 
1979 there was a disagreement between the banks and the union 
about an increase of 22% due to governmental decree No. 6,708/ 
79. The opposition once again accused the union’s president 
of not pursuing the rank-and-file’s interests. It put pressure 
on the union officials during some meetings held to discuss 
strategies of negotiation. Such meetings were finished when 
fighting took place amongst members of these two factions 
during a meeting held in the headquarters of the Weavers’ 
Union (Interviews Nos, 23 and 45).
Violence broke out again during the 1984 wage campaign. 
A general assembly was held on September 14th in order to 
choose the members of the wage committee. During the 
discussions, disagreements developed regarding the role the 
Banco do Brasil employees were to play in this committee. This
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was, of course, a disagreement about the participation of 
opposition militants, for most of them were employees of this 
bank. Once again violent fighting erupted between the two 
factions, ending with seven wounded in hospital and most of 
the others at the nearest police station (Cf. 0 Defensor, July 
1985; and Boletim da CUT, July 1985)*®.
The 1986 wage campaign witnessed a union official being 
attacked by a Workers* United Central (CUT) militant. The 
ruling and the opposition groups were promoting a 
demonstration in the city centre when an opposition militant, 
who was distributing pamphlets, spat in the face of the 
union’s president and attacked him. In turn, another union 
official attacked the militant. The police had to come in and 
both were arrested (Didrio de Pernambuco, 5 April 1986).
The next round of violence took place in the 1988 
47election . According to one of the radical militants:
"The opposition had to employ some men as a bodyguard to 
guarantee their physical security" (Interview No. 47).
On the other hand, a newspaper reported that:
"In spite of being a union of middle-class employees, the 
Bank Workers* Union has been marked by violent electoral 
and wage campaigns...[Thus], another violent occurrence
i C
The 0 Defensor issue also published the official 
document written by the public prosecutor about the nature of 
corporal injuries produced during the fight. During the 1985 
wage campaign an opposition member still reminded the rank- 
and-file in a rally of the fact that they had been beaten up 
inside the union’s headquarters (Cf. Jornal do Comerciot 22 
June 1985) .
47 Denunciations of violence toward opposing groups 
during elections are also found in other unions which are not 
being analysed here. During the campaign for the 1986 election 
in the Construction Workers* Union, for instance, the 
opposition had to ask the Pernambuco state’s Secretary for 
Public Security for protection. According to the leader of the 
opposition, members of the ruling group had beaten him and 
stoned his car (Cf. Informe Sindical, 14-29 Oct. 1985; and 
Jornal do Comerciot 13 Nov. 1985).
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took place yesterday, this time being against Luiz 
Sinval, a union’s official, who was attacked by off duty 
policemen" (Diario de Pernambuco, 8 Oct. 1988. Cf. Folha 
de Pernambuco, 6 Oct. 1988) .
On the other hand, during processes when ruling groups 
have to deal with an opposition, be it in electoral campaigns, 
be it in wage negotiations, severe accusations are published 
trying to demonstrate either that the opposition is supported 
by the employers; or that it is formed by corrupt people; or 
that it is formed by militants with «hidden» objectives.
This last resource was particularly used in the late
1970s and early 1980s, when the military were still in power,
in order to link the opposition with the «red perils, i.e.,
the communists. During the 1981 electoral campaign in the
Metalworkers* Union the ruling group issued some pamphlets
which suggested that the opposition had been trained and was
being financed by ^external forces». Thus, the opposition,
"Perhaps taken by a feeling of revolt when facing the 
difficulties due to international and national situations 
...has been easily influenced by politicians, ideologists 
and specialized catechists, who are experts in preaching 
hate, revolt and discord, and thinks that only through 
threats and force is that social peace is achieved" 
(Union pamphlet Chapa 1 Une os Metalurgicos [1981:1]).
Accordingly, the opposition was also portrayed as saying
that
"Our group’s money comes from another country. We must 
only direct the workers to strike; to arm themselves for 
the struggle; to violence and bloodshed. We want 
struggle, not peace. This is the union opposition" (Union 
pamphlet Atengao, Companheiros: Veja o Evangelho da
Oposigao Sindical [1981]).
In spite of their efforts, the conservative group was
48 The Folha de Pernambuco says that a director of the 
regional Workers* United Central (CUT), plus its own 
journalist and photographer reporting about this election were 
beaten up by members of the incumbent group.
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defeated. In 1984, these two groups clashed again. Now, during 
the campaign, the left-wing officials published documents 
trying to incriminate the conservative candidate for the 
union’s presidency as a corrupt man. The new officials accused 
him of having sold a Volkswagen Kombi owned by the union for 
a cheap price, without consulting anybody and without a public 
auction (Cf. Z6 Ferrugem Metaldrgico, June 1984). 
Interestingly enough, the radical officials knew of these 
facts before the election campaign, but kept them and only 
released them during the campaign.
The 1985 wage campaign of the Bank Workers’ Union was one
of the bitterest during the 1980s in terms of exchange of
accusations between the ruling group and the opposition.
During the campaign the ruling group accused the opposition
of being on the employers’ side several times. Accordingly,
the opposition had signed a «dirty pact» with conservative
officials of the Bank Workers* Union Federation to benefit the
bankers (Cf. O Defensor, Edigao Extra, July 1985; O Defensor,
"Editorial", July 1985). It was also to blame for trying to
split the bank workers, for
"during a wage campaign, trying to do so is to play the 
bosses* game...All bank workers were amazed by the move 
of some people who... tried to help the bankers" (O 
Defensor: Boletim Especial, No. 3, Aug. 1985)...[Indeed], 
"the so-called union opposition is trying to defeat the 
wage campaign of 30,000 men and women in order to use it 
as a demagogic electoral platform against the union and 
the bank workers" (O Defensor: Boletim Especial, No. 9, 
Sept. 1985. Cf. O Defensor: Boletim Especial, Nos. 13 and 
15, Sept. 1985).
While the Data Processing Workers* Union is oligarchic 
under the four indicators used above, it is the only union 
whose constitution guarantees any opposition group the right 
to use its headquarters for holding its meetings. According
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to it,
"The constitution emphasizes the rights of individuals 
and minorities. They have the right: 1) to see any
document produced by the union and/or kept in its 
archive; 2) to publish in the union’s newspaper opinions 
in disagreement with directors* acts and decisions; 3) to 
use the union’s headquarters to prepare slates for 
elections, to organize electoral campaigns; 4) to write 
news for the union’s newspapers; 5) to call for any 
general assembly, even to dismiss union officials; and 6) 
to attend any meeting of the union’s general council" 
(Boletim Informativo APPD, March 1979).
This constitution was written for the Data Processing 
Workers* Association in 1979 and was adopted by the union with 
minor alterations in 1985. Although these points do not 
guarantee the emergence of an opposition, they have been used 
as a guarantee by different persuasions inside the union to 
voice their opinions and to hold meetings of their own.
495.2. Union Structure and Means of Participation: 
Committees, Assemblies, and Delegates
In this subsection I provide a description of different 
levels and channels of participation inside the unions. In 
some unions such different channels have been established at 
the workplace not only as a means to strengthen the unions* 
structure, but also as a means to strengthen union democracy 
by providing channels of communication through which workers 
could voice their opinions and demands.
^ See Martin [1987:236]. He says:
"The main determinants of the extent to which the formal 
structure facilitates or hinders the articulation of 
disagreement are the degree of substructural autonomy and 
conversely of centralization, the position of full-time 
vis-a-vis lay officials and the electoral system itself".
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Apart from the administrative structure in running union 
affairs, there are a number of committees to deal with 
problems arising from the day-to-day. Some of them are 
permanent as in the case of the health committee of the Data 
Processing Workers* Union, others are temporary such as the 
wage committees of most of the unions.
These committees have provided a channel which has been
used by different groups to voice their opinions and try to
implement their policies. In late 1970s and early 1980s
opposing groups used the wage committees to channel what they
saw as the true demands of the rank-and-file and to challenge
the ruling groups. The opposition in the Metalworkers* Union
first appeared as an organized group during the 1979 wage
campaign (On the same phenomenon in Sao Paulo state, see Alves
[1989:52-3]). As they put it:
"In 1979 we directed all assemblies during the wage 
campaign. Even with pelegos officials running the union, 
we were the heads of the process of negotiation" 
(Interview No. 12) .
During the 1980s the left-wing officials of several 
unions continued to form wage committees with lay members to 
participate in the negotiations (Cf., for instance, Informe 
Sindicalt 12-18 Aug. 1985). The same holds for most of the 
cases I am discussing.
The left-wing militants who took over the Urban Workers* 
Union in 1980 were active members of the wage committee in
^ The president of the metal industry employers* union 
in an interview to the Jornal do Comercio (13 Sept. 1979) also 
pointed out this fact by saying that:
"In that occasion [a general assembly of metalworkers] we 
realized the existence of a leadership contrary to the 
union’s directors".
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1979. In most of the meetings the union’s president had to
give up conducting the assemblies and the main leader of the
opposition directed them (Cf. Union minutes, 3 Aug.; 21 and
28 Sept.; and 18 Oct. 1979). According to a union official:
"We had the initiative of all actions and negotiations.
We called and promoted the assemblies, and he [the 
president] had to accept our actions. He was only there 
to sign papers" (Interview No. 33).
This allowed some militants to voice their criticisms of
the union’s president because of his strategy to negotiate
with the management during the assemblies held to discuss the
negotiations (Cf. Jornal do ComSrcio, 15 and 30 Sept. 1979).
The union minute of August 24th 1979 reads:
"Mr. Paulo Pacheco [a lay member] directed harsh words 
toward the union’s president, Mr. Saturnino J. da Silva, 
by naming him a pelego. He said that the assembly and the 
[wage] committee could never achieve anything with the 
president working against the rank-and-file and 
denouncing workers to the management".
The same strategy was used by left-wing militants in both 
the Teachers’ Union and Association and in the Bank Workers* 
Union.
"He [the president of the Bank Workers* Union] said that 
the wage committee elected by the general assembly is 
formed by members of the opposition who happen to have 
hidden objectives. They are not interested in signing a 
wage agreement, for what they want is to promote a 
strike" (Jornal do ComSrcio, 20 Sept. 1979).
However, as pointed out above, these committees are 
temporary and usually formed once a year during wage 
campaigns. During the 1980s most of the unions tried, with 
different levels of success, to establish workers* committees 
at the workplace. These committees were not to be branches of 
the union at the workplace, but representatives of the workers 
whose main task was to channel demands and complaints arising 
from the rank-and-file to the union. The distinction is not
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only a semantic one, but means that the committees would have 
a great degree of autonomy in relation to the union. Where 
unions succeeded in establishing them, the members of such 
committees were not appointed, but elected. Contrary to the 
process of electing union officials, militants would stand as 
individuals and not as members of a slate. In this case, many 
militants of opposition groups or members with different 
political beliefs could be elected along with supporters of 
the union’s ruling group, providing a healthy degree of 
internal democracy (Interview No. 35).
The most extreme case of a committee’s autonomy toward
the union is that of the Bank Workers* Union. It was created
by opposition militants working mainly in the Banco do Brasil.
This provided the opposition with an organized means to
contest the union leadership and to voice different proposals
arising from the workplace because
"It was created when we faced the immediate need to 
organize the workers through bank branches and increase 
the relationship between employees of different branches; 
between employees and the union; and between employees 
and the national leadership of the labour movement" 
(Interview No. 45).
This also provided a basis for the opposition to
participate in the negotiations during wage campaigns (Cf.
Diario de Pernambuco, 12 July 1984) and national meetings of
bank workers (Cf. Informe Sindical, July 1988). The
participation of opposition members in temporary wage
committees was made possible through such committees because
"...We were able to make the assembly elect democratic 
wage committees to discuss with the bankers, for the 
rank-and-file did not trust the union’s officials" 
(Interview No. 45. Cf. interview No. 47; and Informe 
Sindicalt 26 Aug.-l Sept. 1985).
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Both the Data Processing Workers* and the Urban Workers*
Unions have succeeded in establishing workers* committees. The
former has a network of delegates which provide the basis for
the communication between the union and the rank-and-file.
After the 1989 wage campaign, for instance, the union praised
the existence of such committees as the basis for their
success in achieving their demands:
"The workers* committees played an important role, along 
with the union, in pursuing the best strategy and the 
organization of the workers" (Informe Sindical, July 
1989) .
On the other hand, when the slate to contest the 1989 
election was formed and the unionists had to comply with the 
union’s constitutional obligation to renew, at least, 1/3 of 
the officials, these committees provided a good source of new 
and experienced militants to become union officials (See Alves 
[1989:56-7]; and Humphrey [1979a:78] on the same phenomenon 
in Sao Paulo state).
The Urban Workers* Union also has a network of delegates
i
and committees in the three firms where it unionizes its rank- 
and file. The first delegates were elected in August 1985. 
Workers were called to elect 24 delegates in the 3 firms (Cf. 
0 Eletricitario, Sept.; Oct.; and Nov.-Dec. 1985; and Informe 
Sindical, 26 Aug.-l Sept. 1985). However, these delegates did 
not, at first, constitute a workers* committee. Instead, they 
acted individually representing groups of workers of certain
^ See also Informe Sindical, Aug. 1989, where an 
official of the Data Processing Workers* Union says that:
"The workers* committees are the best way to organize the 
workers. Even before we founded the union, we were 
already structuring and supporting such committees. Now, 
we support the autonomy of the committees in relation to 
the union".
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sectors of the firms. However, in 1988, a union’s general 
assembly approved of creating the workers* committees (Cf. 
Boletim Urbanitario, 8 Aug. 1988; Informe Sindical, July; and 
Sept. 1988). The assembly decided once again that the 
committees were to have autonomy in relation to the union, 
though the union would be a co-ordinator of the committees* 
actions. Many of the militants of the Workers* Party (PT) who 
opposed and clashed with the ruling group in the 1986 and 1989 
elections are also members of these committees (Cf. Union 
pamphlet Oposigao Urbanitdria 2 [1989]).
Finally, the Metalworkers* Union has not been fully 
successful in implementing such committees. Although they 
founded the first workers* committee in the North/Northeast 
region of the country, it was afterwards disbanded by the 
management. Also neither the Teachers* Union and Association 
have been successful in establishing these committees. They 
have met with tough restrictions and tough answers from the 
schools* owners and the state government.
5.3. Political/Union Factions and Union Democracy
The image of union democracy drawn by the electoral model 
is a homogeneous one. If, on the one hand, the union is 
dominated by an oligarchic group, one is unable to 
characterize its internal divisions in terms of political/ 
union factions which build up the ruling group. On the other 
hand, the same holds for the case in which two opposing groups 
always clash giving the union a democratic life. The two or 
more groups are depicted as uniform entities without internal 
divisions. However, as must be clear by now, it has not always
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been so. The data used so far has shown that ruling as well 
as opposition groups are constituted by a number of factions, 
and that these groups, from time to time, face internal 
disputes. These internal disputes influence the composition 
of the groups who contest the union leadership, even in those 
unions ruled by unopposed groups.
The composition of the national leadership of the 
Workers* United Central (CUT) has been analysed by Rodrigues. 
According to him (Rodrigues [1990:21]), the national executive
of the Workers* United Central (CUT) elected during its 3rd
52National Congress in 1988 was formed by 6 factions . The 
number of members of each faction in the executive body 
depends on its share of the votes in the election held during 
the congress. This national picture is reflected, with minor 
changes, at the regional level and at the level of different 
unions which are members of the Workers* United Central
CQ
(CUT) . This means that both ruling and opposing groups 
whose unions are affiliated to the Workers* United Central 
(CUT) face almost the same divisions seen in terms of 
different groups struggling for hegemony.
52 The national executive of the Workers United Central 
(CUT) elected in 1988 had 20 members divided as follows: 1)
Articulagao group, 10 members; 2) Forga Socialista group, 2 
members; 3) Democracia e Luta group, 1 member; 4) Unir a 
Cidade e o Campo group, 1 member; 5) Construir a CUT Classista 
e pela Base group, 1 member; and 6) CUT pel a Base group, 5 
members. The weekly Istoe Senhor (No. 1147, 18 Sept. 1991) 
reported that during the IV National Congress of the Workers* 
United Central (CUT) there were 26 political factions fighting 
for power inside this labour organization. On the mechanism 
based on proportional share of votes to form the executive of 
this Central, see Alves [1989:60-2].
53 For instance, during the 4th Regional Congress of the 
Workers* United Central (CUT) in Pernambuco (26-28 Aug. 1988), 
four slates contested the election to renew its board of 
directors. Its composition was decided on the share of votes 
of each slate (Cf. Informe Sindical, Sept. 1988, Annexe).
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Nevertheless, the existence of different political 
factions does not lead necessarily to contested elections. For 
instance, the ruling group of the Data Processing Workers’ 
Union is formed by some political factions (Interview No. 35). 
As mentioned above, this union has never faced a contested 
election. Although this may well mean intolerance toward 
conservative groups, the same is not true for left-wing 
minorities. Even so, it does not seem that this union has been 
intolerant toward conservative members. There is evidence 
that, though the conservatives do not form an organized 
opposition, they have a stronghold in the EMPREL where they 
have a majority in the workers* committee in that firm. As it 
is guaranteed by the union’s constitution, the different 
political persuasions use the union’s headquarters to hold 
their meetings. Besides, all through the years they have been 
able to stand united with only one slate for each election. 
However, the formation of such slates consists of a complex 
network of negotiations. Unionists have to deal with the 
constitutional obligation to renew, at least, 1/3 of the 
officials and, at the same time, to maintain the 
representativeness of all political factions.
The Metalworkers* Union has also faced such a phenomenon.
Although the left-wing militants, who won the union in 1981,
helped to create the Workers* Party (PT) and the Workers*
United Central (CUT) in Pernambuco, they do not constitute a
homogeneous body. An official says:
"Before taking over the union, what defined the
participation of the militants in the opposition was
their praxis in front of the factories* gates, their
dedication...After we won the union the affiliation of 
the militant to one or other group was what determined 
his/her participation. So, there were a number of
comrades who were not well prepared for the job, but were
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elected due to the support of their groups... Moreover, 
greater divergencies have arisen from the fact that some 
militants want the union to be a simple appendage of the 
party" (Interview No. 11).
In other cases this has produced a different picture. The 
Teachers* Association faced contested elections in 1987 and 
1989. Nevertheless, both the ruling and the opposing groups 
are affiliated to the Workers* United Central (CUT) and the 
Workers* Party (PT) (Interview No. 27). Moreover, the 
opposition is formed by a rare alliance of anarchists and 
«independent» communists {Informe Sindical, July; and Aug. 
1989).
Divisions in the opposition’s ranks have also happened 
when it split over political conceptions about how to take 
over the union. ' Both the opposition groups of the Bank 
Workers* and the Teachers* Unions faced this experience, as 
mentioned above. This did not affect the strength of the 
opposition in the case of the Bank Workers* Union. The group 
that intended to establish an alliance with the ruling group 
to win the union «from inside» did not achieve its aim because 
it was left outside by the union’s officials.
However, it produced a complex web of alliances and 
clashes in the political history of the Teachers* Union during 
the 1980s. In this case the narrow focus on elections reveals 
that in 1982 two slates contested the election. However, it 
does not show that the conservative group, which was able to 
maintain power, did so through an alliance with an opposition 
group, and that these groups traded votes and posts. The 
exclusive use of the electoral model also does not reveal the 
«submerged» process underlying the 1985 election. The ruling 
group faced the opposition once again. However, the ruling
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group was not the same any longer. Its composition had 
changed, for the left-wing officials managed to expel the 
conservative officials from the alliance. The latter were not 
able to form a slate of their own and the election was 
contested by two left-wing slates. This led to the process of 
changes already described above when all political factions 
were integrated into a ruling group in the post-1985 period. 
Nowadays, the "board of directors..., considering their 
ideological commitments, is extremely ample" (Interview No. 
38; Cf. interviews Nos. 40 and 41), for it is formed by 
several factions as unlike as they could be: there are
Trotskyists as well as their eternal rivals, the Stalinists; 
there are socialists, communists and anarchists; there are 
members of the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), of the 
Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), and of the Workers* Party 
(PT); and there are members of many factions which are 
affiliated to the Workers* United Central (CUT). Thus, the 
network of alliances and interests present in the history of 
the internal politics of this union reveals a considerable 
degree of negotiation and tolerance of each faction toward 
their partners. However, it must be said that the degree of 
tolerance varies from case to case. For instance, at the end 
of the IV National Congress (4-8 Sept. 1991) of the Workers* 
United Central (CUT), a violent fight exploded amongst the 
several factions just after a «unity» executive had been 
formed. Members of the Articulagao group were commemorating 
the re-election of Jair Meneguelli (a member of Articulagao) 
for Workers’ United Central (CUT) presidency. Then, they 
started shouting that a Convergencia Socialista*s member (an 
ex-president of the Bank Workers* Union of Rio de Janeiro) was
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a thief for having supposedly stolen money from that union. 
It seems that the Articulagao has been facing growing 
opposition from Stalinists and Trotskyists. Thus, some 
Articulagao members took advantage of the occasion to accuse 
a member of those groups, which provoked the fight (Cf. weekly 
Istoe Senhor, No. 1147, 18 Sept. 1991). This seems to indicate 
that the use of violent methods is not restricted to disputes 
between conservative and left-wing factions, as in the case 
of the Bank Workers* Union described above (Cf. Roxborough 
[1981:86]).
5.4. The State, Management, and Union Democracy
A final point remains to be analysed. This refers to 
pressures exerted from the outside both by the State and the 
management and their influence on union democracy.
There is evidence that the existence (or not) of a union 
opposition or radical officials depended, during the period 
I am analysing, to some extent on the attitudes of the State 
and management toward trade unionism. However, the influence 
of the former has diminished throughout the 1980s.
In fact, when the first radical militants started 
emerging in the late 1970s, their profile either as an 
opposition or as union officials depended not only on 
recruitment of new militants and successes in union election, 
but also on the extent to which both the State and management 
were willing to tolerate radical militants participating in 
the unions* affairs (Cf. Alves [1989:53]).
There was then a wide range of measures which both of 
them could take in order to repress radical militancy inside
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the unions. This ranged from threats to dismiss opposition 
members^ to threats to intervene in unions run by radical 
militants.
In the late 1970s when signs of an opposition started 
appearing in the Bank Workers’ Union the government’s answer 
was rapid. The head of the Regional Labour Office (DRT) 
threatened its leaders. Besides, most of the bank workers who 
held jobs in the private sector and participated in the 
opposition’s slate were dismissed after the union election of
RE
1979 . The opposition had to be continued almost solely by 
militants who worked for the state-owned Banco do Brasil. This 
was to have a serious impact on the opposition’s composition 
and its capacity to contest the next election. After a number 
of meetings they decided that they had no chance at all of 
winning the union election. In fact, the opposition was unable 
to present a slate in 1982 due to a lack of militants to carry 
out the job of organizing the grassroots.
Such measures, on a minor scale, were used throughout the 
1980s and had a long term impact on the opposition. This 
reflected, for instance, on the poor performance of the 
opposition in the private banks during the 1985 election and 
on the composition of the opposition slate standing for the 
1988 election. In fact, only three militants out of twenty- 
four members of the opposition slate for this election held
54 An extreme case happened when the secretary of the 
Teachers* Union was shot by a school watchman while 
distributing pamphlets about a wage campaign in front of the 
school Academia Santa Gertrudes (Cf. Boletim da CUT, 12 June 
1985).
55 Yet, in 1981, a employee of the Pernambuco state-owned 
Banco do Estado de Pernambuco and leading militant of the 
opposition was dismissed (Cf. O Eletricitario, April-May 
1981) .
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their job in private banks.
Similarly, after radical militants took over the 
Teachers Association in 1979 , the state government acted 
by dismissing its president in 1980 on the grounds that he was 
not a good professional, for after taking over the 
association’s presidency he had missed, according to 
Pernambuco state’s Secretary for Education, a lot of classes 
(Boletim Informativo APENOPE, Nov. 1981; and interviews Nos. 
22 and 32). Moreover, the government prohibited teachers from 
paying the association’s fees via direct debit from the wages 
roll. Both the measures caused a deep impact on the 
association’s performance up to 1985 (Cf. Boletim da CUT, July 
1985). In fact, membership fell drastically affecting the 
association’s financial situation. In turn, this clearly 
affected its capacity to organize the rank-and-file or extend 
the association’s structure to other Pernambuco towns.
The radical militants of the Metalworkers* Union also 
faced threats of intervention from the government and tough 
action from the management. In 1979, when still an opposition, 
they were told by the head of the Regional Labour Office (DRT) 
that the government would not tolerate their actions. In 1983, 
already as the union’s ruling group, the government threatened 
to intervene in the union because of their leading 
participation in a general strike in that year in which five 
officials and two militants of the union were arrested (Cf.
56 I described above how these unionists took over the 
association during the process of a strike. During the 
organization and development of it, the head of the Regional 
Labour Office (DRT) threatened to prosecute the teachers under 
the National Security Law (LSN) because article 566 of the 
Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT) prohibited civil servants 
from going on strike (Cf. Jornal do Comerciot 19 May 1979).
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Diario de Pernambuco, 22 July 1983. See also the police
document - Inquerito Policial No. 05/83, Denuncia No. 36/84, 
23 April 1984 - sent to the Procuradoria da Republica no 
Estado de Pernambuco). On the other hand, they also faced 
repressive measures taken by the management. Following this 
general strike, employers dismissed a number of workers who 
had played a leading role in organizing it (Didrio de 
Pernambuco, 26 July 1983. On other cases of management
repression on workers taking part in strikes outside 
Pernambuco, see Alves [1989]; and Humphrey [1979a:81-3]). 
Earlier, in 1982, a number of union militants was also 
dismissed because of their participation in a strike (Diario 
de Pernambuco, 3 Oct. 1982. For a similar case see also Jornal 
do Comercio, 5 Sept. 1985). The employers also intended to 
organize a petition asking the Minister of Labour to intervene 
in the union and dismiss its officials (Cf. Didrio de 
Pernambuco, 11 Feb. 1982. For an analysis of this political 
attitude among the Pernambuco entrepreneurs towards labour 
relations, see Abramo [1986:274]). Finally, as mentioned 
above, this union was able to establish the first workers* 
committee in the North/Northeast region of the country. 
However, the management counterattacked by gradually firing 
all members of this committee (Cf. Informe Sindical, June 
1985; interview No. 12; and Jornal da Comissao de Fdbrica 
COSINOR, May 1986). The union’s document Dossie dos 
Metalurgicos-1988 says that:
"We are 24 officials. Eight of us have been struggling
against unfair and illegal dismissals...".
Both the Urban Workers* and the Data Processing Workers* 
Unions faced restrictions from the government. Both
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electricity and data processing were viewed as a matter of 
national security (Interview No. 24). Therefore, the 
government was unwilling to allow radical militancy in these 
areas. In the first case, many militants were dismissed after 
the strikes of 1979, 1981 and 1982 (Cf. Union minutes, 12-13 
Nov. 1979; and Informe Sindical, 13-19 Jan. 1986), and others 
were threatened with prosecution under the National Security 
Law (LSN) (Interview No. 33). In the second case, the 
government did not even allow a union to be formed before 
1985.
Thus, the pressure both from the government and 
management has three aspects affecting union democracy: 1)
repressive measures aimed at the opposition; 2) repressive 
measures toward radical union officials; and 3) repressive 
measures aimed at cutting channels of communication between 
union officials and rank-and-file.
It is unlikely that a repressive approach from external 
forces toward union oppositions would produce fair conditions 
for internal democracy in the unions. Although the electoral 
model showed that there was a considerable degree of union 
democracy in the Bank Workers* Union since 1979 onwards, a 
look at the management approach to radical militancy shows 
that it had an important impact on the performance and 
composition of the opposition. On the other hand, it is also 
unlikely that repressive measures on union officials and union 
organization would produce a healthy ground for democracy 
inside the unions (Cf. Friedlander [1975]). When facing the 
tough approach of the state government towards the Teachers* 
Association, it was unlikely that any opposition would emerge, 
at least in the left-wing realm. When an opposition emerged
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again in this labour organization, the association had been 
more or less accepted by the state government as a 
representative organization of the state schools* teachers and 
had been engaged in rebuilding itself since 1985 when the 
government allowed the teachers once again to pay the 
association’s fees via direct debit.
However, this factor should not be exaggerated, for if 
both the Urban Workers* and the Data Processing Workers* Union 
faced threats and repressive action from the government, in 
the long term they have undertaken different paths. Whereas 
the former has experienced the emergence of opposing groups, 
the latter has not.
6. CONCLUSION
Finally, if "politics is about power, not simply 
elections", then the processes described above show that union 
democracy and the mechanisms (elections, alliances, pacts, 
share of power, etc.) underlying the means through which 
democracy actually works are a complex set of phenomena.
The «new unionism» emerged with demands for and promises 
of internal democracy and responsiveness to the shop-floor. 
The data discussed here shows that undoubtedly signs of 
democracy have appeared in Pernambuco unions since 1979. 
However, it also shows that one should not exaggerate the 
extent of this phenomenon. Compared with the period between 
1964 and 1978, the unions have faced a significant number of 
contested elections (for instance, the Bank Workers* and Urban 
Workers* Unions) and different groups have appeared, although 
not always as organized factions. Nevertheless, there is the
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extreme case of the Data Processing Workers* Union and the 
mid-way cases of the Teachers* Association and the 
Metalworkers* Union with a low profile in terms of organized 
oppositions and contested elections.
However, it is worth mentioning that although some unions 
do not seem to be democratic under Edelstein and Warner*s 
model, the evidence available shows that most of them have 
been trying to be responsive to the membership, either through 
strengthening of channels between themselves and the rank-and- 
file or by submitting agreements to the general assembly. 
Therefore, they seem to be meeting the conditions of 
representativeness and accountability put forward by Fosh and 
Cohen [1990] as a sign of democracy.
Thus, I have also taken into account more informal 
factors of union life which affect internal union politics. 
Therefore, the data related to these aspects shows that 1) the 
internal political culture (degree of tolerance toward 
opposing groups); 2) the channels of participation for the 
rank-and-file and lay activists as well as means of 
communication between the leadership and the rank-and-file;
3) the political and union affiliations; and 4) the external 
factors, all have a varied degree of effect on the dynamics 
of union democracy and reveal a complex result. Firstly, while 
there was a quasi-intolerance toward opposition in, according 
to the electoral model, the most democratic union (the Bank 
Workers*), the most oligarchic union (once again, according 
to the electoral model) - the Data Processing Workers* - has 
a constitutional clause obliging the renewal of the union’s 
leadership as well as clause assuring the rights of minorities 
to use the union’s headquarters for their meetings. Secondly,
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apart from the Bank Workers* Union before 1988, the unions* 
officials have been trying to strengthen their organization 
at the workplace, which has allowed them to increase the 
degree of communication between top and bottom and the degree 
of responsiveness toward demands arising from the workplace. 
Thirdly, the myriad of political and union groups at the 
national level has been reflected inside the unions. 
Nonetheless, this has produced two opposite effects. On the 
one hand, these factions have been able to secure «unity» 
around a single slate which expresses a common program in the 
cases of the Teachers’ Union from 1985 and more particularly 
from 1987; of the Data Processing Workers* and of the 
Metalworkers* Unions. On the other, these factions have split 
and formed factions which act as an organized opposition (the 
Urban Workers* Union) and contest elections (the Urban 
Workers* Union and the Teachers* Association).
Finally, it was also shown that the external factors 
exerted some influence on the internal political processes of 
the unions. Radical militants and union officials faced a 
varied degree of repression either from the State or from the 
management and this affected radical groups* profiles as well 
the size, composition and performance of opposing groups; the 
unions* organization at the workplace; and the number of 
contested elections.
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CHAPTER V
SOURCES OE UNION MILITANCY: 
DEMANDS, INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN 
C A T E G O R I E S  AND ORGANIZATION AT THE
WORKPLACE
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to assess the sources of union 
militancy in Pernambuco from 1978 in terms of the fight for 
«new» demands. It has been argued that one of the main 
characteristics of the «new unionism^ is the kind of demands 
that the «new unionism» unions have been putting forward.
tn
While the «old» unionism demanded only wage increases , the 
«new unionism» has also been putting forward lists of demands 
with new topics which are not solely related to wage issues. 
Therefore, these new demands would constitute a departure from 
the sort of demands around which the «old» unionism was 
organized (For an analysis of dichotomous models applied to 
Latin American labour movements, see Roxborough [1981]).
Thus, Tavares de Almeida [1981:179] says:
"[The «new unionism»] has pointed out the existence of 
new subjects which could be included in the list of 
demands to be negotiated. They are related to actual day- 
to-day problems of working conditions and labour 
organizations at the workplace" (See also NEPP/UNICAMP 
[1989:109-149]; Moists [1979:59]; Rodrigues [1979]; Sarti 
& Barbosa FQ [1983]; Tavares de Almeida [1983]; and 
Tavares de Almeida et al. [1986:339]).
»>7 It must be said that before the strikes of 1978-79 the 
«old» unionism did not even demand wage increases because the 
government established them through decrees.
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On the other hand, it was argued that these new demands 
were the expression of higher ranks inside the working class 
and that these ranks would constitute a labour aristocracy 
(Tavares de Almeida [1975]. Cf. Rodrigues [1979]). These new 
demands would, then, be related to the needs of the upper 
ranks of the working class.
Finally, it has been argued that these new demands grew 
from autonomous labour organization at the workplace. 
According to Maroni [1982], most of the strikes of May 1978 
were led by informal leaders of workers* committees, not 
linked to the unions, who acted as representatives to 
negotiate these demands arising from the workplace.
Thus, the aim of this chapter is to analyse four related 
problems:
1) to what extent have the demands of the «new unionism»
actually been new ones?;
2) to what extent, in an economy with a high inflation rate,
have the unions been able to put forward and secure new 
demands and fight for them? In other words, how could the 
unions maintain the fight for demands other than economic 
ones in the face of pressure for improved gains to match 
the constant increase in the cost of living?;
3) what role (if any) have the internal divisions of the
working class played in the fight for these new demands?;
4) what role has union organization at the workplace played
in putting forward and securing these new demands?
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2. THE NEW UNIONISM AND NEW DEMANDS
A number of authors have argued that the union militancy 
that emerged in Brazil mainly from the mid-1970s is a «new» 
kind of unionism if compared with the kind of unionism of the 
pre-1964 period, in terms of the quality and quantity of 
demands put forward. Thus, «new unionism» has been synonymous 
with new demands. In fact, new aspects of labour life have 
been taken into account during negotiations between unions and 
employers (Cf. Castro [1990:131]).
As early as 1978, the opposition group in the
Metalworkers* Union of Pernambuco had already asked for
demands, suggested by radical militants, which were not
present in the list of demands negotiated by the «old guard».
"[In 1978] the union officials were only interested in 
calculating the cost of living in order to demand a wage 
increase to compensate for any increase. We, instead, 
demanded wage increases beyond the increase in the cost 
of living. We also demanded the right to participate in 
professional courses for acquiring higher skills and a 
double wage during vacations" (Interview No. 7. Cf. Keck 
[1989:256] on Sao Paulo case).
These new demands have also been present in the list of
demands of other unions:
"In the data processing sector, the level of wage demands 
is the same as that of the general labour movement. 
However, there is a difference between us and the general 
union movement because we have a list of demands and 
agreements revolving around social rights issues which 
are very considerable in the face of the diseases arising 
from the labour process in our profession" (Interview No. 
24) .
2.1. The Bank Workers* Union and the Evolution of Demands
Data presented below shows that there has been an 
increase in the number of demands put forward by this union
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over the years. In fact, the data is first available for 1978 
onwards and shows that in that year the demands of this union 
were focused around three issues: 1) wage increase; 2) time
in service allowance; and 3) limit for working day. It must 
be said that the wage increase demand was linked to the wage 
policy established by the government. In other words, it was 
not strictly a demand because the wage increase was determined 
by the government. Therefore, what the union did was to 
negotiate a formal agreement in which the increase allowed by 
the government was established.
Although the list of demands of 1979 was still a short 
one, it already reflects the emergence of the new radical 
militants within the union. This was the year in which the 
conservative unionists faced their first electoral challenge. 
As the annual wage agreement was also scheduled for August, 
the opposition group tried to link the wage campaign with the 
electoral campaign. This was the first time since 1964 that 
bank workers in Pernambuco had heard of a wage campaign. 
Former wage agreements had just been signed without any 
campaign, for the military government established wage 
increases through decrees which were accepted by the 
conservative officials without discussion. In spite of the 
fact that the opposition group was defeated, it was able, 
through participation in wage campaign meetings, to put 
forward a demand for a professional minimum wage for this 
sector. The aim of this demand was to avoid the fact that 
bankers dismissed many employees after the agreements were 
signed and employed others at lower wages (On a similar case 
in Sao Paulo state, see Moises [1979:64]).
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TABLE 5.1. LISTS OF DEMANDS - BANK WORKERS* UNION
YEAR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
DEMANDS
1. MAGES
1.1 An Across the Board X X X X X X X X X X X
Mage Increase
1.2 Mage Increase (Mage X
Margins)
1.3 Advance Paynent X X X
1.4 Professional Mininun X* X X* X* X* X* X* X* X* X* X*
Mage
1.5 Substitute Enployee’s X
Mage X
1.6 New Enployee’s Mage
1.7. Change in Data-Base X
2. ALLOMANCES
2.1 Productivity Increase X X X X X X* X X X
2.2 Meal Allowance X X VA X X X X X
2.3 Travel Allowance X X X X X X X X
2.4 Overtine Rate X X X X X X X X
2.5 Shift Allowance X I X X
2.6 Tine of Service X X X X X X X X X X X X
Allowance
2.7 Supplenent for Pensions X X
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION
3.1 Job Definition X ' X X X
3.2 Systen for Pronotion X X
3.3 Job Stability for X X X X X X X
Pregnant Monen
3.4 Job Stability for X X X X X
Injured Persons
3.5 Release for Students X X X X X X
Missing Morking Hours
4. MORKING CONDITIONS (No
Monetary Benefits)
4.1 Uniforn X X X X X X
4.2 Morking Tine Linit X X X X X X X X X X X
4,3 Creche X X X X X X X X
5, UNION POMER
5.1 Assistance Contribution X X X X X X X X
5.2 Acceptance by Banks of X
Union Medical
Certificates X
5,3 Union Bulletin Board in
Banks
5,4 Access for Union X X
Officials to Banks
5.5 Free Tine for Officials X X X X X X X X
to Perforn Union Duties
Source: Morais
(*) Professional Minimum Wage according to skill
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The 1981 list of demands had 7 points in comparison with 
3 in 1978 and 5 in 1979 and 4 in 1980. However, the real 
increase in the number of demands was in 1982. One remembers 
that in 1982 there were elections in this union. The 
conservative unionists were to face a new challenge. There was 
also an internal split between the officials about the way an 
extra wage campaign had been conducted by the union president. 
It seems that the 1982 list of demands reflects both 
phenomena. The union officials were not satisfied with the 
role played by the union president during this extra campaign 
negotiations. Then, it is possible that they tried to frame 
a long list of demands in order to steal the opposition’s 
thunder during that electoral year. There is strong evidence 
that although they did not present themselves as an opposition 
group as the radical opposition did, they tried to present 
themselves as the ones who had broken the continuity of 
conservative officials in the union since 1964.
The number of demands in 1982 (20 demands) was three 
times the number of demands in 1981 and there was an increase 
in the number of demands concentrated around indirect wages. 
Moreover, for the first time, demands related to aspects other 
than the economic ones were raised. In fact, in that year the 
union negotiated demands on issues related to professional 
situation and working conditions. These aspects were then 
integrated into the lists of demands put forward in the 
following years, apart from 1987 when no demands related to 
professional situation were presented. However, the number of 
demands decreased in 1983 and 1984 (15 demands each).
Interestingly enough, elections were due in 1985 and the list 
of demands increased marginally to 16 demands. It decreased
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in 1986 (15 demands) and 1987 (12 demands). In 1988, an
electoral year, the list of demands returned to the level of
1985. The first year that the opposition led a wage campaign 
was in 1989. This is also the year in which the list of 
demands increased to the highest level during these years with 
demands related to a number of labour issue aspects. 
Altogether, the membership voted for a list of around 21
CO
demands to be negotiated with the bank employers .
2.2. The Urban Workers’ Union and the Evolution of Demands
In 1978 this union presented a list of demands with 5 
points which were related to wage increases and other monetary 
benefits. The opposition group first participated in a wage 
campaign in 1979. The list of demands was as short as that 
presented in the previous year, with another 5 points. 
However, it is worth noting that the opposition presented the 
idea that the workers should not accept the wage increase
limits allowed by the government. Thus, in that year the
membership demanded a wage increase higher than that put
forward by the government through its wage policy. On the 
other hand, it was a proposal of the opposition group to 
demand a professional minimum wage. Although there has not 
been a high turnover in this sector it seems that the
employees of the Pernambuco water company earned lower wages 
than the employees of both the federal and state electricity
The data was gathered from each final list of demands 
approved by the general assembly and presented every year from 
1978 to be negotiated with the employers. Data about the list 
of demands has been published yearly by the union’s newspaper 
in one of its July issues.
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companies. Therefore, as a decrease in the nominal value of 
wages is not allowed, this professional minimum wage should 
be based on the lowest wages of the electricity companies. 
This meant that wages in the water company should increase to 
meet the conditions established in an agreement.
Although still not in power during the wage campaign of 
1980 the opposition conducted it (See Interview No. 33). From 
5 points in 1979 the list of demands increased to 10 points 
in 1980 and for the first time issues related to professional 
situation and working conditions appeared in it. The number 
of demands increased in 1981 to 11 points. It must be noted 
that the lists of 1980 and 1981 included transitional demands 
for cancelling the dismissals which took place after the 1979 
strike. On the other hand, the 1981 list of demands included 
a new one which was related to control over the duration of 
the working day for certain workers who held jobs in areas of 
extreme responsibility. In 1982 the number of demands 
decreased to 9 points and stood at the same level in 1983. 
From then on up to 1987 the list of demands increased, 
reaching a total of 21 in that year. However, it decreased in 
1988 to 17 points, but increased again in 1989 to 21 points.
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TABLE 5.2. LISTS OF DEMANDS - URBAN WORKERS * UNION
YEAR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 88 I
DEMANDS
1. WAGES
1.1 An Across the Board X X X X X X X X
Wage Increase
1.2 Wage Increase (Wage X X X X
Margins)
1.3 Advance Paynent X X X X
1.4 Professional Mininun X X X X X X X X X X X
Wage
1.5 New Employee*8 Wage X X X
1.6 Change in Data-Base X X X
2. ALLOWANCES
2.1 Productivity Increase X X X X X X X X X X
2.2 Neal Allowance X X X X X X X X X X
2.3 Cooperative X
2.4 Travel Allowance X X X X X X X X X X
2.5 Overtime Rate X X X
2.6 Shift Allowance X X
2.7 Time of Service X X X X X X X X X X
Allowance
2.8 Holiday Rate X X X X X X X X X X
2.9 Supplement for Pensions X X X X
2.10 Supplement for Medical X X X X X X
Assistance
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION
3.1 Criteria for Hiring X X
3.2 Criteria for Dismissals X X
3.3 Job Definition X X X X X X X X
3.4 System for Pronotion X X X X X
3.5 Information on Wages, X
Taxes and Deductions
3.6 Job Stability for X X
Pregnant Women
3.7 Release for Students X
Missing Working Hours
4. WORKING CONDITIONS (No
Monetary Benefits)
4.1 Uniform X X
4.2 Safety Equipment X
4.3 Working Tine Limit X X X X X X X X
4.4 Medical Assistance X X X X
4.5 Creche X X X X X X X X X
5. UNION POWER
5.1 Assistance Contribution X X X
5.2 Free Time for Officials X X
to Perform Union Duties
5.3 Election of Manager X X X X X
(Administrative or
Personnel)
Source: Morais
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There is no evidence at all that the emergence of an 
opposition group in 1986 linked to the Workers* Party (PT) 
provoked any sort of impact on the list of demands. Although 
there was an increase in the number of demands in that year, 
it seems that this had to do with internal processes of 
discussion with the rank-and-file. Indeed, the disagreements 
between the two factions were about strategies for negotiation 
and how to run the union. Moreover, in 1989, when three slates 
contested the elections in this union, the number of demands 
decreased, which seems to indicate that the emergence of 
opposition groups in this union did not provoke the sort of 
impact that it did in the case of the Bank Workers’ Union.
2.3. The Data Processing Workers* Union and the Evolution of
Demands
Data on demands for this union is available from 1985, 
when it was founded. As an association it did not present any 
list of demands. In the case of federally owned companies, 
wage increases and other matters related to labour relations 
were based on the government’s wage policies. The same holds 
for state- and municipal-owned companies. In the case of 
private companies, employees were represented by the Trade 
Workers* National Confederation (CNTC). Although the data 
processing workers* associations of many states tried to 
influence the list of demands that was to be discussed, they 
were not very successful and did not take part in the process 
of negotiation (Cf. interview No. 24).
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TABLE 5.3. LISTS OF DEMANDS - DATA PROCESSING WORKERS* UNION
YEAR 85 86 87 88 89
DEMANDS
1. WAGES
1.1 An Across the Board X X X X
Wage Increase
1.2 Wage Increase (Wage X
Margins)
1.3 Advance Paynent X X X X
1.4 Professional Mininun X X* X* X* X*
Wage
1.5 Substitute Enployee’s X
Wage
1.6 New Enployee’s Wage X
1.7 Change in Data Base X X
2. ALLOWANCES
2.1 Productivity Increase X X X X X
2.2 Meal Allowance X X X X X
2.3 Travel Allowance X X X X
2.4 Overtine Rate X X X X
2.5 Shift Allowance X X X
2.6 Tine of Service X X X X X
Allowance
2.7 Holiday Rate X X X X
2.8 Supplenent for Pensions X
2.9 Supplenent for Medical X X X
] Assistance
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION
3.1 Criteria for Hiring X X
3.2 Job Definition X X X X
3.3 Systen for Pronotion X X X X
3.4 Job Stability for X X X
Pregnant Wonen
3.5 Release for Students X X X
Missing Working Hours
4. WORKING CONDITIONS (No
Monetary Benefits)
4.1 Working Tine Linit X X X X X
4.2 Creche X X X X X
1 4.3 Working Hour (50x10) X X X X X
5. UNION POWER
5.1 Assistance Contribution X X X
5.2 Access by Union X X
Officials to Firns
5.3 Free Tine for Officials X X
| to Perforn Union Duties
Source: Morais
(*) Minimum professional wage according to 
skill
The data available for 5 years shows that the number of
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demands increased over the period, except for 1989. Thus, in 
the first year in which this union took part in a process of 
negotiation, a list of 14 demands was presented, which was 
repeated in 1986. The list increased to 20 in 1987, 24 in 
1988, decreasing to 18 in 1989. However, it is worth noting 
that this insignificant decrease did not mean a qualitative 
change in the demands presented, as will be discussed later.
One point raised throughout the years is the demand for 
the regulation of the working hour. One remembers that a major 
concern within this union is on the discrepancy between the 
number of keystrokes recommended by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) and what most employers insist on. The 
union has been trying to have the matter regulated through an 
agreement on the working hour, i.e., the amount of minutes 
actually worked which would be 50 minutes while the workers 
would rest for 10 minutes.
2.4. The Metalworkers* Union and the Evolution of Demands
Following the pattern of unions run by conservative
officials, the Metalworkers* Union used to present few
demands. As quoted above, the opposition group tried to
influence the list of demands by trying to bring in demands
related to matters other than the wage increase alone. In
terms of wages it seems that the conservative officials
presented a very poor list of demands which was related to a
wage increase based on the government’s wage policy.
’’There was no campaign during that time. Nobody knew what 
a dissfdio was and the union did not come to factory 
gates. The union president and his mates simply went to 
the workplace to say: «the wage increase is so much, and 
that is that»” (Interview No. 8).
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This was challenged by the opposition group, which 
suggested a wage increase higher than that allowed by the 
government (Lima [1991:16]. For the case of the Metalworkers* 
Union of Sao Bernardo, Sao Paulo state, see Humphrey [1979a: 
84]). By 1979 the opposition group had become stronger and 
influenced the list of demands which increased to 9 items. In 
1980 the union presented a list with 15 points which increased 
further to 18 points in 1981 when elections were held. The 
opposition having taken power in 1981, the list decreased to 
9 points constituting the 1982 core demands. This core of 
demands decreased to 7 points in 1983 and 8 points in 1984. 
The number of demands increased again to 12 points in 1985 and 
to 13 points in 1986. The list increased further in 1987 to 
14 points, but decreased in 1988 to 12 points. There was a 
slight increase in 1989 to 13 points.
In spite of this wide variation in the number of demands 
presented each year, it seems that this union has kept an 
average number of demands related to crucial aspects of labour 
problems. The peaks in the number of demands seem to be linked 
to temporary problems which the union has tried to get 
resolved through the annual negotiations. On the other hand, 
the only contested election this radical group faced was in 
1984. There is evidence that the conservative group that 
challenged it did not have much support at the workplace. The 
conservative group was also unable to influence the list of 
demands whether in terms of number of demands, or in terms of 
the kind of demands presented. Though elections were held in 
1984 the number of demands was around the same level of the 
two previous years.
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TABLE 5.4. LISTS OF DEMANDS - METALWORKERS* UNION
YEAR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
DERANDS
1. WAGES
1.1 An Across the Board I X X X X X X X X X X X
Wage Increase
1.2 Advance Payment X X X
1.3 Professional Niniaua X X X X X X X X* X X X
Wage
1.4 Substitute Employee’s X X X X
Wage
1.5 Change in Data-Base X
2. ALLOWANCES
2.1 Productivity Increase X X X X* X* X X X X X
2.2 Neal Allowance X X X X X X
2.3 Travel Allowance X X X X X X X X X
2.4 Overtime Rate X X X X X X X X X X
2.5 Shift Allowance X X X
2.6 Tine of Service X X
Allowance
2.7 Holiday Rate X X X X X X X X
2.8 Supplenent for Nedical X
Assistance
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION
3.1 Criteria for Hiring X
3.2 Criteria for Dismissals X
3.3 Information on Wages, X X X
Taxes and Deductions
3.4 Job Stability for X X X X X X X X X X X
Pregnant Women
3.5 Release for Students X X X X
Hissing Working Hours
4. WORKING CONDITIONS (No
Monetary Benefits)
4,1 Uniform X X X X X X
4.2 Safety Equipment X X
4,3 Working Time Limit X X X X X X X X
5. UNION POWER
5.1 Assistance Contribution X X X X X X X X X X
5.2 Acceptance by Firms of X X X X X X X
Union Nedical
Certificates 1
Source: Morais
(*) Professional Minimum Wage according to skill
The data available for this union shows that its demands 
are strongly concentrated around indirect monetary benefits. 
It seems there has been a major concern with the regulation
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of overtime in this sector either by trying to limit working 
time or by demanding higher wages for work performed during 
overtime. In fact, the union movement has been denouncing over 
the years the fact that management prefers to insist on 
increasing output through overtime instead of hiring new 
employees because it is cheaper to make use of existing staff. 
Therefore, the union has been trying to increase the price of 
labour during overtime as a means of inhibiting employers from 
insisting on overtime. Finally, in terms of professional 
situation, a major concern in this sector has been the demand 
for job stability during pregnancy and in the months following 
birth. It seems that though pregnant women are protected by 
the labour law against dismissals, there is a great turnover 
rate due to pregnancy.
2.5. The Teachers* Association and the Evolution of Demands
This association presented lists with few demands over 
the years. It seems that state school teachers* demands are 
strongly related to wage increases and the wage and job 
structures. Even so, it is possible to detect the impact of 
the emergence of the opposition group in 1979. In 1978, the 
association had presented three demands related to the two 
aspects referred to above. When the opposition emerged during 
the discussion for framing the 1979 list of demands, new 
points were raised and integrated into it. The opposition 
suggested a wage increase higher than that allowed by the 
government. Teachers are paid for the number of classes they 
teach. A percentage is added to their basic wages to cover 
activities conducted outside classes: to prepare classes and
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exams, to correct exams, and so on. The opposition suggested 
a change in this percentage to allow greater time for research 
and reading.
TABLE 5.5. LISTS OF DEMANDS - TEACHERS * ASSOCIATION
— — — — — — — l ■ML. ■J.U   JL t mm— ammmm
TEAR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
DEHANDS
1. WAGES
1.1 An Across the Board 
Wage Increase
1.2 Wage Increase (Wage 
Kargins)
1.3 Advance Paynent
1.4 Professional Hiniiun 
Wage
| 1.5 Change in Data-Base
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X*
X
X
X*
X
X
X
X
X
2. ALLOWANCES 
| 2.1 Travel Allowance X
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION 
3.1 Criteria for Hiring 
1 3.2 Job Definition 
| 3.3 Systei of Proiotion
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
4. WORKING CONDITIONS (No 
Honetary Benefits)
| 4.1 Working Tine Linit X X X
5. UNION POWER 
5,1 Free Tine for Officials 
to Perforn Union Duties
X X X
Source: Morais
(*) Professional Minimum Wage according to skill
The opposition gained control just after the 1979 wage 
campaign and the government counteracted by cutting the 
payment of the association’s fees, which teachers paid through 
direct debit, and by firing its president. These facts had a 
highly negative impact on the association’s profile. This is 
clear from the fact that from 1980 up to 1983 the association 
was unable to present any list of demands. The level of 
membership dropped sharply and without money the association
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was unable to get the membership together because many of its 
communication networks were cut. Lack of financial resources 
prevented officials from travelling around Pernambuco state 
or even to print enough newspapers to get support for a wage 
campaign. They could just try to keep the association alive.
It was able to present a list of demands from 1983 when 
4 points were put forward and the same is true for 1984. The 
return of the direct debit for payment of the association’s 
fees had a clear impact on its capacity to present new 
demands. The 1985 list of demands increased to 6 points. 
Insofar as the association has been able to become stronger, 
it has been able to consolidate its lists of demands to be 
negotiated from then around at 6 or 7 points.
However, it must be added that though the lists of 
demands put forward by the association seem to be much shorter 
in comparison with other unions’ lists, many of the points on 
which they have been campaigning are guaranteed at the state 
level to all civil servants. Thus, the state guarantees, for 
instance, time of service allowance and has its own health 
service, which seems to provide better health care than the 
national health service. The state also guarantees stability 
during pregnancy and gives full information on wages, taxes 
and deductions, which are printed on the pay slip. Therefore, 
the association’s lists of demands are strongly concentrated 
around wage increases and other monetary issues.
2.6. The Teachers' Union and the Evolution of Demands
The evolution of demands in this union follows the same 
pattern described above. In 1978, without any opposition group
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taking part in the process, this union presented as few as 
three demands, one of them being the assistance contribution, 
a transfer of income from union members to the union to cover 
the costs of the wage campaign. With the emergence of the 
opposition in 1979 the list increased to 4 demands. The list 
of demands increased to 10 points in 1980 and 11 in 1981. From 
1982 up to 1985, the number of demands increased from year to 
year reaching a peak of 16 demands in this last year. Although 
the number of demands has dropped in some years from then on, 
the union has continued to present an average level of 14-16 
demands in each year up to 1989.
Although the impact of the emergence of an opposition 
group on the list of demands in 1979 is clear, this impact is 
less clear during the years following. The internal political 
process in this union is somewhat complex because of the 
number of alliances established amongst the different 
political persuasions inside this union. However, it can be 
said that the alliance between communists and the «old guard», 
in 1982, may have caused a slight increase in the number of 
demands which were to be negotiated. On the other hand, in 
1985 the communists managed to drive the conservatives out of 
their slate. This meant that they had full control over the 
union political machine and this was reflected in the level 
of demands presented, for the list of demands had an increase 
of about 1/3 from 1984 to 1985.
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TABLE 5.6. LISTS OF DEMANDS - TEACHERS* UNION
YEAR 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89
DEHANDS
1. WAGES
1.1 An Across the Board ! X X X X X X X X X X X
Wage Increase
1.2 Advance Payment X
1.3 Professional Hinimm X* X* X* X* X* X X X X* X* X
Wage
1.4 New Employee * s Wage X X X X X X X X X X X
1.5 Change in Data-Base X
2. ALLOWANCES
2.1 Productivity Increase X X X X X X X X X
2.2 Heal Allowance X X
2.3 Travel Allowance X X X X
2.4 Overtime Rate X X X X X X X X X X
2.5 Shift Allowance X
2.6 Time of Service X X X X X
Allowance
2.7 Holiday Rate X
3. PROFESSIONAL SITUATION
3.1 Job Definition X
3.2 System for Promotion X
3.3 Information on Wages, X X X X X X X X X X
Taxes and Deductions
3.4 Job Stability for X X X X X X X X X
Pregnant Women
4. WORKING CONDITIONS (No
Monetary Benefits)
4.1 Uniform X X X X X X
4.2 Working Time Limit X X X X X X X X X X
4,3 Creche X X X X
5. UNION POWER
5.1 Assistance Contribution X X X X X X X X X X X X
5,2 Union Bulletin Board in X X X X X X X X X X
Firms
5.3 Access by Union X X
Officials to Firms
5,4 Financial Contribution X X X X
From Firms to Union 1
Source: Morais
(*) Professional Minimum Wage according to skill
The fact that the Trotskyist opposition took power in 
1985 when the communists abdicated does not seem to indicate 
any impact on the level of the number of demands presented in
1986. Indeed, the number of demands decreased in that year,
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although it increased slightly in the following years.
3. THE NATURE OF THE DEMANDS: A COMPARISON AMONG THE UNIONS
Demands presented by the unions have been grouped in 5 
sections as suggested by Tavares de Almeida ([1981:181-3]; and 
[1983:289-90]. Cf. NEPP/UNICAMP [1988] and [1989]; and Souza 
[1985:30-2]): 1) Wages - referring mainly to demands for
general wage increases, professional minimum wage, and wage 
increase for new employees; 2) Allowances - referring mainly 
to productivity increase, meal and travel allowances, time of 
service allowance and overtime rate; 3) Professional situation 
- referring mainly to aspects related to job stability for 
pregnant women and conscripts, criteria for dismissals, 
information on wage structure, and promotion systems; 4) 
Working conditions - referring mainly to the conditions linked 
to individual safety at the workplace, such as uniform, limits 
for overtime, limits for working day and medical assistance 
provided by firms; and 5) Union power - referring mainly to 
union matters such as free time for union officials to perform 
their union duties and access by union officials to the 
workplace.
Apart from the case of the Teachers* Association, the 
demands of all unions that negotiated agreements in the last 
two years of the 1970s referred almost exclusively to wage 
matters. Roughly speaking, from 1980 onwards it is only that 
the unions started presenting a more complex list of demands.
In the case of the Bank Workers* Union, from 1978 to 1981 
the demands were mainly related to monetary aspects of the 
labour relations. In fact, the negotiations were centred on
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discussion of the annual wage increase, a minimum professional 
wage (suggested by the opposition) and a time of service 
allowance. The only demand not directly related to wage 
matters was the demand for a limit to the duration of the 
working day. The Urban Workers* Union was in the same 
situation, although it also presented demands related to the 
establishment of a system introducing job and wage structure 
and creches. On the other hand, the Metalworkers* Union 
started presenting demands related to matters other than only 
wage increases in 1979. Coupled with the demand for wage 
increase and other benefits in cash, demands related to 
professional situation, working conditions and union power 
were also presented by this union.
It was during the 1980s that the unions started 
presenting longer lists of demands due to the fact that 
opposition groups either took over the unions or simply tried 
to influence the content of these lists by participating in 
the discussion process during wage campaigns in unions 
controlled by conservative unionists. On the one hand, demands 
for wage increases no longer relied on the indexes established 
by the government. Instead, there was strong pressure for 
negotiating better wage increases related to inflation rates 
calculated by non-governmental agencies like the Inter-Union 
Office for Statistical and Socio-Economic Studies (DIEESE). 
At the same time, the unions tried to secure other monetary 
benefits which might help workers to cope with high inflation 
rates. Undoubtedly there was an increase in the number of 
demands related to points like productivity increases, meal 
and travel allowances, allowances for those who had held their 
jobs for a given time, medical assistance provided by firms,
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and a double wage during vacations.
In addition, claims related to the professional situation 
itself and to working conditions began to appear in the lists 
of demands. The most important demands related to the 
professional situation were those which referred to calls for 
a clear jobs and wages structure as well as criteria for 
dismissals and hiring. There has also been concern about 
provisional job stability for those most targeted during 
dismissals, that is, students, conscripts, injured employees 
and pregnant women. At the same time, preoccupation with the 
working conditions has been on the increase.
These demands are, however, linked not only to better 
physical conditions at the workplace, but also to conditions 
which would allow the workers to continue to perform their 
jobs well. For example, this is clear from the renewal of 
demands for the enforcement of the limits to the working day. 
These demands were related mainly to the private sector where 
employers seem to be much less concerned to uphold the labour 
law. To take the case of the banking sector as an
illustration, there have over the years been denunciations of 
long working days for the employees of private banks. A look 
at the kind of issues raised by the newspaper of the Bank 
Workers* Union reveals that this is a recurrent theme in 
private banks, although it is hard to find any such
denunciation in the state-owned banks. On the other hand, when 
the Urban Workers* Union demanded a limitation to the working 
day, it was doing so in relation to special jobs requiring 
heavy responsibility.
In the case of the Metalworkers* and Urban Workers*
Unions, demands have also been raised about safety at work.
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By their very nature, the performance of some jobs in the 
metallurgy and electricity sectors implies considerable risk 
to the lives of the workers. The same does not occur in the 
banking sector. In this case, the most dangerous job is that 
held by cashiers under threat of robbery, when their lives 
would be at risk. The Bank Workers* Union has demanded an 
increase in the wages of such employees through insurance.
Unions have also raised demands which are aimed at 
gaining some discretion in the tasks they must perform. This 
is clear both from the Teachers* Union and Association and 
from the Data Processing Workers* Union. In the first case, 
there have been complaints that teachers have had little time 
for reading, to prepare better classes and carry out research 
which could aid development of the classes they teach. They 
argue that they earn low wages and are obliged to teach for 
long hours without any time for other activities related to 
teaching (Resolugoes do 4Q Encontro Estadual do Ensino Oficial 
de Pernambuco, 1986, Resolution No. 46; Resolugoes do IQ
Congresso Estadual dos Professores do Ensino Oficial de 
Pernambuco, 23-26 Oct. 1987, Resolution No. 4/3; and letter 
No. 01/88, 22 Feb. 1988, sent to the Pernambuco state
Secretary for Education). Both the union and the association 
have been campaigning to increase the number of paid hours 
which would be directed to these activities. This would allow 
them, it is argued, to stay longer in their school without 
having to «run» from school to school in order to teach as 
many classes as they can in order to increase their incomes. 
At the same time, this would promote better classes and an 
improvement in the general level of teaching and learning.
In the case of the Data Processing Workers* Union, a
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major concern is about the job performed by those who have the
task of typing data into the computers. As these workers are
required (obliged) to perform a higher number of keystrokes
than those advised by the International Labour Organization
(ILO), there has been a high rate of occupational diseases
affecting the bones of the hands and leading workers thus
affected to become useless for such a job.
"Nowadays, the working time in this job is what we call 
50 by 10. That is, for each hour the employee works 50 
and rests 10 minutes. This is so because people need to 
rest their hand muscles by doing other kinds of physical 
movement. They need to have their muscles relaxed to 
continue the job. This is a terrible disease because 
there is no cure for it. There are people affected by it 
who cannot strike a match or hold a cup of coffee" 
(Interview No. 28).
Along with the demands for regulation of this matter 
during wage campaigns, there is wide concern about the health 
of data processing workers, indicated by the number of 
discussions and seminars promoted by this union. In fact, 
since the data processing workers formed their association in 
Pernambuco, they have promoted seminars on the workers* health 
in this sector. For instance, although the Consolidation of 
Labour Laws (CLT) stated that people working with typing and 
similar machines would have the right to rest for 10 minutes 
in every 90-minute period, this was not upheld by employers 
(Boletim da APPD-PEt May 1980; APPD-PE Informativo, 26 May
1983; and Jornal APPD-PE, Sept. 1983).
As Tavares de Almeida [1981:179] writes on the emergence 
of new matters related to labour issues arising from the shop- 
floor:
"Contrary to the unionism of the populist period, the 
«new unionism» has emphasized socio-professional demands 
arising from the workplace".
This is clear from the description above and is also
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confirmed by an employer who declared:
"What the [Data Processing] Workers ’ Union has sought is 
to augment the number of [workers’] social rights. We 
have discussed this a lot because, in Brazil, the labour 
market with the highest rate of increase is this one, the 
data processing sector" (Interview No. 53).
With the help of the legal advisers, the unions have
tried to innovate in terms of new social rights previously
unknown to the labour movement dominated by conservative
unionists. Thus, many of the rights which were integrated into
the new Constitution of 1988 emerged as demands put forward
by the unions through legal initiatives to guarantee what was
not yet contained in jurisprudence. Once pronounced upon and
recognized by the labour court they were integrated into the
law and many of these rights were integrated into the
Constitution of 1988.
"For example, payment for overtime: before [the 1988
Constitution] each hour of overtime was paid as an 
allowance of 25%, now as 50%. Why? Because we started 
demanding during wage campaigns and collective agreements 
a higher percentage for overtime as a means of curtailing 
excessive working days. If the employer was to pay just 
an increment of 25% it was cheaper for him/her to oblige 
the workers to stay longer hours at the workplace instead 
of employing other workers. Nowadays, after the new 
Constitution, we already have jurisprudence for an 
allowance of 100%" (Interview No. 26. Cf. article 7, 
paragraph XVI, of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988).
One of the main problems the unions have faced is trying 
to stop the huge number of dismissals in the private sector 
following signature of agreements about wage increases and 
other aspects of labour life (Cf. M.H.M. Alves [1984:90]; and 
Tavares de Almeida et al. [1986:339]. On the legislation
regulating dismissals in the post-64 period, see Ferrante 
[1978:43-50], Cf. Humphrey [1979c:232-5]; and Keck [1989: 
257]). In fact, after signing agreements, many employers 
simply fire a number of workers and replace them with new
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employees simply anxious to get a job (Cf., for instance,
Informe Sindical, 2-8 Sept. 1985. On the national case, see
Alves [1989:47]). However, it is worth noting on this point
that Humphrey ([1979b:102]. Cf. [1979a:75-6]) says that:
"There is certainly a high turnover rate...However, the 
workers fired are mainly those whose wages are low. The 
reduction in the wage levels might be a result of the 
turnover but the main cause seems to lie elsewhere".
Nevertheless, it seems to be more than mere coincidence 
that, over the years, a great number of dismissals occurs just 
after the signature of annual agreements. This is a recurrent 
and characteristic phenomenon of the private sector, mainly 
in banking, metallurgy and education. This has not occurred 
in the power and water sector, and the banking, metallurgy and 
education sectors where the state is the entrepreneur, because 
of a tacit or legal right to job stability (Macedo [1985:51- 
3]; and NEPP/UNICAMP [1989:119]). In the data processing 
sector, this phenomenon did not occur until the labour market 
became saturated, and mainly in those lower paid jobs. These 
dismissals have been occurring once again in the private 
sector (Cf. interviews Nos. 24, 28 and 45).
On this aspect Keck [1989:268] says:
"Job security... had always been an issue in the 
metalworking sector in particular, as employers used a 
high turnover rate as a way of keeping wages down".
This is clearer in the banking sector. For instance, at 
the beginning of 1981, the conservative officials were 
complaining about the high number of dismissals that took 
place in 1980 following settlement of the annual agreement (O 
Defensor, Jan. 1981. See also O Defensor, June and July 1981 
on dismissals in 1981, and O Defensor, Nov. 1982 on this 
phenomenon in 1982. The O Defensor of Nov. of 1985 reprints
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the letter No. 72/85 which was sent by the union to the 
Bankers* Union of Pernambuco protesting against the high 
number of dismissals which followed the agreement of that 
year. Cf. interview No. 36 on the overall issue). The union 
has developed a strategy through which it promotes a number 
of small strikes, called greves pipocas (popcorn strikes), to 
protest against such dismissals. Each day the union would 
promote a blitz strike in a branch of a bank which had 
dismissed a large number of employees during the previous 
week.
In 1979, Rodrigues [1979:48] said about this problem:
"...The autonomy of the workers* movement and the 
development of aggressive unionism have to face a 
national labour market which is favourable to the 
employers because the labour force supply is higher than 
the demand".
The unions have been trying to stop this phenomenon by 
demanding that employers should stop dismissing the labour 
force. However, it is unlikely that they would be successful 
merely by complaining about it or demanding job stability for 
the labour force when employers could easily find hundreds of 
workers in the labour market simply trying to get a job 
without much caring about wages (See Hill [1981:128]; and 
Roxborough [1981:84]).
Those unions most affected by this problem faced it by 
trying to introduce clauses in their agreements aimed at 
blocking employers* room for manoeuvre. This was done mainly 
through the proposal of three clauses: 1) the demand for a
professional minimum wage; 2) demands to establish the wages 
of new employees; and 3) demands for regulating the payout on 
dismissal.
As mentioned above, a professional minimum wage would
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prevent employers from hiring any employee for a lower wage 
than that established in the agreement. However, this could 
not stop employers dismissing a senior worker and hiring a 
junior worker. This would mean that employers could pay lower 
wages because allowances and supplements attached to senior 
workers* wages would not need to be paid. The second demand 
has the same shortcoming of the first one because employers 
are not obliged to pay allowances and supplements for junior 
workers.
The Teachers’ Union has been the most successful in 
trying to stop dismissals following signature of annual 
agreements. It has been able to introduce a clause which 
regulates the price of the dismissals. Thus, at first, in 
1979, an agreement was demanded - and reached - by which 
employers were obliged to pay 55% of the wages due to a fired 
teacher up to the end of the annual agreement (Cf. Jornal do 
ComSrcio, 25 April 1979). Moreover, all teachers are entitled 
to job stability for 90 days after the agreement’s signature 
and employers have to give the teacher(s) who is (are) to be 
fired two months prior notice of dismissal. As a union 
official says:
"This makes dismissals very expensive in this sector. 
While wages are low, dismissals are dear because if an 
employer fires a teacher, for example, in May, he or she 
has to pay the rest of the wages. In other words, to make 
dismissals expensive is a strategy we have found to 
safeguard our jobs" (Interview No. 52).
Another important feature of union disputes is that 
related to the increase in union power. Some of the demands 
related to this aspect of union life are: 1) demands for the 
union officials to have access to the workplace; 2) more time 
allowed for union duties; and 3) boards for union news at the
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workplace.
4. RADICALISM AND THE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PURSUIT OF NEW 
DEMANDS
Apart from those demands mentioned above regarding the 
increase in union power, unions have tried to extend their 
power and organizational structure through general demands 
which appear in their newspapers and are related to the right 
to elect union delegates at the workplace as well as the right 
to elect all representatives of the Internal Committee for the 
Prevention of Accidents (CIPA) (For a useful analysis of the 
role played by the CIPA in a Metalworkers* Union, see 
Mangabeira [1991], Also see Keck [1989:269]; and Paiva 
[1986] ) .
Two labour organizations went further by demanding to 
elect people for key posts. In the case of the Teachers* 
Association, it has been demanding over the years the right 
to elect headteachers and their deputies in schools. This has 
not been pursued during wage campaigns but through general 
campaigns. In fact the association has promoted campaigns 
whose only aim is to publicize the need for elected 
headteachers on two grounds: 1) that the election of
headteachers would allow for greater control by parents, 
teachers and the community in general over schools; and 2) 
that elected headteachers would signify an end to the practice 
of patronage on the part of the government which uses these 
posts to trade for political support (See, for example, 
Informativo APENOPE, Jan.-March 1986; Association pamphlet 
Carta ao Professor, Aug. 1986; Association pamphlet Aos Alunos
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e Paist Sept. 1986; Association pamphlet Diretas Jd, Para 
Diretor Escolar, March 1987; and letter No. 23/88 sent to 
governor Miguel Arraes, 13 April 1988). In the case of the 
Urban Workers* Union, specifically in relation to Companhia 
Hidreletrica do Sao Francisco (CHESF), it has been pressing 
for the right to elect either the general administrative or 
the personnel manager.
However, in spite of the fact that the novelty of the 
demands put forward by the «new unionism» has been widely 
emphasized, one must take into account the reality of the 
political and economic situation in which this has been 
happening. Although the data available to compare the lists 
of demands with the lists of what the unions really have got 
from the negotiations is scarce and does not allow me to 
undertake a more complete analysis, a few words can be said 
about it.
Brazilian society has been hit by high and persistent 
rates of inflation. Many of the strikes of 1978-79 from which 
the «new unionism» emerged happened because of disputes over 
inflation rates. It is true that other demands have been 
pursued by the unions. However, how far have they been able 
to go on pushing for new rights in the face of high inflation 
rates? How has the rank-and-file played a part in demanding 
non-economic demands or even monetary benefits which are not 
reflected directly on the total earned as wages?
A number of economic indicators were supplied in section 
4 of chapter I. Data shows that Brazilian inflation in the 
1980s, apart from 1981 and 1986, has always been on the 
increase. Moreover, it shows rates of inflation which are very 
high by any standards. In this economic context, one supposes
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that the unions have had to fight hard in order at least to 
keep up with the pace of inflation. This means that, apart 
from the likely strikes before the signature of annual 
agreements, the unions have had to promote extra campaigns to 
restore workers* wages (Cf. interview No. 47). This also means 
that most of the strikes have happened for economic reasons. 
However, I will restrict myself to analysis of the processes 
involved in the disputes during annual wage campaigns.
There is evidence that although unions have tried to 
promote better gains for the membership through demands 
related to other aspects of working life by "linking [them to) 
the classic themes of wage increases..." (Moises [1979:61]) 
as referred to above, what seems to matter during the fight 
to renew annual agreements is the economic demands, mainly 
those directly related to wage increases.
It seems that while the union leaders have tried to 
attach new demands related to professional and political 
aspects, the membership has been forced by the urgency of the
pace of inflation to accept wage increases, leaving other
59demands out . Thus, one has to look at the emergence of new
^ It should be stressed here that such a political 
attitude on the part of these union leaders seems to be the 
reverse of the behaviour predicted both by Michels*s «iron law 
of oligarchy», which was discussed in chapter IV, and by the 
Marxist theory of trade union bureaucracy:
"according to which trade union leaderships will tend to 
restrain rank-and-file militancy because of its threat to 
their own privileges and to industrial relations order" 
(Kelly [1988:77] ).
Golden ([1988:248]. See also Heery & Kelly [1990:96]) 
reaches the same conclusion in relation to the meaning of 
Michels*s work. She has found:
"that trade unions may be more radical than the employees 
they seek to represent. Such a situation goes against the 
grain of much thinking about modern trade unionism that
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demands very carefully in order to form a more realistic view 
of the attainments of the «new unionism».
The Urban Workers* Union has been considered as one of
the most militant unions in Pernambuco (Cf. Mendonga &
Medeiros [1989]). However, the leadership thinks that the
union has been held back from greater gains because of the
continuous fight to match high inflation.
"Nowadays, what has been dominating the union fight is 
the fact that inflation has been lowering the wages. This 
has weakened Brazilian unionism and has driven it towards 
a terrible economism and to a great grevismo which is 
not good for us" (Interview No. 46).
"During these last 10 years we have had economistic 
disputes. Unfortunately or fortunately, it depends on how 
you see it, we have had difficulty in political fights, 
in obtaining greater room for manoeuvre, because 
government economic policies have been strongly against 
the workers, there has been a constant arrocho salarial 
(wage squeeze).,." (Interview No. 33).
In other words, although it is clear that the «new 
unionism» has contributed to broaden the quality and quantity 
of demands presented and negotiated by the union movement 
since 1978-79, the scale of the gains has been not so large 
as suggested by a look at the annual lists of demands. Of 
course, this does not mean that the union movement has not 
achieved a wider range of social rights previously unknown to 
the labour and union movements. However, what is here 
suggested is that most of these rights have been put forward 
by the radical leaders of the «new unionisms.
...tends to conceive of unions as inherently conservative 
institutions and, often by implication, of workers as 
instinctively radical".
(SO The phenomenon of successive strikes in the same 
sector. Union leaders use this word when they want to mean the 
promotion of strikes even for minor problems which could be 
resolved through negotiation. It is also what they call "to 
go on strike for striking*s own sake".
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"What has fundamentally mobilized the rank-and-file is 
the fight for wages. If the bosses offer an increase 
similar to what we are demanding, the categoria stops the 
strike. It is the union leaders who try to keep the 
categoria striking in order to get other demands...If the 
categoria is obliged to choose between a wage increase 
and to continue the fight for the presence of the union 
at the workplace, it will vote for the wages" (Interview 
No. 52).
Lenin suggested that unions tend to be reformist instead 
of revolutionary organizations because they would pursue aims 
which could easily be met within capitalism and would persuade 
their members to accept capitalism (Cf. Anderson [1967]; Hill 
[1981:128 and 152]; and Martin [1989:43-7]. For a diverse 
interpretation of Lenin’s work, see Kelly [1988:26-34]). This 
is summarized by the division of union goals into "short and 
long-term aims" (Allen [1967:242-4]).
Mann [1981:20] has also suggested an analytical division
of union goals in terms of "the economic and job control
spheres". According to him,
"If workers possessed full class consciousness they would 
seek among their other goals worker control of industry 
and society. Such a form of control would in theory 
enable them to attain both material and moral fulfilment, 
economic sufficiency and freedom of self-expression".
However, it is worth noting that Hill ([1981:128]. See
Cl
This is also confirmed by the following quotations:
"If we look at the clauses in the agreements, the ones 
most emphasized by the unions are not those related to 
the workers’ gains in terms of a better environment at 
the workplace, but those directly related to the workers’ 
pockets" (Interview No. 36).
"The demands arising from the rank-and-file, what they 
suggest the union should fight for, are fundamentally 
economic demands. The preoccupation of these comrades 
about social and working conditions, union organization 
at the workplace, even about social benefits, is very 
little. Commonly, it is wages, wage increases, minimum 
wage...We have sent questionnaires to find out what the 
categoria wants demanded but the answers are very poor" 
(Interview No. 42).
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also Kelly [1988:101]) states that in certain circumstances 
even demands for wage increases, i.e., reformism, could be 
harmful to the system, while demands for job control are 
always harmful.
Following Hill’s remarks, I would suggest that instead 
of a dividing line between short and long term goals, there 
would be a continuous line running from less to more radical 
aims.
FIGURE 5.1. DEMANDS AND DEGREE OF RADICALISM
Wage
Increase
Professional
Situation
Job
Control
This allows us a better understanding of the fight for 
demands in a situation of high inflation just as in the Brazil 
of the 1980s. The economic scenario of Brazil in the 1980s was 
marked by high inflation rates and this seemed to affect the 
fight of the unions in terms of the pursuit of demands other 
than economic ones. The description of the several wage 
policies and macroeconomic plans to deal with inflation 
provided in chapter I showed that workers suffered heavy 
losses in terms of wages. The array of data available on 
strikes and wage campaigns shows that the unions have tried 
to match the effects of the inflation on wages. However, 
because of the pace of inflation rate it seems that they are 
always «one step behind». That is, there have been no real 
gains in economic terms. Therefore, this is not a situation
252
CO
where economic demands are harmful to the system . However, 
this is not a situation either where the unions or their 
members pursue economic demands because they are reformist. 
To contrast economic versus job control goals in terms of 
reformist versus revolutionary aims in this context seems to 
be meaningless since union and employer power is uneven. The 
power of the unions depends for example, as suggested above, 
on the labour market and on the economic situation (Cf. Hill 
[1981:128]). Therefore, the concentration of labour action in 
the Brazil of the 1980s around economic demands seems to 
indicate the effect of constraints of the economic situation 
on labour action rather than a priori social construction by 
which unions pursue reformist goals instead of revolutionary 
aims.
On the other hand, a dividing line between economic and 
job control demands does not allow us to understand labour 
action in the Brazil of the 1980s because some unions have 
been putting forward demands for wage increase, professional 
situation and job control at the same level. In fact, in spite 
of the economic situation restricting the pursuit of more 
radical goals, the Data Processing Workers* Union has been 
demanding the regulation of working conditions particularly 
in relation to the number of keystrokes performed hourly and 
diseases provoked by exposure to computer screens. Clearly, 
tight regulation on these matters can harm employers* profits.
62 It must be said that in this situation perhaps 
economic demands may be harmful to small/medium size firms 
which cannot cope with the costs of labour, raw materials and 
other factors of production, but big companies seem to go 
«untouched» by the inflation rate. However, this does not seem 
to harm the system as a whole. In case of the banks, in spite 
of all economic policies and plans to reduce inflation, they 
have been reporting huge profits throughout the years.
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On the other hand, radical demands for the right to elect a 
manager (in the case of the Urban Workers’ Union) or 
headteachers (in the case of the Teachers’ Association) can 
be harmful not only to management discretion but also to the 
political system because of the impact it would cause on the 
habit of trading political support for posts in the state 
apparatus.
5. DEMANDS AND THE INTERNAL DIVISIONS OF THE CATEGORIAS
Tavares de Almeida ([1975]. Cf. Moists [1979:61]; and 
Rodrigues [1979:52]) argued that the unionism which was 
emerging in Brazil was a business-oriented one, like American 
unionism. Thus, for her it was a kind of «a-politicized» 
unionism. Moreover, it was led by militants who held jobs in 
the most dynamic sectors of the economy and earned high wages. 
They would then constitute a sort of labour aristocracy.
Humphrey ([1979a]; [1979b]; [1980] and [1982]. Cf. M.H.M. 
Alves [1984:90]; Castro [1990:131]; Keck [1989:265-6]; and 
Vianna [1991:22]) has dismissed such a thesis by showing that 
there has not been that kind of labour aristocracy. That kind 
of labour aristocracy identified by Engels and Lenin, whose 
characteristics were analysed by Hobsbawm [1984] and [1986], 
was not to be found in modern Brazilian capitalism. Moreover, 
the labour aristocracy as a classical phenomenon of the labour 
movement was restricted to a period roughly defined between 
1850 up to 1914 of British capitalism.
Alves says that many Brazilian social scientists were in 
a hurry to identify the increasing differentiation within the 
working class structure in terms of dynamic and traditional
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industries with the particular situation of Great Britain.
However, according to her:
"This differentiation is meaningless in terms of the 
labour movement and class political actions...It is that 
would-be conservative working sector that has been in 
prominence in terms of fights, resistance and militancy" 
(V.B.A. Alves [1984:140]).
In other words, there is a higher rank within the 
Brazilian working class, but it does not constitute a labour 
aristocracy with demands of their own (For a critique of such 
a thesis in relation to Latin American countries, see Jelin 
& Torre [1982] )63.
I do not argue that there is anything like a labour 
aristocracy. Indeed, I agree with Humphrey and Alves that 
there is no such phenomenon in Brazil. However, I will argue 
that most of the union leaders were (are) from ranks which are 
better off and this has influenced the outcome of the 
disputes.
Nevertheless, this influence is not necessarily a 
negative one. An analysis of the main labour leaders shows 
that they were (are) part of a higher rank either in terms of 
skill/formal education or in terms of wages. Moreover, many 
strikes have been led by workers whose jobs are either in 
strategic geographical areas or in strategic areas of 
production. It seems that the more workers feel secure in 
their jobs, the more they feel secure to strike. These workers 
are mainly those whose job requires high levels of training 
and who are paid relative higher wages. They are also those
C 0
See also Roxborough [1981:85] where he analyses
"the reification of the supposed dichotomy of the economy 
into a marginal pole and a dynamic manufacturing 
sector. . . " .
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who hold jobs in key plants (this is related to the size of 
the productive units). They have been termed «core workers» 
because of their strategic importance (Cf. Mangabeira [1991]) 
and, in many industries, they have been in the forefront of 
labour action and have been playing strategic roles in such 
action.
In the years following Humphrey’s criticisms on the 
labour aristocracy thesis, many analysts of the Brazilian 
union and labour movement have adopted his position without 
going further in deepening his analysis. He showed that the 
labour aristocracy thesis lacked empirical support, but he did 
not say that there were no divisions in the Brazilian working 
class. He showed that the demands of the higher ranks were no 
different from what was demanded by other workers, but he did 
not say that every categoria or every group of workers have 
to behave in the same way as seems to be implied by many 
analysts. I therefore argue that one has to deepen the 
analysis and look at the strategies put forward by the radical 
leaders to link in a single collective action the different 
positions (in terms of power and control on the labour market) 
arising from the rank-and-file, since the internal differences 
in terms of being better off or not were exploited by 
employers to try to divide labour action.
Data shows that in many cases employers offered proposals 
to meet labour demands whose content was aimed to explore 
these internal divisions in the labour movement. Their 
strategy was to offer higher wage increases to the better off, 
seen as the backbone of a given movement. By doing so they 
tried to provoke divisions within the labour movement because 
if the better off were to finish the strike or to accept
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agreements with such differentials they would return to work, 
leaving the lower ranks without support. The employers* 
strategy had varied effects. Indeed, because of the fact that, 
firstly, not all workers or groups of workers belonging to the 
same categoria exert the same level of control over the labour 
market; secondly, because not all workers are part of a 
enlightened political vanguard; and thirdly, because workers* 
political behaviour may vary - the employers* proposals met 
with different reactions from the workers targeted.
During the 1982 wage campaign of the Urban Workers* Union 
at the Companhia de Eletrificagao de Pernambuco (CELPE), the 
management tried to divide the workers by offering a proposal 
which would benefit the better off. However, the union kept 
up its pressure on the negotiations for the company to accept 
the union’s proposal by which workers with the lowest wages 
were to receive higher wage increases, which was backed by the 
union’s general assembly (Cf. Didrio de Pernambuco, 1 Oct.
1982; Boletim da CUT, July 1985; Informe Sindical, 13-19 Jan. 
1986; and 0 Eletricitario e Compesianost Sept. 1985).
On the other hand, the fact that workers with higher 
skills have been at the forefront of union action was used, 
in this same sector, by the government to promote selective 
repression in order to isolate the movement. During the 
campaign referred to above, 25 engineers (6 of them being 
regarded as of the highest skill levels) were dismissed 
because of their role in the campaign (Diario de Pernambuco,
Ci
24 June 1986) . The government did so to repress the
^ On this day (June 24th 1986), after almost 4 years 
from their dismissals, the engineers were formally returned 
to their jobs due to the pressure of the union through a 
nationwide campaign. See Simoes [1989] on the political role
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movement as a whole. However, it is interesting to note that 
it was aimed at those who played a major role in events. These 
two events, on the one hand, give support to Humphrey’s and 
Alves’s view that the thesis of the labour aristocracy lacks 
empirical support (Cf. Castro [1990:151]). On the other hand, 
they show that the fact that the movement has been led by, and 
sometimes depended on, skilled workers, is of major importance 
both in the strategy put forward by management when dealing 
with the union movement and on the dilemmas faced by the 
unions when having to unite interests and demands of different 
sectors of the same categoria in a single action to face 
management strategies.
In 1985, just after the Metalworkers* Union had signed 
the annual agreement, unskilled workers went on strike because 
most of the employers were not respecting the agreement in 
relation to the professional minimum wage. Employers seemed 
to count on the fact that such workers would not be strong 
enough to contest this move by going on strike because of the 
fact that these were the only workers affected by the breach 
of the agreement. In other words, the fact that employers did 
not enforce the professional minimum wage did not affect «core 
workers)) and it was expected that they would not get involved 
in supporting any disputes which were not theirs. However, 
contrary to the employers* expectations, unskilled workers 
went on strike to demand that the agreement should be 
respected. Moreover, the union articulated the participation 
of «core workers)) in the strike and their role proved to be
played by Brazilian engineers as well as their role in trade 
unions.
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65important in forcing employers to respect the agreement .
According to a union official:
"The solidarity of the skilled lads was great. They had 
more to lose than to benefit from their participation, 
but they took the workers* part and went on strike, 
everybody stopped..." (Interview No. 9).
Moreover, there are three important facts in the history 
of the «new unionism» in Pernambuco which illustrate clearly 
the kind of problems the unions have faced when negotiating 
their demands, and the moves by the employers to try to divide 
the labour movement by offering differentiated levels of wage 
increases.
Firstly, the Teachers’ Union has over the years faced the 
fact that employers have been trying to take some «core 
teachers)) out of the movement by offering higher wage 
increases before negotiations start. In this sector schools 
compete for some teachers who are recognised as the «stars» 
in their field because students wishing to get a place at a 
university will choose those schools which employ these 
«stars». Thus, at the beginning of each academic year, the 
schools will advertise based on the quality of their teachers 
in order to attract these students because their share of the 
market depends on the quality of their staff.
Because of their unique situation in the labour market 
these teachers would be in a strong position to negotiate 
their wages independently of the union. What commonly seems 
to happen is that employers have been trying to negotiate the 
wage of these teachers before the annual agreements. This is
See M.H.M. Alves [1984:90]; Humphrey [1979a:75]; and 
Mangabeira [1991], on similar cases in Sao Paulo and Rio de 
Janeiro states. See also Engelstein [1982], on a similar 
phenomenon in Moscow in 1905.
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so because of the central role these teachers are able to play 
in the negotiations.
Many of the militants who started participating in the
union from 1979 onwards belonged to this privileged rank.
According to some accounts, these teachers are more sensitive
to political issues and concerned about political militancy.
In this case they would combine a privileged position in the
labour market with a great sense of their professional value
and political consciousness. This has been used by the union
to overcome employers* strategies to divide the categoria
during negotiations and to enhance the union’s strength vis-a-
vis employers (Cf. interview No. 38).
"These teachers, in general, are highly committed 
militants and they use their power in the labour market 
as an weapon. . .When the categoria goes on strike they 
support it by threatening to resign if other teachers are 
dismissed. For example, if Mr. R.P. resigns from his post 
at the Colegio C, a great number of students will follow 
him to another school because he is considered the best 
teacher of physics in Recife. Now he uses this power to 
help the organization of the categoria. These teachers 
have a good relationship with the union. Indeed, most of 
them are members of the political forces that rule the 
union. . .They give us strength to put pressure on the 
employers. If they stop, the schools offer better 
proposals" (Interview No. 52).
Secondly, in 1986 the Pernambuco state government tried 
to divide a state schools teachers* strike by offering a 
higher wage increase for those teachers who already earned 
better wages. Since 1984 the Teachers* Association had been 
campaigning for a professional minimum wage for the teachers 
of primary classes which was to be worth three times the 
national minimum wages (Cf. Informativo APENOPE, Jan.-March
1986). In October 1985 the Teachers* Association won twice the 
national minimum wage as the professional minimum wage to be 
earned by teachers of primary classes and an agreement that
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this and the professional minimum wage for other teachers
would increase soon (Cf. Pamphlet Colega Professor(a), May
1986; and Informativo APENOPE, July-Sept. 1986)®®. However,
by May 1986 the government had not increased the professional
minimum wage for all teachers and was also trying to divide
the movement by offering a lower increase for all teachers,
apart from the teachers of primary classes, to whom it offered
nothing (Cf. Diario de Pernambuco, 24 May 1986)®^ .
"In its recent decree sent to the Legislative Assembly 
the government has forgotten the teachers of primary 
classes. We ask students* parents: is it fair for a
teacher of primary classes, the basis of education, to 
earn Cz$ 1,700.00 as the cesta basica established by the 
government itself costs Cz$ 3,740.00? (Pamphlet Carta aos 
Pais e Alunos, June 1986)... [Moreover] , it does not 
establish a professional minimum wage for anybody" 
(Pamphlet Companheiro Servidor, Aug. 1986).
However, the strategy of the government to divide the
movement was clear to the association, which declared:
"The government has ignored the teacher of primary 
classes in its decree just sent to the Legislative 
Assembly. By proposing only to increase the wages of 
teachers with a college degree, the government tries to 
divide the categoria. However, this political tactic has 
been detected and repudiated by us. The fight must be 
undertaken by everybody and from the base - the teacher 
of primary classes. By offering an increase only to 
teachers with a college degree, the government is 
thinking of the categoria segment which is best 
mobilized. But we must realise that primary class 
teachers number about 12,000 people" (Pamphlet A 
Professora de 1& a 4& Series, Aug. 1986).
The association faced this problem by the massive use of
Cg
On the chronology of negotiations between the 
association and the government from 1984 to 1986, see APENOPE 
Boletim Especial, May 1986. On the agreement on the part of 
the government that it would concede the demands of the 
association, see Didrio Oficial, 23 Oct. 1985.
fi7 On the content of the government’s proposal, see the 
letter No. 18/86, 3 July 1986, which the association sent to 
the Secretary for Education of Pernambuco. This letter 
reprints the main points of such proposal.
261
pamphlets and extra newspapers to support its view on the
government's manoeuvres, for "as a form of collective activity
they [strikes] require the development of a degree of unity
among those involved..." (Batstone et al. [1978:1]). It was
argued that if the government's proposals were to be accepted
this would divide the movement and that this would cause major
problems to the categoria in a long term perspective (See Hill
[1981:147] on a similar argument). What the government
actually intended, according to the association's officials,
was to face a weak movement and nobody would benefit from it,
except the government itself (See Hill [1981:130]). It was
also argued that the main aim of the association and the
teachers was to raise the standard of teaching in Pernambuco.
By doing so, the association intended to show that no
educational system could be good enough if the first base of
education - the primary class teachers - were to earn low
wages (Cf. Comando de Greve - Boletim No. 5, Sept. 1986)®®.
"The main support of education is primary teaching. One 
cannot think of changing the educational system without 
first taking into consideration the role of the primary 
class teachers" (Informativo APENOPE, Oct. 1986).
On the other hand, the association's proposals linked 
together the economic interests of the different levels within 
this categoria. The association did not propose a wage 
increase in terms of pure percentages to match inflation. 
Instead, it proposed a minimum wage for each rank of the
GO
On this point, in a British context, Batstone et al. 
[1978:3] say that:
"two related elements appear...to be of crucial 
importance in strike action: first, patterns of influence 
among the workers concerned, and, second, a range of 
vocabularies or systems of arguments which can be 
employed in relation to collective action".
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categoria with a gap of 15% between each of them. This had two 
aims: firstly, an increase based on a minimum wage would not 
suffer from the shortcomings of an increase based on pure 
percentage because the federal government decrees periodical 
increases in the national minimum wage. Thus, any increase in 
the national minimum wage would cause the teachers* wages to 
increase. Secondly, by linking the levels of wages by a 
difference of 15% between each of them, the association 
intended to impede the government’s attempts to reduce some 
wages while increasing others. In other words, any increase 
for a given rank of the categoria would mean a general 
increase for everybody. Thus, by linking together the wages 
of these different ranks the association tried to avoid 
defections of any of these ranks when negotiating wage 
increases.
It seems that this general strategy was successful, for
in the end the government had to accept the demands of the
association, which was able to declare that:
"The great symbol of this movement is the strong unity 
that has been built within the categoria around the same 
objectives by teachers at all levels of teaching"
(Comando de Greve - Boletim No. 4, Aug. 1986).
On the other hand, defections were minimal and did not
comprise any sizeable batch of teachers able to get their wage
69increases by their solitary action . Moreover, there is
69 This is clearly an example of a union having to deal 
with the problem of free-riding. Olson [1982] inaugurated a 
debate in rational choice theory by arguing that
"the larger the group, the more likely its individual 
members will feel that their not joining collective 
actions to secure public goods would have little impact 
on the group’s activity as a whole. Thus there is no 
rational reason for an individual to expend energy, time 
and other costs in contributing to attain a good which 
would be available anyway" (Barbalet [1991-92]. Cf.
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evidence that these defections were due to threats by the 
government to dismiss those not teaching after thirty days on 
strike and not to release teachers* payment (Cf. Comando de 
Greve - Boletim No. 3, Aug. 1986; and Diario de Pernambuco, 
7 Aug. 1986).
Another fact which can be accounted for in the analysis 
of this problem, but with a different outcome, is the process 
of internal divisions during the wage campaign of the bank 
workers in 1986.
The Bank Workers’ Union represents workers from both 
private and state-owned banks. Over the years the evolution 
of the organization of workers has led to a single list of 
demands drawn up in regional assemblies and to attempts for 
a unified national wage campaign (Cf. interview No. 47). This 
does not mean that the process of negotiation with employers 
is unified. As will be shown in chapter VI, there are 
different levels of negotiation in this sector. This means 
that workers try to maintain the negotiations based on a 
single strategy although with different negotiators. For 
instance, workers of federal state-owned banks like the Banco 
do Brasil's employees have been negotiating directly with 
governmental negotiators whereas employees of private banks 
have been negotiating minor points at regional level and major 
points at national level with employers’ unions (See chapter 
VI on this point).
On the other hand, the Banco do Brasil*s employees have
Crouch [1982]; Friedman [1983]; and Muller & Opp [1986]).
A critique inside the rational choice framework of 
Olson’s work can be found in Hardin [1982]. Other critiques 
are also found in Booth [1978] and Johnson [1988].
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played a major role in negotiations because of the central
role of this bank in the Brazilian financial system. This bank
holds the exclusiveness of being responsible for the Camara
de Compensagao (cheque clearing house), which functions
legally as a place where banks exchange each other’s cheques.
By being able to halt all banks, private or state-owned, when
closing down the Camara de Compensagao (cheque clearing
house), the employees of this bank have played an important
role in negotiations because they have been able to back
private banks’ employees.
"When the union is able to close the [Camara de] 
Compensagao it halts the financial institutions because 
it stops financial accounting. When it blockades the 
[Camara de] Compensagao it halts all banks, the whole of 
the financial community as well as other companies" 
(Interview No. 51).
"The movement in this sector has been dependent on the 
role of the Banco do Brasil1 s employees because when the 
Banco do Brasil goes on strike and closes the [Camara de] 
Compensagao it guarantees the success of the fight in the 
private sector. Now less than earlier. But there is still 
a great expectation because the Banco do Brasil is a 
strategic bank in terms of power to damage bankers’ 
profits. If the bankers profit, they can face a long 
strike but they will negotiate and discuss the 
categoria1s demands if their profits are affected" 
(Interview No. 47. Cf. interview No. 23).
Moreover, in the case of Pernambuco, the Banco do Brasil 
is also the point of emergence of the «new unionism» militancy 
which opposed the conservative officials running the Bank 
Workers’ Union since 1965 (Cf. interview No. 23). In this 
case, the bank represented both a strategic and a political 
stronghold in terms of its employees opposing employers as 
well as being the fountainhead of radical militancy. This 
means that radical militants secured unity of action in terms 
of forcing employers to negotiate by holding back the end of 
strikes in the Banco do Brasil.
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However, this unity was broken down by the refusal of
most of Banco do Brasil* s employees to go on strike in 1986
when they were offered a satisfactory proposal.
"The Banco do Brasil*s employees weakened the movement 
politically by refusing to go on strike. At that moment 
the private banks* employees were forced to stop the 
strike because of lack of political strength and did not 
get a good result from negotiations with the bankers" 
(Interview No. 45).
Moreover, the Camara de Compensagao (cheque clearing
house) carried on functioning, which did not cause much
trouble to the financial system. This was seen by the
conservative officials and radical militants alike as the
cause of the failure of a first strike which took place
between 23 March and 2 April 1986 (Cf. Diario de Pernambuco,
8 May 1986). The result was that the movement weakened because
private banks’ employees could no longer rely on being backed
by their counterparts in the public sector. On the other hand,
employers were able to exploit the internal divisions of the
movement and to propose lower wage increases.
"The labour leaders at the Banco do Brasil did not
persuade their colleagues to go on strike, which gave 
employers strong motives to exploit the divisions in our
fight" (0 Defensor, Dec. 1986).
Although private banks’ employees were able to carry on 
their strike for some time, they were less able to gain what 
they had been demanding, at least at the levels they were 
asking for (Cf. Boletim dos Bancarios de Pernambuco, Sept. 
1986; 0 Defensor: Boletim Especial, Oct. 1986; O Defensor, 
Dec. 1986; and Boletim dos Bancarios de Pernambuco, Sept.
1987).
This, of course, provoked bitter divisions within the 
movement. Many private banks’ employees became angry with the
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Banco do Brasil's employees, calling them «traitors of the 
categoria». According to radical militants, they had to 
rebuild the fabric of the union movement in this sector. It 
seems that after this event private banks’ employees have 
become less dependent in terms of expectations on the role to 
be played by the Banco do Brasil. This has led to some 
differentiation in terms of what employees of different banks 
have got from their negotiations with employers (Cf. interview 
No. 54). However, the radical militants have been trying, 
mainly after they took over the union in 1988, to build unity 
around these differences (Cf. interview No. 47). Their 
strategy has been to draw up lists of demands which 
incorporate what has already been won by some ranks of the 
categoria. In other words, if employees of the Banco do Brasil 
have won a given demand which is important for the movement 
as a whole, the union campaigns around this and other issues 
for the whole categoria. This has been so in order to overcome 
some feeling within the movement that the Banco do Brasil's 
employees are the «aristocrats» because of the level of their 
wages and the strategic importance of the bank. The union has 
been able to rebuild the unity of the movement by arguing that 
the categoria has to fight to win what the Banco do Brasil's 
employees have already got, and not the other way around.
6. THE ROLE OF THE WORKERS’ COMMITTEES AND THE NEW DEMANDS
Some authors have argued that the «new unionism» emerged 
through the existence of workers* committees. According to 
Maroni [1982], the main characteristic of the strikes of May 
1978 in Sao Paulo was the role played by such committees.
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These strikes were not organized by the unions. Instead, they 
were organized by the workers’ committees, which were not 
formally linked to union structure. Militants had been 
organizing committees to strengthen the position of the 
workers vis-a-vis the employers. Thus, these committees were 
established as a means of organizing the workers at their 
workplace and helping them to channel their demands. This was 
made possible because such committees were in touch with 
demands arising from the workplace. When strikes occurred and 
the unions were called in, the workers refused to let them 
play any role. Instead, they elected their own committees to 
negotiate with the employers.
Humphrey also viewed this as an important point for 
strengthening the power of the unions in negotiations. As he 
points out:
”...[A] problem that faces the unions is the question of 
trade-union organization in the workplace. In 1978 and 
1979, many firms responded to the strike movements by 
firing those workers considered to be the organizers, and 
as a result of this policy, the unions were weaker by 
mid-1979 than they had been a year earlier" [1979a:82].
In this section I shall analyse the role the workers’ 
committees played in the emergence of new demands in 
Pernambuco. My argument is that such committees played a minor 
role (For a similar point, see Keck [1989:266ff.] ) . Left-wing 
militants took over most of the unions without the previous 
existence of factory/workers’ committees. The only experience 
of such a committee was that of the metalworkers. In other 
cases the committees were established after left-wing 
militants took over the unions. In other words, committees did 
not contribute, at least in Pernambuco, towards the emergence 
of the «new unionism» and new demands. Instead, the unions
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have played an important role in establishing them.
What seems to have happened was that during the process 
of wage campaigns, radical militants put pressure on the 
conservative union officials to form wage committees, which 
would then negotiate on behalf of the workers. Therefore, they 
did not play the role attributed to the workers* committees 
by Maroni for the case of Sao Paulo. According to her, such 
committees existed before formal wage campaigns took place and 
they played an important role in organizing the rank-and-file 
to strike and win their demands.
Mangabeira [1991] has shown that there is a link between 
the «new unionism» and disputes arising from the shop-floor. 
However, she also shows that the «new unionism)) union she 
analysed was able to incorporate new demands in spite of the 
difficulties in implementing factory committees.
In Pernambuco, committees arising from the workplace did 
not exist prior to the emergence of the «new unionism», apart 
from the case of the Metalworkers* Union. In fact, a 
clandestine committee existed in one factory in the metal 
sector. Many of the radical militants who took over the 
Metalworkers* Union in 1981 were members of this committee 
and, as seen above, they influenced the list of demands in 
1978. However, they did not do so as a factory committee, but 
as members of a wider group who opposed the conservative 
officials.
When these radical unionists took over the union in 1981 
the establishment of factory committees continued to be 
pursued without much success. These unionists were finally 
able to establish one committee in the COSINOR in the mid- 
1980s, which did not survive long in the face of fierce
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repression undertaken by the management. However, in spite of 
these facts, this union has been successful in presenting new 
demands. A look at the kind of demands presented by this union 
shows that although factory committees have not been 
established the union has presented demands arising from the 
shop-floor, which are directly linked to the workplace 
environment.
Also the Bank Workers* Union did not have workers* 
committees up to the mid-1980s. Moreover, contrary to the 
experience of the Metalworkers* Union, when a committee was 
established in this sector it was not linked to the union. 
Indeed, the members of this committee were also members of the 
opposition group.
This committee has played a minor role in the whole 
movement in this sector because its influence is restricted 
to the Banco do Brasil. Therefore, other employees have not, 
in this sector, counted on it to express their demands. 
However, new demands have been added to the lists of demands 
presented each year in spite of the fact that such committees 
were not widespread throughout the whole sector and that the 
conservative officials did nothing in order to have them 
established.
Both the Teachers* Association and Union have never 
succeeded in winning the right to establish teachers* 
committees. However, since 1979 these labour organizations 
have been in the forefront of the labour movement in 
Pernambuco. In fact, in the case of the Teachers* Union, the 
different political factions within the union managed to 
present new demands which were related to problems faced by 
the rank-and-file. Although part of this opposition had to
270
share power with the «old guard)), since 1979 communists and 
Trotskyists alike started putting forward new demands not only 
related to new aspects of labour relations to be regulated but 
also in relation to new indexes related to wage increases. 
This happened in spite of the fact that the radicalism of the 
new unionists was not strong enough to break the resistance 
of school owners in order to establish workers* committees. 
On the other hand, when the Teachers* Association was not able 
to present any demands at all this happened because of 
government pressure on this organization. But as soon as the 
association was able to recover, it once again started putting 
forward demands related to both economic, political and 
professional aspects of working life.
Both the Urban Workers* and the Data Processing Workers* 
Unions are perhaps the most successful labour organizations 
in this sample to establish workers* committees. The former 
started establishing them from 1985 and has won the right to 
establish these committees in the three companies where it 
unionizes workers. The latter has been establishing such 
committees in the state-owned companies since 1988. However, 
when these unions started presenting new demands which were 
different from the «old» unionism in qualitative and 
quantitative terms they did so without being helped by such 
committees. What seems to have happened is that these 
committees have been established as an expansion of union 
power. In fact, the former started presenting new demands from 
1979 when the radical opposition group was able to influence 
the list of demands and continued to do so after it took over 
the union in 1980. The latter was founded in 1985 and since 
then had been presenting demands related to many aspects of
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working life.
What seems a much more common experience is the election 
of different committees which are temporary. In fact, since 
1979 when the first signs of a «new unionism^ emerged in 
Pernambuco, a very common experience has been that of wage 
committees (See M.H.M. Alves [1984:91] and [1989:54]). This 
constitutes a common factor for all these unions. This was a 
strategy of radical unionists to participate in union affairs 
and influence the demands which were to be negotiated. The 
role to be played by these committees has been to write down 
the demands suggested by a given categoria and negotiate them 
together with union officials. These committees have a short 
lifespan circumscribed by periods of wage campaigns. Of 
course, they have the right to job stability for some time 
after wage campaigns in order to avoid managerial pressures 
but they have not played a major role in union structure in 
terms of being a permanent «bridge» between the unions and the 
shop-floor.
The emergence of «new» demands seems to be due to the new 
kind of relationship between radical militants and/or union 
officials, and the rank-and-file. In fact, one remembers that 
the «old guard» did not care much about the membership having 
a say on the lists of demands (Cf., for example, interviews 
Nos. 4, 7 and 8). They used to present a very short list of 
demands which were mainly linked to wage increases and which 
reproduced the indexes decreed by the government. The rank- 
and-file had only the right to know that their wages had been 
increased. The emergence of the «new unionism^ means that this 
relationship has changed. Radical militants asked for 
assemblies in which the rank-and-file could express their
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demands. They also started going to factory gates in order to 
find out what the membership’s demands are. A third means of 
doing so has been the increasing use of questionnaires which 
are distributed by these militants in order to ascertain what 
the membership wishes to demand and its main problems.
Therefore, according to data presented here, factory or 
workers* committees have not played a major role at all, at 
least in Pernambuco, in putting forward new demands. These new 
demands have arisen from the new kind of relationship between 
militants and/or officials, and the membership through which 
the latter started playing an important role in the framing 
of lists of demands to be discussed during the negotiations 
for renewal of annual agreements. When these committees were 
established, they were simply used as a means by which the 
unions could reinforce their presence at the workplace.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to discuss four related 
aspects of the emergence of the so-called «new» demands. 
Firstly, there was analysis of the evolution of these «new» 
demands and the extent to which they were new demands. 
Moreover, there was analysis of the extent to which the rank- 
and-file has been willing to pursue these «new» demands in 
face of the high inflation rates that have been hitting the 
country. Thirdly, there was analysis of the internal divisions 
of the categorias and how this affected the efforts of the 
«new unionism» to win demands. Finally, came analysis of the 
role of factory/workers * committees in the emergence of «new» 
demands.
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It was shown that undoubtedly the emergence of radical 
militants and their participation in union affairs affected 
the quality and quantity of demands the unions have been 
putting forward to be negotiated. These groups have influenced 
union life by pointing out the need for new demands to be 
negotiated. These «new» demands are related to issues ranging 
from wage increases to professional aspects of the labour 
world. However, these «new» demands have been put forward in 
a context of high inflation rates. There is evidence that this 
has limited both the range of effort and the rank-and-file's 
willingness to carry out strikes and other forms of industrial 
action for demands other than economic ones when offered a 
reasonable wage increase.
Most of the categorias have been led by militants of 
higher ranks. On the other hand, «core workers)) who earn 
better wages and occupy strategic sectors have played a major 
role in disputes throughout the 1980s (See Hill [1981:143]). 
It was also shown that the divisions within the categorias 
were exploited by employers in order to weaken labour action. 
Thus, this has presented the unions with additional problems 
in order to unify the rank-and-file around a single strategy. 
When employers were successful, this affected the outcome of 
benefits, both in terms of quality and quantity, won by the 
unions, as in the case of the 1986 wage campaign in the 
banking sector. Thus, it was shown that strategic workers have 
power to influence the outcome of disputes.
Finally, it was also shown that although there is a close 
link between the new demands and shop-floor politics, factory/ 
workers* committees played a minor role in the emergence of 
these «new» demands. Indeed, «new» demands emerged from the
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new kind of relationship between radical militants and/or 
union officials, and the rank-and-file by the use of some 
means by which they have been able to ascertain what the 
membership seeks to demand.
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C H A P T E R  VI
SOURCES OE UNION MILITANCY II: 
UNIONS, LEVELS OF NEGOTIATION AND
STRIKES
1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is the analysis of how the unions
have faced negotiations over wages and other labour disputes.
One of the main characteristics of the «new unionism» has been
its general demand for direct negotiation with employers,
without the presence of the State (Alves [1989:52]; Humphrey
[1979a:71, 77 and 84]; Keck [1989:254]; Moists [1979:59-60];
Sarti & Barbosa FQ [1983:318]; Souza & Lamounier [1981:145];
and Tavares de Almeida [1981:161]). According to radical
militants, employers and employees should be freed from the
constraints imposed on them by the State when negotiating (Cf.
70Jornal do Comercio, 25 July 1978) . Therefore, it was said,
these constraints were one of the main reasons why unions 
could not improve their gains (Cf. Humphrey [1979a:85-6]). 
Moreover, in a democratic society (or in transition to
70 This newspaper reports that on July 24th a group of 
radical militants had released a document during the V 
National Congress of Industrial Workers in which they 
criticized the fact that workers could not negotiate directly 
with employers. In an interview, Lula declared about this 
point that:
"It was necessary to show that even if we called a 
meeting about the wage level, it did not matter if 500 or 
20,000 workers came since everything would remain the 
same, because it was the government that decreed the new 
salary index" (Silva [1979:92]).
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democracy), the government should stop dictating what 
employers and employees could or could not negotiate. In fact, 
the strikes of 1978-79 in the ABC paulista were characterized 
by face to face negotiations between employers and employees.
Another characteristic of the «new unionism» has been its 
insistence on the role the shop-floor has to play in the 
process of presenting demands and participating in 
negotiations through workplace committees (Moises [1979:63]). 
This has been represented by the efforts of the «new unionism» 
in establishing factory/worker’s committees which could 
channel workers* grievances to the unions as well as represent 
workers* immediate interests in minor negotiations with 
employers. Even where unions have not been successful in 
establishing such committees, they have relied on the role 
militant workers could play in organizing other workers 
without the constant presence of the union at the workplace.
Although the division of the economy in public and 
private sectors is not an important one, as implicitly 
emphasized by Tavares de Almeida [1975] and Rodrigues [1979], 
in attempting to characterize the «new unionism», it is the 
argument of this chapter that in some cases unions cannot 
avoid the presence of the government during negotiations when 
the unions represent both private and public sectors* 
employees. Therefore, it is not the case that unions should 
or should not avoid the presence of the government. Moreover, 
in some cases, even when the government is present only as an 
employer, some unions have demanded that it also be present 
as a political actor.
Another aspect of this question is that the autonomy of 
the workers at the workplace has produced some problems of
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representation for the unions during negotiations. The
71increasing organization of the workers at the workplace has 
led to cases where the unions are barely needed. In these 
cases, which are related to public sector employees, unions 
have secured their participation in the negotiations because 
of the exclusiveness of representation guaranteed by the 
Brazilian Constitution (Cf. Brazilian Constitution, article 
8, paragraph VI. For a very good analysis of the monopoly of 
representation guaranteed to the unions by the 1988 
Constitution, see Souza [1990], See also Tavares de Almeida 
[1989:162-67]).
Thus, the aim of this chapter is twofold: 1) to discuss 
how far the unions have been able to avoid the presence of the 
State in negotiations throughout the 1980s; and 2) to discuss 
the role unions have played in negotiations which, depending 
on the workers* status (in terms of public or private sector), 
are characterized by different levels of bargaining.
2. THE UNIONS, SECTORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF WORKERS AND LEVELS 
OF NEGOTIATION
This section is related to an analysis which outlines, 
on the one hand, the relation between the distribution of the
71 It is worth noting once again that the power of the 
workers at the workplace is not reflected solely on them being 
successful or not in establishing factory committees. The fact 
that unions have stressed the role workers and militants are 
to play in their own organization have enhanced this power. 
As seen throughout the former chapters, unions have not been 
very successful in establishing such committees in Pernambuco. 
However, unions have had a great deal of success in securing 
the participation of the workers in the wage campaigns and 
strikes. This has been so because of other links established 
by the unions with the workers at the workplace.
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workers in terms of public and private sectors and the 
presence of the State in the processes of negotiation. On the 
other hand, it analyses the different levels of negotiation 
depending on the status of the workers represented by the 
union.
The unions of my sample are of three kinds: 1) one which 
represents only private sector employees; 2) three which 
represent both private and public sector employees; and 3) two 
which represent only public sector employees.
A wage campaign in these unions, as in other unions in 
the country, starts with preceding talks between union 
officials and militants at the workplace, except in the case 
of the Bank Workers* Union up to 1988 as described in chapters 
IV and V. These talks are aimed at outlining a preliminary 
list of demands to be put forward for future discussions with 
the general assembly.
The next step is to promote several local meetings (Cf. 
Alves [1989:54]; and Humphrey [1979a:77]). These meetings are 
held according to geographical areas or by sectors or both. 
The aim of such meetings is to get to know what both general
and specific demands of each area and/or sector are. Also
during these meetings the unions try to have some local 
representatives elected. These workers, representing different 
sectors or geographical areas, will constitute, together with 
union officials, a committee for negotiation. On the other 
hand, if the union already has a structure of union delegates 
or workers* committees, as in the cases of both the Data
Processing Workers* and the Urban Workers* Unions, it will
rely mainly on this structure to build up the list of demands.
Next is the job of synthesizing the several outcomes of
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these small meetings into a single list of demands which will 
be presented to the general assembly to be amended and 
ratified.
Then the union will communicate to the employers, mainly 
through the Regional Labour Office (DRT), that negotiations 
should start (On the role of the Regional Labour Office [DRT] 
in collective negotiations, see Souza [1985]). Once notified, 
the employers will answer by trying to establish a date and 
a venue for the first talks. The number of meetings between 
union officials and employers will depend on the willingness 
of both sides to agree on the nature and extension of demands. 
If no compromise is reached during the negotiations and they 
get nowhere, the process will be taken to the Regional Labour 
Court (TRT) (Cf. Humphrey [1979c:224]; and interviews Nos. 25, 
26, 36 and 54).
During the negotiations, the unions will use a number of 
different tactics to achieve an agreement with the employers. 
These tactics will depend on the nature of the industry, the 
strength of the main companies and on the unions* estimation 
on how divided employers are.
2.1. The Teachers’ Union
This union represents only workers from private schools 
in Pernambuco. It has been demanding to have negotiations held 
directly with the employers since first experiencing the 
presence of radical militants in discussions during the 1979 
wage campaign. Breaking with the pattern of wage settlements 
followed by this union, which was to accept the government’s 
wage policies without discussion, radical militants urged the
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conservative officials to negotiate higher wage increases with 
employers.
"The president of the [Teachers*] Union said that the 
teachers will opt for direct negotiations with the 
employers and will give them a time limit for the demands 
to be analysed and answered" (Jornal do Comercio, 24
April 1979) ,
On that occasion a committee for negotiation was proposed 
by the radical militants and approved by the assembly to talk 
directly with the employers (Cf. Jornal do Comercio, 4 May 
1979). The schools* owners did not accept the teachers*
demands and they went on strike. Eventually, the State became 
involved through the Regional Labour Office (DRT) to mediate 
the dispute with a proposal of an average wage increase
intended to satisfy both the employers and employees (Cf.
Jornal do Comerciot 31 May 1979). No settlement was reached
and the union took the dispute for judgement by the Regional 
Labour Court (TRT) (Cf. Jornal do Comercio, 2 and 6 June
1979).
This pattern of negotiation has been followed over the 
years by this union. In spite of its efforts to undertake 
direct negotiations with the employers, the State, of 
necessity, continues to be invited as ultimate arbitrator in 
the settlement of wage disputes, although this is no longer
a legal requirement. This has been so because of an almost
72recurrent zero-sum game in which neither party is able to 
convince the other about the fairness of its proposal or even
72 I am not employing this term as defined by rational 
choice theorists (Cf., for example, Hardin [1982:141]). It is 
just used here to express the puzzle faced by parties in 
disputes on wage negotiations when each one is unable to force 
one another to accept its own proposal.
281
73to force the other to accept such a proposal . What this
union has been able to do is to undertake direct negotiation
around minor demands which are settled without the
participation of the governmental agencies. In general, the
process of negotiation starts about two months before the date
on which the annual wage agreement is due to be signed.
"The [employers] accept our invitation to negotiate. They 
attend the meetings, but they waste time by just delaying 
the main discussion. It takes hours and hours of 
discussions and, at the end, when we are about to discuss 
wages, they hold back. Then, we go on strike" (Interview 
No. 52; Cf. interviews No. 38 and 41).
This means that either the Regional Labour Office (DRT) 
or the Regional Labour Court (TRT) have to intervene in the 
dispute. The former has no power to oblige the disputing 
parties to accept its proposal but plays a major role in 
presenting and securing a proposal to be accepted by all 
parties (Cf. interview No. 36). The latter had, until 1988, 
power to judge and arbitrate a final settlement which was to 
be accepted by employers and employees alike (Interviews Nos. 
26, 34 and 37; Alves [1989:43]; and Humphrey [1979c:224 and 
231]).
There is only one level of negotiation at this union. In 
fact, as it represents only private schools* teachers, this 
means that it does not have to deal with different employers 
in the sense of private and public sectors. On the other hand, 
private schools are not branches of national companies. In
73 On the entrepreneurs* views on negotiations on labour 
disputes, see Abramo [1986]. This author uses data from the 
research named "Estrutura e Representagao Sindical no Brasil" 
carried out in 5 Brazilian states: Sao Paulo, Minas Gerais, 
Rio de Janeiro, Rio G. do Sul and Pernambuco. See also 
Humphrey [1979c:238-9]. For a more recent analysis of the view 
of both workers and employers on the relation between capital 
and labour, see Amadeo & Camargo [1990].
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other words, they are owned by local entrepreneurs without 
legal ties with other schools in other Brazilian states. It 
is worth noting that the largest schools are owned by 
different orders of the Catholic Church. Even so they are 
largely independent from other catholic schools spread over 
the country.
This means that this union has not faced problems in 
splitting the process of negotiation. The general pattern of 
negotiation is that described above and this union has only 
to deal with the Private Schools* Union of Pernambuco which 
represents schools* owners. In other words, a characteristic 
process of negotiation for annual agreements in this sector 
is a unified one.
Although the union represents teachers of all private
schools in Pernambuco, its stronghold is the metropolitan
region of Recife. Moreover, it is the large schools in this
geographical area that matter.
"If we stop all schools in the outskirts of Recife and 
the largest ones continue to remain open, we get nothing 
because the small schools have no importance in society 
. . .We have to stop the Academia Santa Gertrudes, Marista, 
Nobrega, Salesiano, Boa Viagemt Contato, Atual, Sao 
Bento, Dom Bosco...These are the fundamental schools” 
(Interview No. 52. Cf. interview No. 43).
"The large schools of the town centre concentrate the 
majority of the students. These are schools with from 
2,000 up to 5,000 students and if we close them we will 
cause the majority of the students to forego classes. 
This is how we analyse a strike. So that when we go on 
strike our aim is not to close small schools, our aim is 
to close the large ones for the strike to be successful.
If we close 20 small schools with 50-200 students this 
represents nothing” (Interview No. 40. Cf. interview No. 
38) .
Thus, the union makes a great effort to mobilize the 
largest schools which are situated in the town centre. These 
are mainly the catholic schools and a number of lay schools
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whose main teaching is aimed for those willing to get a place 
at the universities. It is also in these schools where the 
union has its greatest concentration of activists (Interviews 
Nos. 38 and 43). In order to secure a good deal during 
negotiations through a strike, it has to close these schools. 
Then, its activists drawn from the large schools will picket 
other medium-size schools. The small schools do not play any 
role in this process.
Such action also allows the union to publicize the 
campaign’s aims through closing the large schools. These 
factors have to be taken into consideration for a successful 
deal with the schools* owners because of the newsworthiness 
of thousands of students missing classes in these schools and 
because of the influence the large schools have on the 
schools* owners* union.
2.2. The Bank Workers’ Union
This union represents employees from both private and 
state-owned banks. Most of the private bank employees are 
hired by branches of banks whose headquarters are in other 
states. Only two of the banks that have branches in Pernambuco 
have their headquarters in this state. On the other hand, 
state-owned banks employees are from federal state banks and 
banks owned by different Brazilian states.
Contrary to the experience of the Teachers* Union, this 
union does not follow a unified campaign. Although a single 
national list of demands has been the aim of the bank workers* 
union movement in the country (Keck [1989:272]), the fact that 
the union represents workers from different legal ownerships
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and administrative levels means that it has to negotiate with 
different bodies at a number of levels. On the one hand, when 
representing private banks* employees, this union has to talk 
with private employers and follows the same pattern of 
negotiations as the Teachers* Union. On the other hand, when 
representing state-owned banks* employees this union has to 
face the State as a mediator and as an employer as well. In 
this case, while the Teachers’ Union has to face the presence 
of the State as a mediator, an «outsider», the Bank Workers* 
Union has to face it both as a mediator and as an employer.
As seen in chapters IV and V, the opposition group 
emerged in this union in late 1970s. It put forward demands 
for the union to negotiate directly with the employers. 
Although there were direct talks between the union’s president 
and the employers at that time, these did not correspond to 
what the «new unionism)) understands by direct negotiations. 
The union’s president used to ask the general assembly for 
formal authorization to negotiate with employers. However, 
this did not involve the participation of the rank-and-file 
and/or militants through committees for negotiation nor its 
participation in the making of the list of demands (Cf. Jornal 
do Comercio, 10 Sept. 1978).
There are three levels of talks within this sector during 
the wage campaigns: 1) talks with private employees; 2) talks 
with the Pernambuco state-owned bank; and 3) talks with the 
federal state-owned banks.
At the first level, the employers’ strategy has been 
similar to the strategy of the schools* owners. Commonly, 
minor demands will be negotiated while wage settlements will 
be delayed and finally taken to the labour court.
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The Bank Workers* Union represents workers from a number 
of private banks. Banks exist through a national network of 
branches in several states and towns. Therefore, the several 
Bank Workers* Unions in the country have been trying to 
establish a national list of demands as referred to above. 
However, this does not mean that there are no talks at the 
regional level. Indeed, a number of talks takes place between 
the Bank Workers* Union of Pernambuco and the Union of Banks 
of Pernambuco, which represents the employers. This is so 
because there are specific demands in each state and because 
the agreement to be signed between the two parties is to be 
ratified within the jurisdiction of Pernambuco State. It must 
be said, however, that up to 1988, the period during which 
this union was ruled by conservative unionists, these talks 
were formal ones because the agreement reached between the 
bank workers* national committee for negotiation and the 
bankers* federation was taken as valid by the parties for 
Pernambuco and a regional agreement was shortly to be settled 
and ratified by the Regional Labour Court (TRT).
However, there is evidence that the opposition group 
tried to influence the process by pressing for talks not only 
on the supervision of the agreement’s enforcement but also for 
settlement of local issues not covered by the national 
agreement. As explained in chapter IV, the opposition played 
a central role in wage campaigns and strikes in this sector 
(For a description of the typical tasks performed by the 
opposition during negotiations and strikes, see Informe 
Sindical, 26 Aug.-l Sept. 1985). Thus, in spite of the
conservative officials’ approach to the negotiation, the 
opposition’s pressure meant that talks had to be held for
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settlement of local issues (Cf. interview No. 47). This has 
become increasingly apparent after the radical unionists took 
over the union.
Two of the private banks - Banco Nacional do Norte and 
Banco Mercantil de Pernambuco - have their central 
headquarters in Pernambuco. This means that they carry a great 
weight in talks partly due to their importance in the economy 
of the state and also due to the large number of their 
branches in the state. On the other hand, great national banks 
with a large number of branches in Pernambuco, mainly BRADESCO 
and Banco ITAU, have also played a major role in the 
negotiation. Therefore, pre 1988 the union often resorted to 
the use of stoppages at the branches of these banks to secure 
any results because they constitute a strategic stronghold in 
the banking sector and in the economy.
In this sector, the union tended to use the labour court 
to validate national agreements for Pernambuco. This was a 
common practice undertaken by the conservative unionists. On 
the other hand, although radical unionists have tried to avoid 
the use of the labour courts, at least in the settlement of 
wage disputes, the employers* position towards workers* 
demands is also important. Thus, if negotiations are in a 
stalemate, the union is forced by this and by the rank-and- 
file to use the labour courts as a means to get the dispute 
resolved.
"During this year’s campaign [1990] this became clear. At 
the national level, the bank workers reached an agreement 
with the bankers without the presence of the labour 
court. However, in Pernambuco, the categoria refused to 
accept this agreement because it did not guarantee a 
temporary job stability. We had to maintain the strike 
for another week because the categoria expected to win it 
at the labour court. This further week expressed the 
willingness to fight, the workers* strengthen. But, at
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the same time, it also represented a political retreat 
because the categoria refused the result of a direct 
agreement with the employers because it was counting on 
the interference of the labour court" (Interview No. 45).
On the other hand, the union has also had to negotiate 
with both federal state-owned and state-owned banks. This 
means that if the negotiations get nowhere because of state 
and federal governments* wage policy, the union has to appeal 
to the labour courts. In the first of these cases, the 
government will be involved not only as a mediator or as 
employer but as both.
The second level of negotiations is that at which the 
union has to talk with the Pernambuco state-owned bank’s 
management. This is so because this state bank is not 
represented by the bankers* union and the state government has 
its own wage policy. During the period in which conservative 
officials run the union the negotiations were held by an 
informal committee formed by militants of the Workers* Party 
(PT). The management tried to make it difficult by demanding 
the presence of union officials. According to some accounts, 
these officials did not play an important role in these 
negotiations (Cf. interviews Nos. 23 and 47). After the 
conservatives were defeated in 1988, the radical officials 
began to participate more actively in these discussions. 
Although a formal structure of autonomous representation of 
employees does not exist in this bank, a more or less informal 
committee, elected by the employees, still exists and plays 
the main role in drawing the list of demands to be negotiated 
with the management.
At this level of negotiation the bank’s management does 
not necessarily represent a "presence of the state in the
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labour relations1’ because the negotiations are likely to be 
held without the presence of higher ranks of political 
representation. Thus, the presence of the state at this level 
occurs if negotiations get nowhere and higher political ranks 
are called in to negotiate. On the other hand, if the dispute 
becomes bitter the parties are likely to take it to the labour 
court which implies the presence of the state in the 
negotiations.
Finally, another aspect of this question is related to 
the problem of representativeness. Although there is not a 
permanent and autonomous workers* committee at the Pernambuco 
state-owned bank, the temporary committee elected to elaborate 
a list of demands and negotiate with the management plays the 
main role in the process of settlement of wage agreements. The 
union has had a firmer and more constant presence during 
negotiations as from 1988. However, its role has been defined 
as a supportive one through which material support and the 
union’s organizational assets are used to help the militants 
to conduct the wage campaign. As the union stimulates autonomy 
at the workplace, this may well mean that its role is reduced 
to being a supportive partner which entails exclusive 
representativeness through the Brazilian Constitution.
The third level of talks in this sector is related to 
negotiations with the federal government. As explained above, 
although a single list of demands is drawn to guide a national 
campaign, in practice the talks take place at three levels. 
This third level concerns the employees of federal state-owned 
banks. In this analysis I use the case of the Banco do 
Brasil1& employees as a paradigm because it provides a clearer 
illustration than the negotiations in other federal state-
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owned banks and will help to clarify the discussion.
The negotiation of these workers with this bank happens
at the federal level for at least three major reasons: 1) the
federal government is not a member of the bankers* union; 2)
the federal government has its own wage policy for the public
sector; and 3) the bank*s wage and personnel policies are also
centralized in Brasilia.
"Everything is centralized by the bank’s general 
management in Brasilia. What we do in the branches is to 
execute policies. My task is to supervise these policies, 
and the development of specific training programmes for 
this branch by trying to adapt it to the bank’s programm 
and the relationship with this branch’s staff. The 
negotiation of wages happens at the national level 
through employees* and the bank’s representatives and 
they decide everything. Here we just try to define a 
common framework for everybody’s behaviour during a 
strike but we do not negotiate values nor sit down to 
settle an agreement because this happens at the national 
level" (Interview No. 51).
The national committee for negotiation is formed by 
workers’ delegates (part of the formal structure of 
representation at the workplace) and representatives elected 
especially for it (part of a temporary structure of 
representation) plus officials of some Bank Workers’ Unions 
in the country. The role of the union seems to be the 
coordination of political support for this negotiation as well 
as providing a «bridge» between this level and the other 
levels described above in order to link together negotiations 
on several fronts. The union also participates for two 
political reasons: 1) the Brazilian Constitution guarantees
the right of exclusive representation to the union. Therefore, 
there cannot be a settlement of wage agreement without the 
signature of the union. If the Banco do Brasil*s employees, 
for example, go on strike, it is the union’s right (or duty), 
within the framework of the law, to organize the strike and
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notify the bank’s management. Finally, if the bank’s employees 
want to take the dispute to the labour court it is the duty 
(or right) of the union to do so; and 2) because of the 
weakness of the delegates and representatives position without 
wider grassroots political support. According to a union 
off icial:
"Look at the Banco do Brasil, for instance. There is a 
National Association of Banco do Brasil*s Staff. However, 
it is directed by the management, it is the bank that 
elects the association’s officials. This association is 
pelega. The same would happen to the organization of the 
delegates without the support of the union. The employees 
need us" (Interview No. 47).
At this level the presence of the union is needed because 
of the exclusiveness of representation and the political 
support it provides for the participants of the national 
committee for negotiation. However, in the long term this 
poses a problem of representativeness. If Banco do Brasil*s 
employees are capable of developing a firm structure for 
negotiation strong enough to withstand the management’s 
manoeuvres aiming to control it, it is possible that the role 
played by the union will decrease to the point where the 
agreement is signed only because of its constitutional right 
(duty) to do so.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this is not likely 
to happen in a scenario where there is a tough governmental 
approach to labour relations and particularly towards the 
autonomous organization of employees in the public sector. 
Therefore, being the union an organization which exists 
independently from the government’s willingness to accept it 
or not, it is likely to continue to perform a fundamental role 
in labour relations and settlements of annual agreements.
On the other hand, labour relations at this level are
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characterized by the presence of the state both as an employer 
arid as a «mediator». When the negotiating parties find 
themselves in a stalemate the dispute has to be taken to the 
Supreme Labour Court (TST) which is part of the state 
apparatus.
2.3. The Metalworkers’ Union
As seen in chapters II and V, the way the conservative 
leadership of this union behaved towards the rank-and-file 
during annual wage campaigns was not different from the 
experience of other unions ruled by «old guard» unionists. The 
process of wage settlement was like an annual ritual in which 
the union and employers merely signed an agreement which 
established the increases allowed by the government (See 
Humphrey [1979a:78]; and Moists [1979:55]).
This union represents workers from a number of private
companies and the federal state-owned COSINOR. However, unlike
the federal state-owned banks, the COSINOR enjoys far more
administrative autonomy and the process of negotiation for
wage settlements follows the pattern of that for private 
74companies .
The data available shows that the «new unionism» 
militants have tried to diminish the presence of the State in 
direct talks with the employers. The process of negotiation 
for wage settlements involves a series of preliminary 
discussions with the rank-and-file about a list of demands to
74 See Mangabeira [1991] for an analysis of negotiations 
in a similar company - the CSN - in Volta Redonda, Rio de 
Janeiro state, Brazil.
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be negotiated. During this preliminary process a committee for 
negotiation is elected to participate in talks with employers.
Once again, if no agreement is reached during these 
talks, as frequently occurs, the disputes are taken to be 
judged by the Regional Labour Court (TRT).
In the case of the federal state-owned COSINOR, in 
Pernambuco the negotiations take place between union officials 
and management. Although wage policy for this company is to 
some extent dictated by the wage policy of the government, it 
has more autonomy in terms of direct negotiation with the 
union. One could say that labour relations and negotiations 
in this company resembles that which occurs in the private 
sector. On the other hand, it is worth saying that, contrary 
to the experience of the Banco do Brasil in the banking 
sector, this company is not a branch of a national company nor 
plays the same strategic role as the Banco do Brasil. Thus, 
wage and other labour disputes settlements are likely to occur 
in Pernambuco without any interference from the federal 
government. This means that the Metalworkers* Union has been 
able to develop a more unified campaign in which it has to 
face only one level of talks.
The negotiations for the renewal of annual agreements in 
this union resemble the pattern followed by the Teachers* 
Union. It has sought to undertake direct talks with employers. 
However, when negotiations reach a deadlock, the negotiating 
parties are likely to take their case to the labour court.
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2.4. The Data Processing Workers* Union
The structure of representation of this union resembles 
that of the Bank Workers* Union. It unionizes data processing 
workers from private and municipal-, state- and federal state- 
owned companies.
This union was founded by radical unionists who embrace 
the idea that negotiations between unions and employers should 
be free from state intervention. However, in practice, this 
has proved difficult either due to intransigent employers 
being unwilling to negotiate or to political strategies by 
which the union tries to improve its position in the 
negotiations by involving the government as a political actor.
The first of these cases may occur when the union and 
private employers face a stalemate and get nowhere because 
each party is unable to convince the other into acceptance of 
its proposal. On the other hand, this is also likely to happen 
in negotiations where the union represents federal employees.
The second case happens frequently in the negotiations 
between this union and the Pernambuco state and Recife 
municipal governments. The Pernambuco government owns the 
FISEPE-CETEPE, and Recife municipal government owns the 
EMPREL.
In both cases the initial steps in the process of 
negotiation resemble those of the negotiation in the private 
and federal spheres. It is also likely to follow that pattern 
if the parties reach an agreement and go to the Regional 
Labour Court (TRT) solely in order to ratify it. However, this 
is not always so. When the union and the management do not 
reach an agreement, the union has instituted the strategy of
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calling in higher hierarchical ranks of the government to get 
the disputes resolved.
As in the case of the Bank Workers* Union, the wage 
campaign of the Data Processing Workers’ Union is 
characterized by a national structure for negotiation. 
However, this is aimed at the negotiations with the federal 
state-owned companies as will be explained later. The campaign 
within the private companies, contrary to the experience 
analysed above, develops solely in Pernambuco because most of 
the firms are owned by local business people.
The strength of the union is based on the large 
75companies . Although the union has no precise data on the
number of companies in this sector in Pernambuco, it estimates
that there are about 120 data processing firms in the state
(Cf. interviews Nos. 24, 35, 42 and 45).
"If we want to be successful we must put pressure on the 
areas where the employers will feel most affected. So, we 
concentrate on the four largest firms because we are 
likely to force the bosses to negotiate" (Interview No. 
42).
"The agreement we settle with the largest companies will 
be a reference for the rest of the firms. We settle an
Humphrey [1979a:75-6] points out the effect of the 
size of the units on the labour relations in the auto 
industry. In spite of the obvious differences in size units 
between Sao Paulo and Pernambuco states, his analysis may be 
extended to this case. He says:
"A...factor which influences labour relations in the auto 
industry is the rapid growth of the industry itself. This 
has two distinct effects. On the one hand, the growth of 
industry and the development of large factories employing 
thousands of workers breaks down paternalistic industrial 
relations and makes the division between capital and 
labour more apparent. In smaller plants workers are under 
the direct supervision of the top management and the 
owners, and their union and organizing activities are 
more subject to pressure... On the other hand, the growth 
of the dynamic sectors gave the trade union an expanding 
base on which to develop its organization and an easy 
target for allegations of high profits and low wages".
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agreement with these companies and we do not campaign in 
the small ones. We just ask the labour court to validate 
the agreement for all companies. If we go to campaign at 
the small firms they will say that they cannot afford the 
wage increases and so on. In general, they are very 
small, they are mainly softhouses [software houses] with 
4 or 5 employees" (Interview No. 28. Cf. interview No. 
24).
There have not been stoppages involving a large number
of private firms in this sector. This is so because of another
tactic developed by the union. It is thought that general
strikes in the sector would give rise to greater solidarity
amongst the employers. The union has developed a culture of
greves pipocas (popcorn strikes), small stoppages lasting 1
or 2 hours in a given firm to cause some trouble in data 
7fiprocessing . The negotiation starts with a number of firms.
Then, the union promotes a greve pipoca (popcorn strike) in
one or two firms which abandon the negotiation to sign a
separate agreement. Therefore, the union tries to validate
this agreement for the other firms.
"A stoppage lasting 1 or 2 hours in a private firm has a 
very large, negative impact because we are able to damage 
the whole productive process. The data processing sector 
works with information. If the firms do not deliver the 
results on time, they are likely to lose their customers" 
(Interview No. 24).
This means that this union has not relied heavily on the 
use of the labour court for settlement of wage disputes. When 
it has taken the step of using the labour court this has been 
done in order to extend an advantageous agreement to other 
firms where the organization is very weak to provide the 
workers a better bargaining position (Cf. interview No. 53), 
a point which is emphasized by Tavares de Almeida et al.
See Alves [1989:51]. Cf. Batstone et al. [1978:27] for 
an analysis of disruptive power of workers concerning 
technical organization.
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[1986:340] in their assessment of labour relations in Brazil 
as a whole:
"...It is certain that the system of industrial relations 
itself contains some procedures through which the 
achievements of ranks that have greater negotiating clout 
are extended to weaker ranks through the labour court”.
The second level of talks in this union during 
negotiations for the renewal of annual agreement is related 
to the relationship both with Pernambuco state*s government 
which owns the FISEPE-CETEPE and Recife’s local government 
which owns the EMPREL. Although these are two distinct 
negotiations, they develop in the same way.
Both of them are strategic companies for these two levels 
of government. All information vital to the administration of 
the state and of the city is processed in these two companies. 
Moreover, all governmental accounts are processed by these 
companies. Therefore, they constitute a crucial sector to 
these two levels of government. A common union practice is to 
issue a threat to go on strike around the time when 
governmental employees’ wages are about to be paid. This has 
been used as a political weapon in order to focus attention 
on their own demands. Wages, unsurprisingly, seem to be a very 
sensitive area. If they are not paid because of a strike which 
disrupts the data processing it is expected that the 
government will become isolated and under pressure to meet the 
union’s demands.
The next move is to try to involve higher political ranks 
inside the negotiations. If the management is strong enough 
to face a strike without advancing the negotiations, the union 
is likely to threaten to take the negotiation to a higher 
level, which means that it will no longer be a «professional»
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or «neutral» negotiation but will be transformed into a
77«political» negotiation . In other words, the union will, 
depending at what level it is negotiating, threaten to take 
the negotiation directly to either the Pernambuco state’s or 
Recife’s local government’s secretary for labour. The main 
reason for such a move is that the management will be forced 
to negotiate to defend themselves against possible charges of 
lack of administrative autonomy or political weakness in 
dealing with the union. On the other hand, this procedure is 
also used by the union as a means to publicize its campaign 
by calling in a political interlocutor. Although, in this 
case, the government is an employer, one can say that, at this 
level, the union has relied on the state as an arbitrator. 
Higher political ranks are not called in as part of a 
professional management team to deal with labour matters but 
within their role as political actors likely to influence the 
outcome of the process of negotiation.
The third level of negotiations occur between the union 
and the federal government. It is aimed to settle an annual 
agreement for the three federal state-owned companies. This 
level of negotiation resembles that of the Bank Workers’ 
Union. The federal state companies are branches of larger 
companies and play a vital role in the federal administration.
77 Cf, interview No. 42. On the notion of politicized 
negotiations as a result of state interference in labour 
disputes, see Rodrigues [1979:51]. See also Hill [1981:163-4] 
for a similar formulation regarding Western European 
countries, where he refers to the case of public ownership. 
He argues that, at least in the case of the social democracies 
of Western Europe, the problem of distribution of surplus
"moved from the economic to the political realm, because 
in the final analysis it is the politicians rather than 
managers who make decisions about investment, return on 
capital, and the share of wages in the product".
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For instance, the SERPRO, the largest one of the three federal 
state companies in Recife, with about 1,200 employees, 
processes data for the federal government related not only to 
Pernambuco but also to other neighbouring Northeastern states.
Therefore, negotiations happen in Brasilia through a 
national structure in which the individual data processing 
workers’ unions of the country play a minor role. The process 
is the same as in the banking sector. However, there is a 
minor difference between these two cases. While at the banking 
sector a national list of demands is negotiated for all 
employees of the Banco do Brasil, at the data processing 
sector there is a regional list of demands covering aspects 
to be negotiated at the state level. These regional lists of 
demands consist of aspects related mainly to secondary aspects 
not covered by the national agreement (Cf. interview No. 42).
Negotiations at this level have relied heavily on the 
autonomous structure of representation inside the union 
apparatus. Even when the union had not yet established 
workers’ committees, it would encourage the participation of 
lay activists and militants closely linked to the union to 
participate in the national talks.
2.5. The Urban Workers* Union
This union represents workers from three public owned 
companies. This is a union which cannot avoid the presence of 
the State in the process of negotiation because of the state 
ownership of the three companies. The union has to deal with 
the government at least as an employer.
However, there is another face of this relationship which
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shows that, in spite of the rhetoric of «new unionism)) unions 
speaking against the presence of the government in settlement 
of agreements on labour disputes, there are grounds for 
imaginative use of the labour courts as a political weapon 
(For a similar case in Rio de Janeiro state, see Mangabeira 
[1991:specially chapter 8]).
In December 1983 the government issued decree No. 2,100 
cutting the participagao nos lucros (profit sharing), an extra 
that the electricity workers had been earning by then for 16 
years at the end of each fiscal year, on the grounds that the 
profits of the federal state-owned electricity companies had 
only been an accountancy result of their properties (Cf. O 
Eletricitdrio e Compesianos, Dec. 1984). The Pernambuco state- 
owned Companhia de Eletrificagao de Pernambuco (CELPE) took 
advantage of the fact and transformed the participagao nos 
lucros (profit sharing) in a fixed part of workers* wages 
worth three national minimum wages and continued to pay it, 
but the federal state-owned Companhia Hidreletrica do Sao 
Francisco (CHESF) refused to pay it, following central 
government policy.
Workers understood it to be an «acquired» right and that 
the government could not refuse to pay it solely on 
accountancy grounds. Thus, the union promoted a number of 
meetings and advised workers to take the government to the 
labour court (For a similar case in the ABC paulista in 1977, 
see Keck [1989:262]; and Moists [1979:58]).
Even with the transformation of the participagao nos 
lucros (profit sharing) into a fixed part of the wages, 
workers would suffer a loss of income, according to the
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union’s calculations.
TABLE 6.1. ELECTRICITY WORKERS* WAGES LOSES AS A RESULT OF THE 
INCORPORATION OF THE PARTICIPAQAO NOS LUCROS (PROFIT SHARING)
INTO THE WAGES (BASIS 1984)
TIME IN 3 
YEARS 
(%)
IN 4 
YEARS 
(%)WAGES
3 HMW 0.0 0.90
4 HMW 12.66 17.10
6 HMW 10.98 14.22
8 HMW 8.46 11.10
10 HMW 6.90 9.06
14 HMW 30.70 39.17
24 HMW 55.31 61.55
30 HMW 63.90 72.41
Source: Urban Workers* Union
HMW - Highest Minimum Wage
Due to these losses, the policy put forward by the union 
was to fight against the cut of the 1983 participagao nos 
lucros (profit sharing). By July 1984, when electricity 
workers of all Northeastern states met in Recife to outline 
p. common strategy to face the problem, 1,512 electricity 
workers of Pernambuco had already taken the government to the 
Regional Labour Court (TRT) (Cf. Folha Sindical, July 1984. 
On workers’ reaction in other states, see Keck [1984:31]).
The union even demanded that the Companhia Hidreletrica 
do Sao Francisco (CHESF) should pay the participagao nos 
lucros (profit sharing) during the 1985 Wage Campaign. This 
was the main point of dispute between the union and the 
management, which argued that it could not negotiate such an 
item because of the constraints established by the federal 
government’s decree (Cf. Informe Sindicalt 7-13 Oct.; and 28
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Oct.-3 Nov. 1985).
The number of cases was so high that the Regional Labour 
Court (TRT) had to distribute the processes between several 
judicial teams. The number of workers represented through the 
various lawsuits also varied. Lawsuit No. 2,796, for instance, 
represented 1,505 workers, while one sent to the 7th judicial 
team in April 1986 represented 200 workers. The total number 
of workers who took the government to the Regional Labour 
Court (TRT) was around 5,000 in January 1986 (Cf. Informe 
Sindical, 30 Dec. 1985-5 Jan. 1986). By April 1986, the 
results in the Regional Labour Court (TRT) were varied. While 
some lawsuits had been deferred, others had not (Cf. Union 
document Quadro Demonstrativo da Posigao da «PL/83» Junto a 
Justiga do Trabalho, 16 April 1986).
By July 1986, the results were generally not very 
favourable to the workers and the union had referred the 
lawsuits to the Supreme Labour Court (TST) in Brasilia. It 
seemed that the workers’ morale was not high and the union 
promoted a number of meetings to draw up a strategy aimed at 
the intensification of contacts with other unions in the 
country facing the same problem (Cf. Union document PL/83, 17 
July 1986). Finally, by the end of 1986, the Supreme Labour 
Court (TST) had ruled against the first workers* lawsuits (Cf. 
Diario de Pernambuco, 20 Dec. 1986) and by the end of October 
1987 all lawsuits had been ruled out (Cf. Jornal Urbanitario, 
Sept.-Oct.; and Nov.-Dec. 1987; and interview No. 54).
In relation to the levels of negotiation, the union has 
followed 3 different campaigns at two levels. In other words, 
it faces a negotiation at the federal government level and two 
at the state level.
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Employees of the federal state-owned Companhia 
Hidreletrica do Sao Francisco (CHESF) are organized by this 
union. In administrative terms this company is largely 
autonomous and is not a branch of a national company. However, 
it is defined as a company owned by a holding, ELETROBRAS. On 
the other hand, electricity is certainly conceived of as 
having strategic importance by the government. This means that 
negotiations tend to be developed at a highly concentrated 
level directly with the federal government. Because of this 
aspect the union has tried to develop a single list of demands 
with other electricity workers* unions within the country. 
Thus, at this level the union does not, unlike other single 
unions, play an important role because it relies mainly on the 
structure of a national team of negotiators.
On the other hand, when negotiations become difficult in 
the sense that the parties do not reach an agreement, the 
government pre 1985 used to intervene by using force (Cf. 
Alves [1989:53-4]; Humphrey [1979a:81]; Keck [1989:267]; and 
Mangabeira [1991]). This was a common practice up to the mid- 
1980s. The first strike in a federal state company to hit the 
country after 1964 happened in the Companhia HidrelStrica do 
Sao Francisco (CHESF) in 1979. The army occupied the plants 
of this company in Recife and Paulo Afonso (Bahia state) and 
union officials were prosecuted by the federal police (Cf. 
interviews Nos. 33, 46 and 49. See also Mendonga & Medeiros 
[1989:5]) because electricity as a fundamental resource to 
maintain the economy as a whole was considered a matter of 
national security.
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FIGURE 6.1. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE 1982 WAGE CAMPAIGN
AT CHESF
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Source: Urban Workers* Union, Boletim No. 2, "CHESF: Campanha 
Salarial Unificada de 1982", 17 Aug. 1982
Another major strike happened in 1982 when the 
headquarters of the Companhia HidrelStrica do Sao Francisco 
(CHESF) in Recife were surrounded by the military police armed 
with heavy weaponry, while the army was prepared to occupy the 
plant in Paulo Afonso (Cf. Estado de Sao Paulo, 28 Oct. 1982; 
and Folha de Sao Paulo, 29 Oct. 1982. Reprinted in CEDI [n/d: 
197]).
However, in spite of the political presence of the State 
in the labour relations within this sector, the union has not 
relied on it as arbitrator to reach agreements precisely 
because of the union’s strong negotiating power owing to the 
very nature of electricity as an essential service. This union
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has sought to implement direct talks with management in order 
to settle accords and has not used the state as a «mediator». 
Instead, the state has politicized the labour disputes by 
utilizing its repressive apparatus.
A second level of talks is related to negotiations with 
Pernambuco state’s government when the union deals with 
matters concerned with employees of the Companhia de 
Eletrificagao de Pernambuco (CELPE) and Companhia de 
Saneamento do Estado de Pernambuco (COMPESA). Although both 
of them are owned by Pernambuco state, the union follows two 
separate negotiations because of the different nature of these 
two companies and their different datas-bases, The former 
distributes electricity, while the latter distributes water 
and treats sewage. Also at this level the union has reached 
a high degree of autonomy in relation to the state’s presence, 
as a «mediator», in the settlement of labour disputes.
What characterizes negotiations for the renewal of annual
agreements in this union is that the campaign is split into
three different areas. This is firstly because of the
different administrative levels (federal and state
government), in the electricity sector; secondly, because of
the different sectors (electricity and water) represented in
the same union; and thirdly, because of the differences in
their datas-bases,
"We organize three companies and we work, in most 
aspects, as if we were three unions in one...We have not 
gone on strike in one company for reasons of solidarity 
with another one. When we go on strike in CHESF and CELPE 
this does not happen because of a unified campaign but 
because their campaigns are coincidental. COMPESA1s 
employees, for instance, never went on strike together 
with the other two companies" (Interview No. 46).
This poses a problem not only of political strength
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before the state as an employer but also a problem of 
corporatism in the sense that workers of the different 
companies do not envisage the fights within a common strategy. 
This has led to a complete separation of the union officials 
in terms of their dedication to wage campaigns because of 
their corporatist attitude. This has also led to problems of 
representation. The point is that when the union splits to 
pursue a settlement of labour disputes, the rank-and-file in 
one given company does not perceive the campaigns of workers 
in the other two companies as part of a whole campaign, nor 
do officials think that they are representatives of the whole 
membership.
"People from CHESF only organize CHESFt people from CELPE 
are only dedicated to CELPE and so on. This has provoked 
corporatism. There are few of us who have been able to 
break these three unions which exist in our union. Our 
discourse is aimed at a common fight, a common strike but 
we have been failing" (Interview No. 46).
2.6. The Teachers* Association
This association only represents teachers of Pernambuco 
state’s schools. Therefore, negotiations for wage settlement 
have been happening only at one level. This organization has 
been the most successful of the unions . in this sample to 
confront the government as an employer during wage campaigns. 
In fact, this association and Pernambuco state’s government 
have always signed agreements without the participation of the 
labour court or the Regional Labour Office (DRT). Even during 
the bitterest disputes, they have managed to set up 
settlements of their own without any external participation 
or arbitration. This may be explained in part as a result of
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the juridical status of the association which could not 
legally represent the teachers before the labour court during 
wages disputes. However, the Teachers* Union, if asked by the 
Teachers* Association, could act as its attorney if 
settlements were to be judged by the labour court. 
Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the association has 
ever asked the union to act as its attorney.
The association was unable to face any wage campaign 
between 1980 and 1982 because of the tough approach the 
government had taken. Wage campaigns were resumed in 1983. In 
1989 the association and Pernambuco state’s government found 
themselves in deadlock. The state government suggested that 
the solution would be a dissidio to be judged by the labour 
court. If this was to happen, the association should ask the 
Teachers’ Union to represent it in the judgement. The matter 
was taken to the general assembly. In spite of the speeches 
given by two officials of the Teachers* Union explaining how 
it could represent the Teachers* Association the proposal was 
rejected by the general assembly (Cf. General assembly 
minutes, 13 and 20 Nov. 1989).
However, the association used the labour court to act 
against the state government in other matters. Just after the 
1979 wage campaign during which radical militants took over 
the association, 169 teachers alleged that the state 
government was not enforcing the federal government’s decree 
No. 67,322/70. It was explained in chapter V that the 
teachers’ wages are related to the number of classes they 
teach. Thus, they are paid on the basis of what is called 
hora-aula (class-wage). The decree referred to above read that 
those teachers with a college degree should earn an hora-aula
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(class-wage) worth 3.5% of the regional minimum wage. However, 
according to these teachers, the state government had never 
enforced such a law (Cf. Jornal do Comercio, 17 July 1979).
The teachers, therefore, through the association, took the 
case to the labour court. Nevertheless, the results were 
varied. In September 1979, for instance, a labour judge ruled 
against the claims of two teachers but others had had their 
plea deferred earlier (Cf. Jornal do Comercio, 22 Sept. 1979). 
By the end of this month, there were 178 teachers, through the 
association, claiming payment of their losses in the labour 
court. The state government contested those decisions 
favourable to the teachers by questioning three aspects: 1)
that the lawsuits of 55 teachers could not be judged by the 
labour court because of the kind of labour contract linking 
them to the state government; 2) that 26 of these teachers 
were still students and were not entitled to earn such a wage; 
and 3) that the federal government had revoked this decree 
what meant that it was unconstitutional (Cf. Jornal do 
Comercio, 27 Sept. 1979).
As a result, the association took the lawsuits to the 
Supreme Labour Court (TST) in Brasilia. Nevertheless, in 1984, 
this court decided that the state government’s action in not 
paying such a wage was correct because there was jurisprudence 
on such a case ruling that the decree was unconstitutional 
(Cf. Jornal do Comercio, 23 Sept. 1984; and Informativo
APENOPE, Jan.-March 1986).
The association also took the state government to the 
labour court because the state secretary for education had 
rescinded the labour contracts of some teachers and had not 
paid due compensation. The court eventually ruled in favour
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of the teachers by deciding that the state government should 
pay compensation (Cf. Informe Sindicaly 22-28 July 1985; and 
Informativo APENOPEy Jan.-March 1986).
Another interesting case is that of the dismissal of the 
association’s president in December 1980. The government 
alleged that the dismissal of this official was based on the 
grounds of his work record. It was said that he had missed a 
lot of classes and this reflected negatively on his pupils* 
learning. Once again the association took the case to the 
Regional Labour Court (TRT) arguing that this official could 
not have been fired on these grounds because in fact he had 
a very good work record. Therefore, it was argued, unless the 
government intended to dismiss him for political reasons, 
there was not a justifiable motive for firing him (Cf. Boletim 
Informativo APENOPEy Nov. 1981; and Diario de Pernambucof 1 
Dec. 1981).
Both the cases of the Urban Workers* Union and the 
Teachers* Association show that radical labour organizations 
have been using the state apparatus in an imaginative way to 
pursue some of their goals. In both cases, when the workers* 
organizations took the government or its companies to the 
labour court, they did so not to get a wage dispute resolved 
but to demand enforcement of particular laws. It is 
interesting to look at these cases because the military 
government and its supporters at state level argued that they 
were a government of order and law enforcement. However, even 
when the labour organizations were defeated in their legal 
actions in the labour courts, they tried symbolically to show 
that the government was a law breaker by not enforcing one of 
its own laws.
309
3. THE UNIONS AND LEVELS OF NEGOTIATION
The processes and the different levels of negotiation, 
and the role played by the unions in the settlement of annual 
wage agreements were analysed. From what has been analysed it 
is possible to infer five types of processes of negotiation 
in which unions are involved. These types are not related to 
any particular union or industry. Indeed, they depend on the 
administrative levels where they unionize workers and, at the 
case of state owned companies, the strategic importance of the 
particular sector for the economy as a whole.
It must once again be stated that commonly the unions do 
not start separate wage campaigns for each of the plants or 
companies where they unionize nor separate campaigns for 
private and public sectors’ employees. On the contrary, where 
possible, they launch their campaigns in a unified way. 
However, the development of the campaign leads to independent 
channels and levels depending on the nature of the sector 
(public or private) whose employees are being represented.
The first type is represented by the Bank Workers’, the 
Data Processing Workers *, the Teachers* and the Metalworkers* 
Unions. This level of negotiations has developed either in 
private companies or the public sector where the rank-and-file 
is not employed by a branch of a national company nor by a 
strategically important firm. This level of talks is 
characterized by negotiations between unions and management 
and the parties use the labour court as a «mediator» when they 
are unable to reach a satisfactory agreement.
A second type, which refers to the Metalworkers* Union 
when representing COSINOR*s employees and to the Teachers*
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Association, illustrates a case in the public sector in which 
negotiations develop at the local level because neither 
represents a strategic sector nor are they branches of 
national companies. In fact, the State as a «mediator» is 
unlikely to intervene in disputes arising in these two 
sectors, as far as factual evidence is concerned. However, it 
must be added that in this second type the Metalworkers* Union 
shares with the first case the fact that in the case of the 
COSINOR the union is also likely to use the labour court in 
some cases of stalemates in the process of wage settlement, 
while the association has never taken such a decision.
A third type is that which occurs in industries like the 
electricity and water sectors. The companies in this sector 
also have a great deal of administrative autonomy and 
negotiations tend to be decentralized at the state level in 
terms of minor matters related to certain demands in the realm 
of professional situation (for instance, job instability for 
pregnant women) working conditions (for instance, safety 
equipment) and union power (for instance, assistance 
contribution). On the other hand, negotiations are centralized 
in terms of settlement of demands and disputes related to 
crucial aspects like those affecting control of labour 
process. Thus, the government is likely to be more involved 
in the negotiations because of the greater strategic 
importance of energy in relation to metallurgy, for example. 
Therefore, union leaders have been unable to deal solely with 
management. This does not mean that a union in this case has 
sought to negotiate under the protection of the state as a 
mediator. Instead, the state has interfered as a political 
actor due to the crucial importance of electricity and water
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for society.
A fourth type is that developed in sectors where state- 
owned units are branches of larger national companies as in 
the bank and data processing industries. In these industries 
negotiations are more centralized because of a unified state 
policy for the sector. The individual unions have tried to 
define a single list of demands for the whole of the sector 
but have played, individually, a minor role in the 
negotiations. On the other hand, the local management is able 
to deal only with minor cases and likewise do not play an 
important role in negotiations. If the case is to be taken to 
court the Regional Labour Courts (TRTs) do not play any role 
at all. Instead, the case is taken to the Supreme Labour Court 
(TST). In the case of the Banco do Brasil employees the single 
unions in the country play a role in signing the agreements 
because of the exclusiveness of representation granted by the 
law. However, the internal labour organizations of Banco do 
Brasil1 s employees play the most important role in negotiating 
and securing their demands face to face with general 
management in Brasilia and advisors from the Ministry of 
Economy.
Banco do Brasil and state-owned data processing 
companies, however, share with electricity and water sectors 
the fact that both are strategic to society. The former plays 
a strategic role in the Brazilian financial system, while the 
latter deals with vital information needed for federal, state 
and municipal administrations. Although the government is 
likely to intervene in the negotiations in these three sectors 
because of their strategic importance, the difference among 
the electricity, on the one hand, and the banking and data
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processing sectors, on the other, is related to the national 
administrative structure of the these industries.
A fifth type has developed in sectors where the 
productive units are regional state-owned companies. What 
characterizes this case is that unions have sought to involve 
the government as a political actor in direct talks because 
of the fact that strikes are a political sensitive issue and 
this level of government is nearer to the population than the 
central government in Brasilia.
4. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this chapter was to describe the levels and 
processes of negotiations in the unions of my sample by trying 
to relate them to two characteristics of the «new unionism)), 
namely its calls for direct negotiations without the presence 
of the state as a «mediator» and for autonomous organization 
of the workers, which, in turn, is related to the aspect of 
representation.
Clearly, the opportunities for the «new unionists» to 
take part in direct talks with employers depends, at least, 
on four variables: 1) the extent to which the «new unionists» 
themselves are willing to avoid the presence of the state (Cf. 
Humphrey [1979a:82]); 2) the expectations of the workers on 
the role the labour courts play as an arbitrator perceived to 
be fair and neutral and seen to be above society; 3) the 
state’s willingness not to interfere in the negotiations; and 
4) the employers’ willingness to take part in direct talks 
with unions and other forms of workers* representation.
Although some authors stress that "the mediation of
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labour relations by the state placed workers in a 
straitjacket..." (Keck [1989:286]), it was shown that not all 
steps towards bringing the state in are conceived of as an 
interference by a «mediator». In the case of the public 
sector, when this happens it is seen as a political weapon the 
unions possess to reach and deliver their goals as in the case 
of the Data Processing Workers* Union. On the other hand, it 
was seen that, during the military government, the recourse 
to the labour courts was also a very symbolic way through 
which the alleged illegality of some governmental acts was 
challenged through legal channels, as illustrated by both the 
Urban Workers* Union and the Teachers* Association.
The unions have to take into consideration the
expectations of the workers they represent as well. These
expectations tend to grow when workers win a very favourable
dispute through the labour courts in relation to what was
being offered by employers. Thus, it is difficult for the
unions to convince the workers of the need for direct
negotiations with employers because the rank-and-file will
tend to expect that it will, after all, win large concessions
from the labour court.
"We have sought to show the need for settlements of 
collective agreements through direct negotiation without 
the presence of the labour court. However, [some time 
ago] we had an important victory through the labour court 
in terms of provisory job stability and this had serious 
consequences for the categoria by making them attribute 
to the labour court a very important role in terms of 
favourable expectation to the disputes* outcomes" 
(Interview No. 45).
In some sectors the unions cannot avoid the presence of 
the state because of the strategic importance of the economic 
sectors in which they unionize workers. Thus, they do not have 
a choice in dealing with the government both as an employer
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and as a political actor. This point seems to support the 
theoretical model outlined by Roxborough [1981:90-1] for the 
analysis of labour movements in Latin America where he deals 
with the role of the state in industrial relations. According 
to him,
"the state is likely to intervene in the settlement of 
labour disputes in those industries where it has 
interests...".
Finally, a negotiation for settlement of labour disputes 
is a phenomenon in which at least two parties participate: 
employees through their unions and employers. The willingness 
of the «new unionists» not to use the labour courts as a 
resource for settlement of disputes has also to be considered 
in relation to the employers’ own strategies and willingness 
(See Diesing [1961] on relationships between unions and 
management during collective bargaining). In fact, when 
employers do not wish to agree with the union on the extent 
of the demands, they have been using the strategy of delaying 
the settlement of the annual agreements in order to wait for 
a decision from the labour court. This means that the unions 
have also to rely on employers’ willingness to participate in 
full talks without the use of the labour courts (Cf. Abramo 
[1986:262-3 and 279] ) .
Another aspect of the «new unionism)) in relation to 
negotiations is that of its representation of the workers 
during the talks. In fact, the «new unionism)) has called for 
and tried to implement new forms of representation at the 
workplace. This has meant that even when the unions are unable 
to institute bodies like a workers* committee, workers have 
been able to elect their representatives for negotiations. 
These representatives participate in a body called the
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committee for negotiations. At the local level, this does not 
pose any problem because the unions and these representatives 
have been able to work closely together. However, when 
negotiations are to take place in Brasilia through a national 
structure of negotiation, the individual unions of each state 
have played minor roles which lays open to question their 
proper role in this process.
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C H A P T E R  VII
CONCLUSION: «NEW UNIONISM», MILITANCY
AND UNION DEMOCRACY
1. INTRODUCTION
This conclusion is intended to be a theoretical 
reflection upon the findings of this study and its 
contribution to the sociology of trade unionism as well as to 
the understanding of Brazilian trade unionism.
Although this study is restricted to a small geographical 
area in relation to Brazil as a whole and to a small sample, 
it provides us with a number of findings which can be further 
analysed in terms of its theoretical implications.
A major theme underlining this study is the problem of 
representativeness of the «new unionism)). In fact, while the 
radical changes brought about in the late 1970s and the 1980s 
by the «new unionism» were germinating, there were demands for 
more representative unions. The testimony of many militants, 
who later became «new unionism» officials, and that available 
of many workers in documents issued in the late 1970s shows 
that there was a feeling spread among the workers that the 
"unions exist but are not ours, because they do not represent 
us". In fact, as was shown throughout this study, the «old» 
unionism scarcely represented its members, in particular, and 
the categoria, in general. "They do not represent us" 
signified that there was a gap between the interests of the 
rank-and-file and those of the «old guard» officials in the
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Michelsian sense.
This was clearly expressed in 1977 when a group of
workers of Greater Recife issued a pamphlet in which they say:
"We want to denounce the farce and emptiness of our 
unions...We want to denounce the fact that our unions are 
tied to and directed by the [Regional] Labour Office... 
So, we demand that unions be independent, run by us and 
with power for real discussion with the «bosses»...We 
demand that renovated unions participate in national life 
as the voice of the working classes... The way to a new 
union lies ahead. The unions will be ours, they will be 
class organizations, depending on our action" (Pamphlet 
issued on 20 Nov. 1977) "...[because] we can no longer 
tolerate union officials who are not for our actual 
struggle... we demand free and independent unions" 
(Pamphlet issued on 1 May 1979).
Therefore, one of the major themes concerning workers and 
militants in the Brazil of the 1970s was about the
representativeness of their unions, this being understood not
78as a quantitative relation between leaders and the 
membership, but as a political attitude through which the 
unions should act for and in the interests of their members. 
This means that the unions were to be "ours" again. In other 
words, that the relationship between union officials and the 
members was to be radically changed.
2. TRADE UNIONS, DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
Workers and militants in the Brazil of the late 1970s and 
the 1980s were expressing a general problem which has been 
under investigation for a long time by social scientists 
interested in the impact of formal organizations on the 
political action of the workers. Thus, a general implication
78 Representativeness as a quantitative relation is 
intended to express the idea of similarity and resemblance 
between the representative(s) and represented (Cf. Sartori 
[1968:465]).
318
of this study is related to the discussion of the relationship 
between leaders and the membership in formal union 
organizations, in general, and between «new unionist» leaders 
and workers, in particular. In fact, since Michels’s Political 
Parties [1962] was published, social scientists concerned with 
the problem of democracy in trade unions have tried to answer 
the question whether the relationship between union leaders 
and the membership has to be marked by oligarchic tendencies 
as predicted by Michels.
Michels’s «iron law of oligarchy» predicts that there is 
inevitably a tendency towards oligarchization within formal 
labour organizations, which was echoed by subsequent studies 
on union democracy. Studies such as that of Lipset et al. 
[1977], in spite of their findings differing from Michels’s 
findings, suggested that union democracy, where it existed, 
merely signified a "deviant case". Edelstein and Warner 
[ 1975], and a number of scholars who have adopted their 
electoral model (Cf., for instance, Roxborough [1984]; and 
Thompson & Roxborough [1982]), have arrived at different 
conclusions which suggest that unions may or may not be 
oligarchic, that is, that there is room for democracy within 
formal labour organizations.
On the other hand, Marxist authors concerned with such 
a problem have also been trying to show that there is a gap 
between the practices of the union officials, seen as 
«managers of discontent», and the «true» impulses and demands 
arising from the shop-floor. This is expressed by Hyman [1989] 
when he suggests that unions would be interested in keeping 
the «peace obligation» thus allowing control by managers over 
the workers. For him, the very existence of
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"established union-employer relations may serve, indeed, 
to transmute the very character of employee grievances, 
by defining issues within a narrow focus which shapes the 
parameters for potential resolution; for if fundamental 
questions of principle are suppressed, the task of 
achieving compromise may be greatly eased" (Hyman [1989: 
40]).
In this case, workplace organizations would express the 
interests arising from the shop-floor better than the 
bureaucratized unions because those would not be subject nor 
committed to regulatory rules present in the institutionalized 
relations between union officials and managers.
Another variant of studies in this field is related to 
the question of representativeness in terms of some socio­
economic and political variables. Thus, Handelman [1977] tries 
to analyse the problem of union representativeness by 
considering possible gaps and/or similarities between leaders 
and rank-and-file through variables such as age, income, level 
of education, percent above 50 years old, percent of urban- 
born and others related to "class and industrial 
consciousness". In fact, Handelman found that there was a gap 
between rank-and-file and leaders when considering these 
variables and that this could mean a divergence of interests 
between union leaders and members.
On the other hand, Fosh and Cohen [1990] suggest that the 
analysis of the relationship between leaders and members in 
formal labour organizations has to consider a definition of 
union democracy as comprising the ideas of representativeness 
and accountability. For them, representativeness is understood 
as the policies of the union officials mirroring the 
"expressed interests" of the members, while accountability is 
the practice of "consultation and reporting back to the 
membership". This would account for a definition of union
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democracy which would embody the idea of participative 
democracy.
Finally, Heery and Kelly [1990] suggest that, contrary 
to the claims of Michels and Hyman and other theorists of 
trade union bureaucratization, there is a widespread "pattern 
of co-operation and interdependence between full-time 
officials and shop-stewards". Moreover, instead of being 
conservative as predicted by Michels and Hyman, full-time 
officials are more likely to propose more radical objectives. 
Heery and Kelly [1990:88] also show that, contrary to what 
would be expected by both variants of critics of trade union 
organization, full-time officials stimulated shop-stewards* 
independence in dealing with the management.
3. «NEW UNIONISM», DEMOCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVENESS
The four central aspects discussed in this thesis, namely 
unions and «bureaucracy», union democracy, new demands, and 
negotiations, the nature of the employers and the State, show 
a common feature: the attempts by the «new unionism)) to
establish a new kind of relationship with the rank-and-file.
In fact, the «new unionism» emerged with a political 
agenda for changes in the nature of Brazilian trade unionism. 
Roughly speaking, the «new unionism» put forward an agenda for 
changes in the role the unions were to play in society as a 
whole, in labour relations and in the relationship between the 
unions and the rank-and-file. The «new unionism)) has achieved 
varied degrees of changes and this has been the result of a 
constant making of new social relations within the realm of 
labour relations. In spite of the obvious meaning of the
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former phrase, most scholars commenting on the «new unionism)) 
have taken it for granted that the unionism which emerged in 
Brazil from the late 1970s had a kind of social identity 
constructed a priori. In other words, the political agenda put 
forward by the «new unionism» has been considered as already 
shaped from the beginning. However, the data quoted throughout 
this thesis shows that this social identity has been shaped 
within the development of the «new unionism)) itself.
What is the meaning of this phenomenon? It means that the 
«new unionism» political agenda had to be constructed and 
adapted according to the political circumstances currently 
prevailing. In spite of such an obvious statement, this aspect 
of reality has not been considered by scholars commenting on 
the «new unionism». In other words, the fact that the whole 
of the social and labour relations involved in the changes 
proposed by the «new unionism» have been evolving throughout 
the years is not frequently taken into account.
However, we must take into consideration a general 
feature which has characterized the «new unionism» in order 
to understand the constant development through which the «new 
unionism» has gone. I would suggest, from the data quoted 
throughout this thesis, that a general feature characterizing 
the «new unionism» is a close relationship between union 
leaders and the rank-and-file. In other words, there have been 
attempts to consult and report back to the rank-and-file. This 
characteristic alone has brought about a number of changes 
with implications for other spheres of union life.
Moreover, the data available shows that union leaders 
have tried to combine their own radical demands with the 
interests of the membership. In other words, the data suggests
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that in most cases union leaders have put forward proposals
which are more radical than those of the rank-and-file. This
further suggests that the kind of behaviour predicted both by
Michels and the Marxist theory of trade union bureaucracy,
namely that union officials are conservative while the rank-
and-file is progressive, finds no grounds in reality, at least 
79in Brazil . In fact, the data shows that many «new» demands 
put forward by the «new unionism» unions have been the result 
of union officials’ and/or militants’ proposals, instead of 
proposals of ordinary union members.
Thus, we arrive at a point where we must bring back an 
early statement about the evolution of the «new unionism)), 
that is, that the social characteristics of the «new unionism)) 
have been constructed, adapted and remade. The broad agenda 
of the «new unionism» contained a number of proposals which 
have not been fully achieved. I suggest that this is so 
because of the new relationship implemented by radical 
officials and/or militants with the rank-and-file. In fact, 
by trying to be responsive towards the interests of the 
membership, the «new unionism)) leaders have sometimes held 
back certain radical proposals regarding 1) the end of the 
provision of social, medical and legal assistance by the 
unions, 2) proposals for new, radical demands, and 3) the end 
of the historical and coercive role the State has played in 
labour relations, namely the settlement of labour disputes in 
Brazil.
As shown in chapter III, there were (are) a number of
7Q As noted in chapter V of this study, Golden [1988] 
arrived at a similar conclusion by analysing the Italian union 
movement.
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measures related to organizational aspects of the trade unions 
which the «new unionist» officials wish(ed) to take. Firstly, 
there were (are) the problems of socio-medical assistance 
provided by the unions and of the apparatus itself which the 
unions have to manage in order to provide such services to 
their members. According to data provided, many union 
officials want(ed) to finish off these services and to 
redirect the resources to other aspects of union life.
However, apart from the Data Processing Workers’ Union, 
the unions have continued to provide such services. Both the 
Teachers’ Union and Association, in spite of the small scale 
of their services, continue to provide them. On the other 
hand, the Urban Workers’ and the Bank Workers* Unions (after 
1988) not only did not finish them but indeed have increased 
and improved these services. Of the unions in my sample, the 
Metalworkers* Union was the only one which overtly proposed 
to finish off all socio-medical assistance.
This fact seems to suggest that socio-medical services 
are important for the rank-and-file. In this case, contrary 
to what one might think, i.e., that the «new unionism» is 
betraying its agenda, this further suggests that the «new 
unionism» unions have been trying to meet the interests of the 
membership. If not, one might ask what is the point in 
maintaining such services? The case of the Metalworkers’ Union 
provides clear evidence for my suggestion. Its union officials 
think that the provision of health care for the workers is a 
matter for the Brazilian health service. They also realized 
that such services absorb significant financial resources 
which could be used more effectively to organize the workers 
politically. But they did not impose their view. Instead, they
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decided to find out what the membership thought of such an 
important change. They surveyed the rank-and-file and the 
response was overwhelming. Ninety per cent stood against any 
move which might result in ending the provision of socio­
medical services. This decision was accepted by the union 
officials and social assistance continues to be provided to 
union members.
The data displayed throughout this thesis also shows that 
the Pernambuco trade unions have had varied success in 
implementing factory/workers* committees. However, where they 
have been implemented, they have been used as «bridges» to 
link the unions to the workers. Moreover, there is evidence 
that they are used by union officials to get to know what the 
membership and the categoria in general wishes. This seems to 
indicate that «new unionism» officials are not disregarding 
the interests of the workers or imposing decisions without 
consulting those interested. Of course, this relation between 
unions and members varies from union to union. There are union 
officials such as those of the Urban Workers’ Union who think 
of these committees as appendages to the unions, or as a 
direct presence of the unions at the workplace, which means 
that there may be room for attempts at tight control of the 
committees. However, there are the cases of the 
Metalworkers’, Bank workers’ and the Data Processing Workers’ 
Unions in which the committees had or have a good deal of 
autonomy, which means that the prediction made by the 
theorists of the trade union bureaucratization finds no 
grounds in the practice of the «new unionism)).
Furthermore, it was shown that the «new unionist» 
officials have been trying to establish new forms for lay
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members to participate in the negotiations which lead to the 
settlement of wage agreements. In fact, there are a number of 
provisional committees which are intended to bridge possible 
gaps between the leadership and members during negotiations. 
A committee such as the wage committee is not appointed by the 
union officials, but is elected by the rank-and-file. This 
means that union officials cannot negotiate only at their 
discretion, for these committees have provided wider 
participation for the membership since the beginning of the 
wage campaign. As described in chapter VI, a wage campaign is 
a process which begins at least two months before any 
settlement is reached because the unions have been trying to 
involve the workers at all levels of the campaign. Therefore, 
instead of thinking for the workers or «guiding» the workers 
to their «true» interests, there have been attempts to get to 
know what these interests and demands are. That is why most 
of the unions have implemented geographical and/or sectorial 
meetings before wage campaigns. These provide the workers with 
the opportunity to voice their views, interests and demands.
However, this evidence does not allow us to conclude that 
the «new unionism» officials are mere "agents or delegates who 
carry out the instructions received from the electors" 
(Sartori [1968:468]). Indeed, the data available shows that 
«new unionism» officials and militants have been proposing new 
items for a broader agenda.
In fact, as I have shown throughout this thesis, the «old 
guard» officials scarcely tried to mobilize the membership for 
any action, let alone for wage campaigns. On the one hand, 
there was a passive acceptance of the government’s wage 
policies and, on the other, a lack of belief in and/or
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disregard of practices such as consulting and reporting back 
to the membership. Therefore, few demands appeared in the 
lists of demands put forward by the trade unions run by 
conservative officials.
In turn, «new unionism)) officials have been proposing new 
items previously unknown to the labour movement in general, 
and to the union movement in particular. These items are not 
only linked to new rates for wage increases, but also on items 
regarding social and political aspects of labour relations.
However, the novelty of the «new unionism)) is not related 
solely to these new demands, but also to the very process of 
negotiation and dispute settlement. In fact, apart from the 
attempts to involve the membership in the drawing up of the 
lists of demands, as stressed above, the «new unionism)) 
emerged with proposals for direct negotiation between unions, 
representing the workers, and employers without having to 
resort to the power of the State as an arbitrator. However, 
this is not viewed as a matter of principle which must be 
followed whatever the consequences for the workers are. Two 
cases can illustrate this point because of their different 
outcomes. Firstly, the «new unionism)) officials of the Bank 
Workers* Union support the idea of direct negotiation between 
the two parties involved in the dispute. Nevertheless, because 
of their commitment to consulting the membership, they had, 
some time ago, to take the dispute to the labour court as a 
result of the vote of the general assembly which approved 
pursuit of the case in the state sphere.
The second case took place in the Teachers* Association. 
During a wage campaign the association and the Pernambuco 
government found themselves in deadlock and the labour dispute
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was paralysed. The government then proposed that the dispute 
be arbitrated by the labour court as a means of breaking the 
stalemate. The proposal was unacceptable to the «new unionism» 
officials. However, instead of refusing it from the outset, 
they put it to the vote by the teachers, who refused such a 
proposal.
Another aspect of the wage campaign being under the 
control of the categoria is the final agreement itself. In 
fact, apart from the participation of the workers in the 
making of the list of demands and their participation in 
negotiations through the wage committees, they have the final 
say on the settlement of wage agreements, because these have 
to be voted on and ratified by the general assembly before 
being signed.
In general terms, considering the theories of union 
democracy presented above, this thesis shares with Edelstein 
and Warner’s study the conclusion that there are different 
degrees of democracy and/or oligarchy within trade unions and 
that such phenomena are not determined a priori. That is, the 
data suggests that there is not an inevitable tendency towards 
oligarchy within trade unions. However, this study departs 
from the study of Edelstein and Warner by showing that their 
exaggerated emphasis on electoral contests is misleading, 
since there are other aspects of democracy which are not 
necessarily embodied in union elections.
Moreover, this thesis suggests, following remarks by Fosh 
and Cohen [1990], Heery and Kelly [1990], and Hill [1981], 
that a more significant aspect of the relationship between 
union leaders and the rank-and-file seems to be the degree of 
representativeness and responsiveness towards the interests
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of the union members, and accountability, notions which are 
not present in the electoral model of Edelstein and Warner. 
In the case of the Brazilian «new unionism» trade unions, this 
has been widened further by moves towards ascertaining not 
only the union members’ interests but also what the categoria 
wishes and how to meet these interests, as mentioned above.
The evidence displayed so far allows us to go further in 
exploring the contribution of this study to a theory of union 
democracy in terms of union representativeness. In fact, this 
thesis shows that the relationship between leaders and rank- 
and-file in labour organizations can be better understood by 
resorting to the notion of representativeness as an indicator 
of union democracy instead of a focus on electoral results.
However, this contribution must be qualified even in the 
face of other studies using the notion of representativeness 
as an indicator of union democracy. Handelman [1977], by using 
socio-economic and political variables, found that there was 
a gap between officials and members of the two Mexican unions 
he analysed. But this hardly allows us to understand the 
relationship between «new unionist» officials and the rank- 
and-file. In fact, as shown throughout this thesis, there 
seems to be a gap between many proposals by officials and 
those of the rank-and-file. However, what Handelman’s study 
misses are the notions of responsiveness, that is, reporting 
back, and accountability, i.e., the fact that officials may 
propose new items, but these have to be presented to, voted 
on and sanctioned by the membership before full 
implementation.
Secondly, a more useful approach is that of Fosh and 
Cohen [1990], However, their definition of representativeness
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as being the mirror of the "expressed interests" of the
members also does not allow us to understand the cases in
which the officials propose new items or policies. Indeed,
they recognize that:
"We are not advocating here a simplistic model of 
participative democracy where local leaders merely mouth 
members’ aspirations, however unrealistic. A commitment 
to collectivism intrinsically embodies the concept of 
leadership. An interactive process between local leaders 
and members takes place whereby local leaders to a 
significant extent mould members* demands, sometimes 
moderating them and sometimes increasing their scope..." 
(Fosh & Cohen [1990:138]).
Their conception of union democracy actually allows us 
to understand the relationship between leaders and the 
membership within the realm of the «new unionism». However, 
there is a problem in identifying such a relationship as 
mirroring the "expressed interests" of the membership.
In fact, a major contribution of this thesis to the 
understanding of union democracy as an expression of the 
representativeness of the unions to their members is to show 
that, to be truly representative, union officials do not 
necessarily have to mirror the socio-economic characteristics 
of their constituents nor to mirror the "expressed interests" 
of the members.
This thesis shows that this is so for two reasons. 
Firstly, in spite of some gaps between officials and members 
in terms of their short- and long-term policies and interests, 
evidence was provided to show that «new unionists officials 
submitted their most radical proposals to the rank-and-file. 
In fact, as mentioned above, when the officials of the 
Metalworkers’ Union had it in mind to finish off the socio­
medical services provided by the union to its members, they 
resorted to the use of a questionnaire in order to get to know
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what the membership wished.
Secondly, the definition of representativeness as 
mirroring the "expressed interests" of the members misses the 
full meaning of representativeness. In fact, to be 
representative does not mean that one has to fully mirror the 
"expressed interests" of the constituents, for as suggested 
by Fosh and Cohen themselves, at the very moment when union 
officials propose new items and/or interpret the interests of 
the members, the idea of mirroring the "expressed interests" 
of the members is missing. As suggested by some theorists, the 
concept of representativeness also entails the idea of some 
discretion for the representative (Cf. Laclau [1991a] and 
[1991b]; Pitkin [1969]; and Sartori [1968]). In other words, 
the role of the representative, instead of being understood 
as a passive one, must be seen as entailing the idea that he 
or she can propose new items or shape ideas and demands 
arising from his or her constituents.
Thus, this study lends further support to the findings 
of Heery and Kelly [1990]. They showed that the leadership 
plays a positive role in putting forward new demands which are 
not necessarily expressed by the members, but are later 
endorsed by them.
Thus, the evidence provided throughout this thesis shows 
that to define representativeness as the mirror of the 
"expressed interests" of the members is to miss another aspect 
of this relation, which is: that the representative also
shapes the identity of the represented (Laclau [1991a:12]).
In fact, it is difficult to affirm that all themes and 
demands of the different categories were already present from 
the beginning or indeed were proposed by them during the 1970s
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and 1980s. A more realistic view is to say that demands are 
proposed by members and officials. Moreover, it is possible 
to say that radical demands have been put forward more 
frequently by the union officials than by the membership (See 
Heery & Kelly [1990:92 and 102-3] on this point in a British 
context).
The study also shows that even if the leadership promoted 
only those "expressed interests" of the members there is still 
room for the leaders to shape the identity of the rank-and- 
and-file. Let us consider the simple example of professional 
diseases in some industries. The fact that the workers feel 
the effects of these diseases does not necessarily mean that 
they will be able to express articulated demands regarding 
health and safety at the workplace. Thus, the leaders of the 
Data Processing Workers* Union have been expressing concern 
for the health of the data processing workers in a number of 
ways hardly thought up by the membership. This can also be 
illustrated by the case of the Bank Workers* Union. I showed 
that after a strike in which the employees of private banks 
did not enjoy the support of the employees of the state-owned 
Banco do Brasil, there was a feeling amongst the former that 
the latter were the «aristocrats», the ones who had «high» 
wages, in short, a feeling of competition rather than of 
cooperation. Had the leadership mirrored the "expressed 
interests" of the majority of the membership rather than 
implementing a policy of "political education" in order to 
better the relationship between the two parties, probably the 
losses for the membership in general, in terms of other 
interests, would have been greater than a mirror of the 
"expressed interests" of the majority of the members.
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Therefore, a major contribution of this study is to 
provide support for a theory of union democracy in which the 
notion of representativeness plays a central role. However, 
representativeness must be understood as a two-way relation 
through which members and leaders have their identity shaped 
by each other. In other words, central to the existence of 
union democracy is the fact that leaders represent (not 
mirror) the interests of the members and be responsive and 
accountable to the membership. This definition of 
representativeness allows us to explain what has been taking 
place in Brazilian unionism from the late 1970s. That is, the 
existence of a union leadership which tries to be responsive 
to the demands of the members, proposes (not imposes) new 
items and demands, and tries to be accountable to the members 
through a number of means, without failing the 
responsibilities embodied in the role of the leadership (See 
Heery & Kelly [1990:86]).
4. DEMOCRACY, REPRESENTATIVENESS AND THE FUTURE OF THE «NEW 
UNIONISM»
This leads us to a final and more particular point which 
is: what is the future of the «new unionism»? The data quoted 
in previous chapters seems to indicate that a tendency which 
has been developing is related to a more moderate approach 
towards labour disputes and negotiations. However, it is worth 
noting that this does not mean that the «new unionism» is 
becoming conservative or taking the path proposed by more 
conservative trends within the Brazilian labour movement. It 
means indeed that a more realistic approach is being taken in
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the face of the political and economic scenarios, on the one 
hand, and in face of the collective action the membership and 
the different categorias as a whole are willing to undertake, 
on the other hand.
In fact, the radical agenda of the «new unionism)) 
proposed at the beginning of the movement has been shaped 
throughout the years. This means, firstly, that the unions are 
likely to continue to perform a dual role both as a provider 
of socio-medical assistance to their members and as a 
representative of the categoria in labour disputes. Insofar 
as the Brazilian State continues to provide a low standard 
health service, there will be pressure from the rank-and-file 
to have access to socio-medical services provided by the 
unions, particularly in those unions which represent 
categorias whose workers earn low wages and where firms do not 
provide further medical assistance. The evidence arising from 
the data quoted shows that the only unions which can afford 
to terminate socio-medical assistance are those representing 
categorias which are relatively better off both in terms of 
wages and/or in terms of further medical assistance provided 
by the employers.
In relation to the role of the unions as representatives 
of the categorias in labour disputes, it seems that the unions 
will continue to play an important role both in putting 
forward «new» demands and in negotiating agreements, with the 
involvement of the workers at various levels, on behalf of the 
categorias they seek to represent.
Although the 1988 Constitution guaranteed a number of 
social rights, it is not mere speculation to point out that 
in Brazil many social rights granted by law become dead
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letters and that the unions will have plenty of room to try 
to bargain over these rights. In spite of all regulations 
brought about by the Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), there 
have throughout the years been complaints about employers not 
upholding basic rights guaranteed in the labour code. For 
instance, the labour law granted job stability during 
pregnancy for a certain period of time including some months 
before and after women give birth. However, this has not 
inhibited employers from continuing with unlawful and unfair 
dismissals of pregnant women as illustrated by the lists of 
demands put forward by «new unionism» unions.
This means that it is likely that social rights present 
in the Constitution will continue to be subject to ordinary 
settlement via negotiation between employers and unions. In 
an interview with the Jornal do Brasil (18 Oct. 1987) when the 
National Congress was discussing the new Constitution, Amaury 
de Souza, a social scientist with expertise in labour 
problems, warned against a certain euphoria which could 
«contaminate» the union movement in the face of the new social 
rights which were to be incorporated into the Constitution. 
This lends further support to the remarks made up to now in 
relation to this aspect. Therefore, instead of appealing for 
respect towards what is guaranteed by the Constitution, it is 
likely that the unions will continue negotiating the 
regulation of disputes regarding such labour problems during 
their annual wage campaigns.
On the other hand, the role that unions are likely to 
play in the settlement of labour disputes may lead to two 
different paths. Firstly, if the unions succeed in 
implementing strong factory/workers* committees and if these
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committees become strong enough to play a central role in 
negotiations as illustrated by the case of the Banco do 
Brasil, perhaps the unions will become organizations which 
participate in negotiations with employers because they hold 
the exclusive right guaranteed by the Constitution to 
represent the categoria, Secondly, if the unions succeed in 
implementing such committees but the committees face strong 
opposition from the employers or if the committees keep strong 
organic links with the unions, it is likely that the unions 
will continue to play an important role in the settlement of 
wage agreements not only as a negotiator on behalf of the 
categoria as in all cases discussed in chapter V, but also as 
a «bridge» between the several fronts of negotiation, as 
illustrated by the cases of those unions which face national 
negotiations.
The data concerning the six Pernambuco unions analysed 
in this thesis shows that «new unionism» unions have 
undertaken a flexible approach towards the presence of the 
State in labour disputes. Because of the end of the military 
government and the promulgation of a new Constitution granting 
further rights of existence to the unions away from the old 
controls, it is likely that the State will not interfere in 
labour disputes, at least in the manner it used to, even after 
the civil government took power when the army invaded the CSN 
plant in Volta Redonda, Rio de Janeiro state (Cf. Mangabeira 
[1991]). However, a more subtle interference may be expected 
in the face of strikes in key sectors of the economy. On the 
other hand, contrary to what has been forecast by many 
scholars and radical militants, the data shows that the unions 
will continue to use the state apparatus to get disputes
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resolved, because of the fact that the choice of means to 
settle a given labour dispute does not depend, since there are 
attempts to be responsive towards the rank-and-file, solely 
on the wishes of the leadership. It has also to do with the 
expectations of the rank-and-file. In other words, if the 
leadership wishes to continue to take into consideration what 
the membership wants, it has sometimes to consider the use of 
the labour courts. This means that in the face of advantageous 
agreements achieved through the labour courts, it is likely 
that the rank-and-file will press, in certain cases, for 
settlements to be achieved by this means.
Another aspect of the same problem is related to the 
relative strength of the unions at the workplace. The data 
shows that this power is uneven. In other words, the power of 
a given union varies from place to place. The implication of 
this is that the unions will continue to resort to the labour 
courts to extend advantageous agreements to segments of the 
categoria which are not strong enough to negotiate on their 
own terms, insofar as the unions do not achieve a strong and 
unified strategy for negotiation.
Finally, a labour dispute is a game for at least two 
players: employers and unions. Many authors have shown that 
the unions are relatively weaker in relation to the power of 
employers. Therefore, situations in which the unions are able 
to oblige employers to negotiate on their own terms seem to 
be relatively rare. That is, employers also have power to 
decide whether they will undertake direct negotiations without 
the presence of the State as an arbitrator or whatever. Thus 
this fact, combined with the wishes of the membership and the 
varied strength of the unions at the workplace, means that the
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presence of the State in the settlement of labour disputes 
will continue, however weakened, at least in the years to 
come.
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED, WITH 
POSTS AND/OR JOBS AND DATE OF EACH
I NTERVIEW80
1. Mr. Jos6 Leoncio da Silva, a shop-floor militant
metalworker - 17 May 1986
2. Mr. Genesio Siqueira, a shop-floor militant metalworker -
19 May 1986
3. Mr. Severino Campos de Siqueira, a former Metalworkers*
Union treasurer (1956-1960) - 19 May 1986
4. Mr. Marcos Pereira da Silva, president (1981-4), deputy
finance secretary (1984-7) and property secretary (1987- 
90) of the Metalworkers* Union - 4 Sept. 1986
5. Mr. Henri Cossart, a shop-floor militant metalworker - 12
Sept. 1986
6. Mr. Jose Calixto Ramos, secretary general (1958-60/1975-8)
and president (1965-72) of the Metalworkers’ Union. He 
is the current president of the National Confederation 
of Industrial Workers (CNTI) - 25 Sept. 1986
7. Mr. Joao Paulo Lima e Silva, secretary general (1981-4),
president (1984-7) and vice-president (1987-90) of the 
Metalworkers’ Union. He is also a Workers* Party (PT) 
Councillor in Recife Council (1988-90) and was elected 
as an Assemblyman for Pernambuco State Assembly in 
October 1990 - 22 May 1987
80 The number before each interview corresponds to the 
number given throughout the text when the interview was 
quoted.
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8. Mr. Jorge Cezar Bezerra dos Santos, deputy finance
secretary (1981-4), secretary general (1984-7) and 
president (1987-90) of the Metalworkers* Union - 29 May 
1987
9. Mr. Severino Antonio de Lima, labour and social security
secretary (1984-7) and secretary general (1987-90) of the 
Metalworkers’ Union - 16 Oct. 1987
10. Jorge Cezar Bezerra dos Santos (See No. 8 above) - 21 Oct
1987
11. Joao Paulo Lima e Silva (See No. 7 above) - 25 July 1990
12. Severino Antonio de Lima (See No. 9 above) - 2 Aug. 1990
13. Marcos Pereira da Silva (See No. 4 above) - 5 Aug. 1990
14. Mr. Alberto Alves Bezerra, a manager at Retifica 2000 -
5 Aug. 1990
15. Joao Paulo Lima e Silva (See No. 7 above) - 6 Aug. 1990
16. Jorge Cezar Bezerra dos Santos (See No. 8 above) - 8 Aug.
1990
17. Mrs. Enaide Teixeira, public relations secretary (from
1988) of the Bank Workers’ Union - 11 Aug. 1990
18. Mr. Salomao de Freitas, secretary general (from 1988) of
the Bank Workers* Union - 13 Aug. 1990
19. Mr. Jose Alves de Siqueira, finance secretary (1981-4),
property secretary (1984-7) and deputy finance secretary 
(1987-90) of the Metalworkers’ Union - 14 Aug. 1990
20. Mr. Inaldo Francisco de Oliveira, vice-president (1984-7)
and treasurer (1987-90) of the Metalworkers* Union - 17 
Aug. 1990
21. Mr. Jose Roberto Amorim Leandro, vice-president (from
1988) of the Bank Workers’ Union - 18 Aug. 1990
22. Mr. Paulo Fernando Valenqa, former president of the
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Pernambuco State’s Schools Teachers’ Association. He is 
also a former president and the current vice-president 
of the regional Workers’ United Central (CUT) in 
Pernambuco - 22 Aug. 1990
23. Mr. Jose Francisco de Morais Santos, a Bank Workers’ Union
representative in the Federation of the Bank Workers’ 
Unions - 23 Aug. 1990
24. Mr. Claudio Soares de Oliveira Ferreira, public relations
secretary (1985-6); finance secretary (1986-9) and 
president (from 1989) of the Data Processing Workers’ 
Unions. He is also the current finance secretary of the 
regional Workers’ United Central (CUT) - 24 Aug. 1990
25. Mrs. Patricia Ferreira, a lawyer and Ministry of Labour
official (Fiscal do Tra.ba.lho [Labour Inspector]) - 25 
Aug. 1990
26. Mr. Maurlcio Rands, a labour lawyer - 25 Aug. 1990
27. Mr. Horacio Reis, an official of the Pernambuco State’s
Schools Teachers’ Association - 27 Aug. 1990
28. Mr. Jose Jairo Ferreira Cabral, president (1985-9) and
vice-president (from 1989) of the Data Processing 
Workers* Union. He is also the current president of the 
regional United Workers* Central (CUT) in Pernambuco - 
28 Aug. 1990
29. Mr. Reginaldo Muniz, an economist and director of the
Inter-Union Office for Statistical and Socio-Economic 
Studies (DIEESE) - 1 Sept. 1990
30. Father Adilson Simoes, director of the Colegio Cardeal
Arcoverde (owned by the Catholic Church) - 5 Sept. 1990
31. Mr. Jose Roberto Mendonga, a personnel manager at 
Metalurgica Recifense - 10 Sept. 1990
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32. Mr. Paulo Fernando Valenga (See No. 22 above) - 11 Sept.
1990
33. Mr. Ivaldevan de Araujo Calheiros, president (1986-9) and
inter-union relations secretary (from 1989) of the Urban 
Workers’ Union - 24 Sept. 1990
34. Mr. Jose Gondim Filho, a labour judge at the Regional
Labour Court (TRT) - 26 Sept. 1990
35. Mr. Manoel Messias Nascimento Melo, secretary general
(1985-6 and from 1989) and vice-president (1986-9) of the 
Data Processing Workers* Union - 27 Sept. 1990
36. Mrs. Vera Lucia Jatoba, a lawyer and Ministry of Labour
official (Fiscal do Trabalho [Labour Inspector]) - 4 Oct. 
1990
37. Mr. Everaldo Gaspar, the Regional Labour Attorney in
Pernambuco - 6 Oct. 1990
38. Mr. Janildo Chaves de Albuquerque, the Private Schools
Teachers’ Union representative to the Teaching Interstate 
Federation (FIE) - 10 Oct. 1990
39. Ms. Florentina Francisca Cabral, an official of the
Pernambuco State’s Schools Teachers* Association - 11
Oct. 1990
40. Mr. Severino Oliveira da Silva, secretary general (1985-8)
and treasurer (from 1988) of the Private Schools’ 
Teachers Union - 11 Oct. 1990
41. Mr. Marcus Tullius Bandeira de Menezes, president (from
1988) of the Private Schools Teachers’ Union - 14 Oct. 
1990
42. Mr. Manoel Messias Nascimento Melo (See No. 35 above) -
15 Oct. 1990
43. Mr. Jesualdo de Albuquerque, property secretary (from
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1988) of the Private Schools Teachers’ Union - 17 Oct. 
1990
44. Mr. Paulo Roberto Vieira de Oliveira, a Bank Workers*
Union’s shop steward at Banco do Brasil (Av. Rio Branco 
Branch) - 22 Oct. 1990
45. Mr. Jorge Pedro Perez, a Bank Workers’ Union’s shop-
steward at Banco do Brasil (Av. Rio Branco Branch) - 24 
Oct. 1990
46. Mr. Cicero Fernandes Aquino, property secretary (1983-6),
culture and sport secretary (1986-9) and finance 
secretary (from 1989) of the Urban Workers’ Union - 29 
Oct. 1990
47. Mr. Marcos Antonio Pereira da Silva, president (from 1988)
of the Bank Workers* Union - 31 Oct. 1990
48. Mr. Edson Marcionilo da Silva, culture secretary (from
1989) of the Data Processing Workers* Union - 3 Nov. 1990
49. Mr. Edvaldo Gomes de Souza, president (1980-6 and from
1989) and secretary general (1986-9) of the Urban 
Workers’ Union. He is also the current culture secretary 
of the Urban Workers* National Federation - 5 Nov. 1990
50. Mr. Celso Ferreira de Souza, secretary general (from 1989)
of the Urban Workers* Union - 6 Nov. 1990
51. Mr. Rivaldo Melo Barbosa, a personnel manager of Banco do
Brasil (Av. Rio Branco Branch) - 8 Nov. 1990
52. Ms. Vera Lucia Ferreira Gomes, treasurer (1982-5) and a
current official of the Private Schools Teachers* Union - 
12 Nov. 1990
53. Mr. Antonio de Pascoal Camargo, an entrepreneur in the
Data Processing industry. He is a general manager of 
Elogica which produces data processing services and
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computers. He is also the current president of the Data 
Processing Employers’ Union - 22 Nov. 1990
54. Mr. Mauricio Rands (See No. 26 above) - 16 Feb. 1992
I have also obtained some speeches delivered at a seminar 
on the Workers* United Central (CUT) in Pernambuco held by the 
Centro Josue de Castro. These speeches were delivered by the 
following unionists:
55. Ms. Vera Lucia Ferreira Gomes (see No. 40 above) - June
1983
56. Mr. Paulo Rubem Santiago, former president of the 
Pernambuco State Schools Teachers* Association - June 
1983
57. Mr. Jose Alves de Siqueira (see No. 12 above) - June 1983
58. Mr. Edvaldo Gomes de Souza (see No. 37 above) - June 1983
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A P P E N D I X  XI
A R C H I V E S  A N D  T H E  D A T A  G A T H E R E D
The Pernambuco State Schools* Teachers* Association 
Archive: 1) General documents; 2) Documents on the
association history; 3) Documents on strikes; 4) Letters 
to the Pernambuco State Educational Authority; 5) 
Association minutes; and 6) The association’s newspapers.
The Private Schools Teachers* Union Archive: 1) Documents 
on the union’s history; (2) Documents on lists of 
demands; 3) Union minutes; and 4) The union’s newspapers.
The Bank Workers* Union Archive: 1) The union’s newspapers.
The Data Processing Workers* Union Archive: 1) General
documents; 2) Union minutes; and 3) The union’s bulletins 
and newspapers.
The Metalworkers* Union Archive: 1) Interviews carried out 
by the Centro Josue de Castro; 2) General documents; 3) 
Documents on the union’s history; 4) Documents on strikes 
and lists of demands; 5) The union’s minutes and news on 
the metalworkers of Pernambuco in the local press; and 
6) The union’s newspapers.
The Urban Workers’ Union Archive: 1) The union’s minutes; 
2) Documents on the union’s history; 3) The union’s 
newspaper; 4) General documents; and 5) Documents on 
lists of demands and strikes.
The Pernambuco State Public Library: Data collected from 
the following newspapers: 1) Diario de Pernambuco; 2)
Jornal do Comercio; and 3) Folha de Pernambuco.
The Regional Labour Office (DRT): 1) Data on the formation
of the unions; 2) Data on the unions* boards of 
officials; 3) Data on union membership figures; 4) Data 
on strikes in Pernambuco; and 5) Data on complaints from 
the unions on safety at work.
9. The Pernambuco State Manufacturing Industry Federation
(FIEP): 1) Data on the number of workers by plant each 
individual year and its geographical location.
10. The Agency for the Pernambuco State Development (CONDEPE)
Library: 1) Socio-economic data on Pernambuco state.
11. Pernambuco State Office for Education Department of 
Statistics: 1) Figures on teachers of private and state 
schools on a town to town basis.
12. The Centre for Studies and Social Action (CEAS): 1) Data
on union organization by economic sectors, their 
geographical location, the number of members and 
officials; 2) Data on level of member participation; 3) 
Data on inter-union relations; 4) Data on major union 
problems; 5) Data on unions and major national problems;
6) Data on unions and women; 7) Data on date of 
foundation of each union; 8) Data on workers represented 
and their industry; 9) Data on main geographical area of 
action; 10) Data on the total number of workers which are 
supposed to be potential members; and 11) Data on the 
major plants where the unions have unionized or could 
unionize workers.
13. The Inter-Union Office for Statistical and Socio-Economic
Studies (DIEESE): 1) Data on strikes with the following 
information: a) Categorias on strike; b) Town(s) or
geographical area plus states where the strike is going 
on; c) plant(s) affected by the strike; d) duration; e)
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number of strikers; f) causes of strikes; and g) 
Solutions.
14. The Centro Josue de Castro: 1) Issues of the newspaper
Jornal do DIAP; and 2) Data on the Metalworkers* Union.
15. The Equipe de Comunicagao Sindical (ECOS): 1) Issues of
the newspaper Informe Sindical-ECOS; and 2) Issues of the 
newspaper Folha Sindical.
16. The Workers* United Central (CUT): 1) Papers delivered at
workers’ general meetings in Pernambuco; and 2) The 
Central’s newspaper.
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